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EXTRADITION REFORM LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1981-1983
by
M. CHERIF BAssIouNI*
I. INTRODUCTION
O N SEPTEMBER 18, 1981 a draft extradition act entitled "The Extradition Act
of 1981" was introduced before the United States Senate.' On December
15, 1981, another draft extradition act entitled "The Extradition Reform Act
of 1981" was introduced before the United States House of Representatives.I
Hearings were held in both the Senate3 and House' on these bills, leading to
their amendment and subsequent reintroduction.5 The "1981 Extradition Act"
was passed by the Senate6 while the "1981 Extradition Reform Act" was not
passed by the House. Since no House bill was passed, new legislation had to
be introduced in the next session of Congress. On January 26, 1983 a new Senate
Bill was introduced.7 On April 20, 1983, a new House bill was intro-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University; Dean, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences; Secretary-General, International Association of Penal Law; J.D., Indiana (1964); LL.M., John
Marshall (1966); S.J.D., George Washington (1973); LL.D. (h.c.), University of Torino (1980).
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Susan E. Morehouse, J.D., DePaul University
College of Law, 1984, Clerk, Illinois Appellate Court, who assisted in this research under a grant from
the Illinois Bar Foundation during her senior year in law school.
'See S. 1639, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REc. S10032 (daily ed. Sept. 18, (1981) [hereinafter
referred to as S. 1639]. The provisions in the bill were originally introduced as part of proposed legislation
to amend the federal criminal code. See S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S9916 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1981).
2See H.R. 5227, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H9670 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981) [hereinafter referred
to as H.R. 5227].
'See The Extradition Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639].
4See The Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter referred to as House Judiciary Hearings
on H.R. 5227].
IS. 1639 was amended and reintroduced as S. 1940. See S. 1940, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
S15101 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1981) [hereinafter referred to as S. 1940]. H.R. 5227 was amended and
reintroduced as H.R. 6046 and was entitled "The Extradition Reform Act of 1982." See H.R. 6046, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H1405 (daily ed. April 1, 1982) [hereinafter referred to as H.R. 6046].
'See 128 CONG. REc. S10880 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982).
'See S. 220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S385 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983) [hereinafter referred
to as S. 220] entitled the "Extradition Act of 1983." Comparable extradition legislation was also introduced
as Part M of Title X of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, see S. 829, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), 129 CONG. REc. S 3070 (daily ed. March 16, 1983), which was amended and subsequently
reintroduced as S. 1762. See S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. REc. 511713 (daily ed. August
4, 1983). This subsequent version was favorably reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee on September
14, 1983, see S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and favorably reported by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on September 20, 1983, see S. Rep. No. 241, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Senate
has separated out the provisions regarding extradition from the Comprehensive Crime Control Act bill,
however, and intends to consider it separately. There is no expectation that the House will accept the
Senate version in view of the fact that it resembles S. 1639 and S. 1940 which the House substantially revised.
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duced.8 The legislative process is still underway, but observers do not believe
that a bill will be passed soon.
This article will analyze the draft legislative texts intended to amend 18
U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195. They are referred to herein as the "Act" when the pro-
visions of the drafts are substantially the same, and are referred to as the "Senate
and House bills" when their provisions differ. Any variances between the dif-
ferent Senate and House versions are noted in the footnotes. The Senate ver-
sion in the text refers to S. 1639 of 1981, S. 1940 of 1982 and S. 220 of 1983
with differences among them noted in the footnotes. The House version in
the text refers to H.R. 5227 of 1981, H.R. 6046 of 1982 and H.R. 2643, with
variances between the two included in the footnotes, as well as references to
committee deliberations.
'See H.R. 2643, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 CONG. REc. H2249 (daily ed. April 20, 1983) [hereinafter referred
to as H.R. 26431. The Administration's views were conveyed to the Senate and the House by Michael Abbell,
then Director, International Affairs Division, Department of Justice, and John Harris of that Division
who prepared the Administration's drafts, and Daniel McGovern, then Deputy Legal Adviser, Department
of State. S. 1639 and S. 1940 were introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Committee
on the Judiciary; the principal resource person on those bills was Paul Summit, Chief Counsel of the
Judiciary Committee. H.R. 2643, H.R. 5227 and H.R. 6046 were introduced by Congressman William
Hughes, Chairman, Sub-Committee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary. The principal resource
person on these bills was David Beier, Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary. S. 220, which was almost
identical to S. 1940, was introduced by Senator Paul Laxalt, Chairman of the newly-created Sub-Committee
on Crime Legislation to the Committee on the Judiciary.
The American Society of International Law contributed to the legislative drafting process in 1982
by convening a meeting of the principal resource persons of the Senate and House Committees on the
Judiciary, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, representatives of the Departments of Justice and
State, and a number of experts to discuss the various contending views. The views of the Administration
were more specifically embodied in the Senate bills. Other views, including many suggestions presented
by this writer, found their expression in the House bills. It was the expectation of all concerned that if
H.R. 6046 would pass the House, a conference on S. 1940 and H.R. 6046 would produce a new Act in
1982. But since the House bill was not passed in 1982, new Senate and House bills had to be introduced
in 1983. This occurred in the Senate with S. 220, and in the House with H.R. 2643 and H.R. 3347. There
would eventually be a conference to reconcile differences between the two versions before a new Act could
be enacted into law entitled the "Extradition Act of 1983." Comparable extradition legislation was also
introduced as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, see H.R. 2013, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. Rac. HIl10 (daily ed. March 9, 1983), which was amended and subsequently
reintroduced as H.R. 2151. See H.R. 2151, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. REc. H1265 (daily
ed. March 16, 1983). H.R. 2643 was the subject of hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime to the
Committee on the Judiciary on April 28, 1983 and May 5, 1983. The Subcommittee is currently contemplating
publication of these hearings. The bill was marked up by the Subcommittee and a clean bill ordered favorably
reported to the full Committee on June 8, 1983. It was then reintroduced as H.R. 3347, also entitled the
"Extradition Act of 1983," on June 16, 1983, see 129 CONG. REC. H 4102 (daily ed. June 16, 1983), and
forwarded to the full Committee. The Judiciary Committee further amended the bill and ordered it favorably
reported to the House on October 4, 1983. See Staff of House Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., Extradition Bill (Comm. Print Oct. 6, 1983). H.R. 3347 as marked up was technically never
reported out to the House, however, since it had to be accompanied by a report and none was ever filed.
This Article will therefore refer to the latest version of H.R. 3347 in the notes where appropriate. It is
expected that the report will not be filed and the bill not reported out to the full House, because of opposition
to it from the Department of Justice as well as dissatisfaction with some of its provisions within the
Committee, particularly the provisions dealing with the rule of non-inquiry and conspiracy. As to the
Department of Justice, it prefers to operate under existing legislation rather than under the new draft,
essentially because of the bill's provisions regarding bail but also, as this writer sees it, because the new
legislation provides far less opportunity for ambiguity, which is frequently utilized to the Government's
advantage, than does existing legislation and its interpretation.
[Vol. 17:4
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The existing legislation on extradition which is found in 18 U.S.C. §§
3181-31959 dates back to 1848.10 In the subsequent 135 years (until 1983) the
original 1848 Act has been amended in a piecemeal fashion ten times.II Thus
there is a need to update this important legislation on which so much of the
international penal cooperation of the United States depends. 2
As indicated above, since 1981 a number of bills regarding extradition have
been introduced before the Senate and House. In addition, the Administra-
tion, although backing the Senate versions, included similar draft legislation
in other criminal law bills before the Senate.' 3 The first version of the Extradi-
tion Reform Act was introduced in the United States Senate on September 18,
1981 as S. 1639 14 ostensibly in order "to modernize the statutory provisions
relating to international extradition,"'" although it did not achieve these far-
reaching objectives. The bill was entitled "The Extradition Act of 1981. ' l
918 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1976).
"Act of August 12, 1848, ch. 167, § 5, 9 Stat. 302, 303 (established authority and procedures for judicial
review of extradition requests).
"Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 184, 12 Stat. 84 (required authentication of documents); Act of March 3, 1869,
ch. 141, §§ 1-3, 15 Stat. 337 (established procedure for delivery of relator from U.S. to requesting state);
Act of June 19, 1876, ch. 133, 19 Stat. 59 (provided that authenticated foreign documents are admissible
into evidence); Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 378, §§ 1-6, 22 Stat. 215 (established fees and costs for extradition);
Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 793, 31 Stat. 656 (specified extraditable offenses and established political offense
exception); Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301 (judicial), 32 Stat. 419, 475 (provided for collection of costs
from requesting state); Act of March 22, 1934, ch. 73, §§ 1-4, 48 Stat. 454 (established procedure for
extradition to and from countries or territories controlled by the U.S.); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 822 (codified existing practice not previously set forth in statute); Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139,
63 Stat. 96 (amended list of extraditable offenses); Act of October 17, 1968, 82 Stat. 1115, Pub. L. No.
90-578, tit. III, § 301(a)(3) (substituted "magistrate" for "commissioner" in extradition statutes).
2International penal cooperation includes the processes of extradition, judicial assistance, and transfer
of offenders. See generally 2 M.C. BASsiOUNI & V.P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW (1973); M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFr INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE
(1980) [hereinafter referred to as M.C. BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE]. For a review of these
procedures under U.S. law and practice, see generally M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN
U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE (2 vols. 1983) [hereinafter referred to as M.C. BASsIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION]. Extradition is a "system consisting of several processes whereby one sovereign surrenders
to another sovereign a person sought after as an accused criminal or a fugitive offender." I Id., at ch.
I, § 1, p. 1. The practice originated in early non-Western civilizations, and has now reached the point
where it is a common feature of bilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements between states. See
1 id., at ch. I, § 1, p. 2, and ch. I, § 6. See also BASsIOuNi, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional
International Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. (1983) 27. The concept of the duty to prosecute
or extradite originated in the writings of Hugo Grotius, who propounded the maxim aut dedere autpunire,
which is more appropriately phrased as aut dedere aut judicare. See H. GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS,
Book 2, ch. 21, §§ 3, 4 (1624). See also 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra at
ch. I, § 2. See generally MURPHY, The Grotian Vision of World Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (1982).
'IS. 1639, the first Senate bill introduced in the 97th Congress on U.S. extradition, was also introduced
as part of S. 1630 to amend the federal criminal code. See supra note 1. S. 220, the first Senate bill introduced
in the 98th Congress, was also introduced as part of S. 829 to amend the federal criminal code. See supra
note 8.
"See supra note 1.
'IS. REP. No. 331, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Senate Judiciary Report on
S. 1940]. The Senate Judiciary Committee did not issue a report on S. 1639, but did issue one on the
amended version of S. 1639 which was numbered S. 1940.
'"See id. at 3 n.1.
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After hearings before the Senate, 7 the original version was amended and a
"clean bill" introduced in the Senate on December 11, 1981 as S. 1940.18 This
clean bill version was favorably reported by the Committee on the Judiciary
with Committee amendments on April 15, 1982,9 and sequentially referred
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 19, 1982.20 Other than
the "political offense exception," the Committee considered in a very cursory
way other questions within its competence, and favorably reported the bill,
with Committee amendments, on June 17, 1982.21
During this period, the House of Representatives was considering its own
version of a new act to revise United States extradition law and procedure.
H.R. 5227, the original House bill, was introduced on December 15, 1981, before
the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary.22 It was en-
titled "The Extradition Reform Act of 1981."123 The bill "incorporated many
of the suggestions of the Administration which [would be] ... found in Senate
bill S. 1940. ' '2' But in response to suggestions made at hearings on the bill
and through written statements,25 the House Subcommittee on Crime made
significant improvements in the bill and approved an amendment in the nature
of a substitution to replace H.R. 5227. The resulting "clean bill" H.R. 6046,
entitled "The Extradition Reform Act of 1982," was favorably reported by
the Committee on the Judiciary on June 24, 1982, with amendments;", on that
date, it was sequentially referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.27 That
Committee, however, declined to entertain any amendments to provisions deal-
ing with matters within its jurisdiction and favorably reported the bill without
amendment on July 29, 1982.8 The Committee's Report expressly noted,
however, that it favorably reported the bill without amendment "with the
understanding that the members of the committee would be able to offer their
amendments to the bill when it [would be] considered by the Committee of
the Whole House." ' 29 Committee members' views were published as "Addi-
'"See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3.
"See S. 1940, supra note 5.
"Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15.
20See S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Senate Foreign Relations
Report on S. 1940]. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not hold formal hearings on the bill.
2 
'Id. See also infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
2'See supra note 2.
"See H.R. REP. No. 627, Part I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as House Judiciary
Report on H.R. 60461. The House Judiciary Committee did not issue a report on H.R. 5227, but did
so on an amended version of H.R. 5277, which was numbered H.R. 6046.
"Id. at 3.
"See House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4.
'See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 22.
"1H.R. REP. NO. 627, Part II, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter referred to as House Foreign Affairs
Report on H.R. 6046]. See The Extradition Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on H.R. 6046 Before the Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (publication pending) [hereinafter referred to as House
Foreign Affairs Hearings on H.R. 6046].
"See House Foreign Affairs Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 27.
"Id. at 2.
[Vol. 17:4
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tional Views" in the Committee's Report."
On August 19, 1982, the Senate, in accordance with Congressional rules,
published its enacted version of the Extradition Act of 1981 in the Congressional
Record.3 ' By error, the enacted bill published in the Record contained, without
distinction, both the amendments adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee
and those adopted by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, which were con-
tradictory on several important points, including the definition of the "political
offense exception" and the court's jurisdiction to determine the applicability
of the exception. 2 However, this was later corrected by an insertion in the
Record to reflect that the Senate had enacted the bill as approved by the Foreign
Relations Committee. This minor technical error was symptomatic of the limited
and hurried attention given by these two Senate Committees to this important
legislation.
Subsequently, the House was to have enacted its own version of the bill
in September 1982 or in the "lame duck" session of November 1982, but it
did not. On January 26, 1983, during the first session of the 98th Congress,
a Senate bill was introduced before the newly established Senate Sub-Committee
on Crime Legislation of the Committee on the Judiciary as S. 220, "The Extra-
dition Act of 1983,"" which is almost identical to S. 1940 adopted by the Senate
"Id. at 6 (remarks of Hon. Geo. W. Crockett, Jr.); id. at 7 (remarks of Hon. Paul Findley); id. at 8
(remarks of Hon. Arlen Erdahl). Subsequent to the House Foreign Affairs Committee's favorable reporting
of H.R. 6046, several Members of Congress voiced strong objections to the bill on the floor of the House.
Congressman Crockett proposed provisions to (a) amend the definition of a "political offense"; (b) give
the judiciary the authority to deny extradition if it finds that the person if returned would be persecuted
because of his "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or political opinion"; (c)
impose upon the Secretary of State the duty to condition extradition upon compliance with international
law, including international protection of human rights; (d) provide explicitly for the relator's right to
petition the Secretary of State to refuse or condition his extradition; (e) provide explicitly for the "rule
of specialty," which requires that the requesting state shall prosecute an individual only for those crimes
for which extradition was granted; (f) require that a requesting state shall be represented only by private
counsel at extradition proceedings in the United States. See 128 CONG. REc. H6968-70 (September 14,
1982). Other members of Congress, while not proposing specific amendments, voiced disagreement over
substantially the same provisions with which Congressman Crockett took issue, most notably the narrowly
defined political offense exception and the perceived need to have the judiciary determine whether the
relator, if returned, would be subjected to persecution because of religious, racial, or political beliefs.
See 128 CONG. RmC. E4128 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1982) (remarks of Hon. D. Edwards); id. at E4145, E4152
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (remarks of Hon. F. Stork; Hon. J. Conyers, Jr.); id. at E4179, E4189, E4192,
E4200, E4201 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1982) (remarks of Hon. A. Moffett, Hon. G. Studds, Hon. W. Fauntroy,
Hon. P. Schroeder, Hon. S. Chisholm); id. at E4214, E4222, E4233, E4241, E4245 (daily ed. Sept. 16,
1982) (remarks of Hon. R. Wyden, Hon. B. Frank, Hon. W. Brodhead, Hon. D. Bonioz, Hon. B.
Rosenthal). Congressman Hughes, sponsor of H.R. 6046 and Chairman of the Subcommitte on Crime
in the House Judiciary Committee, responded to Congressman Crockett's proposed amendments in a letter
to Congressman Crockett dated September 22, 1982. In that letter, Congressman Hughes defended the
bill's definition of the political offense exception and failure to include political persecution in the court's
determination of extraditability. He took no issue with the proposals regarding conditional extradition
to ensure the protection of the relator's human rights, petition to the Secretary of State, and the rule of
speciality, because he considered these proposals to be merely codifications of existing practice. He did
object to the requesting state's use of private counsel.
"1128 CONG. REc. S10880-84 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982).
"Id. at S10882-83.
'IS. 220, supra note 7. The bill was introduced both as a separate, independent bill and as part of a bill
to amend the federal criminal code. See supra note 8.
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on August 12, 1982. On April 20, 1983, during the second session of the 98th
Congress, a new House bill was introduced before the Sub-committee on Crime
of the Judiciary Committee as H.R. 2643, "The Extradition Act of 1983,"l'
which is very similar both to its predecessor in the House, H.R. 6046, and to
the new Senate bill, S. 220. The marked-up copy of H.R. 2643 was reintroduced
as H.R. 3347, but was not technically reported out, even after being marked-
up. 34 a
III. HISTORICAL NOTE
It is particularly interesting to note the historical similarity between the
1848 Act,35 whose structure remains in effect to date subject to the amend-
ments referred to above,36 and the Act which is intended to replace it. The
two reforms were prompted essentially by considerations arising out of the
political aspects of extradition rather than its technical aspects. The 1848 Act
can be traced to the landmark case of In re Robbins," decided in 1799. In
that case, President Adams granted England's request that the United States
extradite an individual charged in England for a murder he had allegedly com-
mitted while in the British navy. Robbins' defense was that he had been im-
pressed into British service; he had escaped during the other crew members'
mutiny in which the ship's officers had been killed. Many individuals in the
United States perceived this to be a justifiable act for which punishment was
wholly inappropriate, such that Robbins should not have been returned to
England.38 Although the exact term "political offense exception" was not used
at the time, the underlying concept was already recognized.39
The legal basis for Robbins' surrender was President Adams' order that
he be arrested and returned to England. In reviewing that order the federal
district court sitting in Charleston, South Carolina in habeas corpus proceedings
relied on the President's directions through the Secretary of State, even though
neither Jay's Treaty with England 0 (which was the treaty basis for the request)
nor national legislation formed a legal basis for such action."' President Adams'
decision in the highly publicized extradition of Robbins was considered one
3H.R. 2643, supra note 8.
3
"aSee supra note 8.
"Act of August 12, 1848, ch. 167, § 5, 9 Stat. 302, 303.
"See supra note 11.
3727 F. Cas. 825 (No. 16,175) (D.S.C. 1799).
"See 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 580-640 (1800), reprinted following U.S. v. Robbins, 27. F. Cas. 825, 833-70
(No. 16,175) (D.S.C. 1799).
"For an historical analysis of the "political offense exception," see 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VIII, § 2; C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL
OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION (1980).
4°The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain (Jay Treaty), 19 November 1794,
8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, reprinted in 1 W. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS,
PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 490 (1910).
"'See In re Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 827 (No. 16,175) (D.S.C. 1799).
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of the reasons for his failure to be re-elected as President.
The political controversy and legal irregularities of Robbins were not soon
forgotten. In 1848, similar factors were brought to the forefront of public atten-
tion once more in the Metzger case, 3 which prompted Congress to enact the
1848 Extradition Act.44
The 1981-82-83 Acts have been prompted primarily by three highly publi-
cized causes c~kbres in which the "political offense exception" was at issue:
Matter of Mackin,"5 In re McMullen, 6 and Eain v. Wilkes.47 In McMullen
and Mackin extradition to England was denied on the basis of the political
offense exception; in the Eain case, however, the exception was denied and
the relator extradited to Israel.
The Department of Justice, through some of its officials, made an inordi-
nate issue of these cases before the Senate and the House. Regrettably, the
motivations for the revisions of the United States extradition statute were
presented to Congress on the erroneous assumption that the "political offense
exception" has been interpreted or perceived to be a bar to effective extradi-
tion. This position was asserted by Administration representatives at hearings
on the bills before both the Senate and the House, 8 wherein there was even
the preposterous and alarming warning that a continuation of such a trend
would cause the United States to become a haven for terrorists.49 This result
411 J. B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTER-STATE RENDITION 550-51 (1891).
"In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232 (No. 9,511) (S.D.N.Y. 1847). In Metzger, France requested that the U.S.
extradite an individual charged with forgery in France. The judicial determination of Metzger's extraditability
was made by Judge Betts in chambers, who found his extradition in order. The decision prompted
considerable discussion over whether judicial review could be performed in chambers as opposed to in
open court.
"Ch. 167, § 5, 9 Stat. 302, 303. See In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 63 (1852), in which the Court expressly
noted "[t]hat the eventful history of Robbins's case had a controlling influence... especially on Congress,
when it passed the act of 1848, is, as I suppose, free from doubt." Id. at 68.
"No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 13, 1981), aff'd, United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.
1981). In Mackin, the United Kingdom's request that a member of the Provisional Irish Republic Army
be extradited to the U.K. in order to face prosecution for the charge of attempted murder and related
offenses he allegedly committed against a British soldier (dressed in civilian clothes) standing in a Belfast
bus station was denied on the grounds that these charges were "political offenses" for which extradition
could not be granted.
"No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., May 11, 1979). In McMullen, the United Kingdom's request that a
member of the Provisional Irish Republic Army be extradited to the U.K. in order to face prosecution
for his alleged bombing of a British army installation in England was denied on the grounds that he was
being sought for a "political offense" for which extradition could not be granted.
"1641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). In Abu Eain, Israel's request that an alleged
member of the Palestine Liberation Organization be extradited to Israel to be prosecuted for his alleged
bombing of a bus in Israel was granted; the court refused to entertain the relator's defense that such charges
constituted "political offenses."
"See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 2, 4, 8, 14 (testimony of M. Abbell, Dep't
of Justice; D. McGovern, Dep't of State); House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 26-27,
32 (testimony of R. Olsen, M. Abbell, Dep't of Justice; D. McGovern, Dep't of State); House Foreign
Affairs Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 26.
"See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 30 (testimony of W. Hannay). The Senate
Judiciary Committee, which supported the view that the political offense exception should be placed outside
the court's jurisdiction, placed special emphasis on this testimony and written statement as "an excellent
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is hardly likely since the "political offense exception" has so rarely been argued,
let alone successfully, in the United States as a basis for denial of an extradi-
tion request. In fact, it has been successful in only two cases in the last twenty
years.5" In addition, the "exception" is rarely used as a defense - in the last
thirty years, there have been only some thirty reported cases having any bearing
on the "political offense exception." During this same period of time, however,
there have been between fifty and one hundred extradition requests per year
raising a panoply of technical questions much more important to the administra-
tion of criminal justice and international cooperation in criminal matters than
the rare "political offense exception."'" These technical questions" have received
little consideration in the Senate, and somewhat greater attention in the House.
The fundamental controversy giving rise to both the 1848 Act and the
1981-82-83 Acts is the respective roles of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches in granting a foreign state's extradition request. The outcomes,
however, were different on these two historic occasions. The 1848 Act was
designed to limit executive power such that President Adams' action in Robbins
of ordering an individual's surrender would be impermissible. The underlying
theory was that the judiciary should have the authority to review executive action
such that fundamental individual liberty would not be improperly infringed.
The 1981-82-83 Acts in the original Senate versions intended the opposite. The
Administration has sought to expand the executive's authority to extradite in-
dividuals on the theory that judicial review should not be allowed to interfere
with the executive's authority to direct the United States' foreign relations, and
to use extradition as a method of fostering friendly relations with foreign states.I
This philosophic diversity is the essence of the differences between the Senate
bills and the House bills, with the Adnrinistration's view reflected in the Senate's
more executive oriented approach.
The Act does not fulfill all of the Administration's requests, although it
does curb judicial discretion and review and the increasing safeguards of in-
dividual rights which have been more manifest in the last two decades of United
States jurisprudence."' The Act represents a technical improvement over existing
discussion of the political offense exception to extradition and the impact of recent cases," which the
Committee adopted as its view. See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 14 nn. 59, 60,
15 n.61.
'"In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 13, 1981), aff'd, United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d
122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., May 11, 1979).
"See generally, 2 M.C. BASSlOUNI & V.P. NANDA, supra note 12 for a review and analysis of the various
forms of international cooperation in penal matters.
"Examples of such aspects are provisions regarding transit extradition, priority of extradition requests,
and the rule of specialty. See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra, note 3, at 20-24 (testimony
of M. Cherif Bassiouni); House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 98-106 (testimony
of M. Cherif Bassiouni).
"This argument was raised unsuccessfully by the U.S. government in Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th
Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
"See, e.g., M.C. BAssIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12; M.C. BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXmADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1974) for a review and analysis of this developing
trend in U.S. jurisprudence.
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legislation and is indeed needed to meet the contemporary exigencies of an ex-
pected volume of some one hundred requests per year in the 1980's, and also
in order to settle some questions with which the judiciary had been wrestling
for years due to the lack of clear legislative mandate. Yet it leaves many open
questions which it shifts to the judiciary for future interpretation. In many
respects the Act does no more than codify existing jurisprudence." More should
have been done, and an opportunity which waited 135 years was not fully
utilized.
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE ACT
Both the Senate and House versions are similarly structured in terms of
the general format of sections regarding: (1) general requirements; (2) the com-
plaint stage; (3) the waiver stage; (4) the hearing stage; (5) the appeal stage;
(6) the surrender stage; (7) the receipt stage; (8) definitions and general pro-
visions. This general format was established in the 1981 Extradition Act em-
bodied in the Senate bills and was followed by the House Judiciary Committee
in its bills.
The specific structures of the Senate and House versions, respectively, are
as follows:
1. Senate Versions:
CHAPTER 210 - INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
Sec.
3191. Extradition authority in general.
3192. Initial procedure.
3193. Waiver of extradition hearing and consent to removal.
3194. Extradition hearing.
3195. Appeal.
3196. Surrender of a person to a foreign state.
3197. Receipt of a person from a foreign state.
3198. General provisions for chapter.-
6
2. House Versions:
CHAPTER 210 - INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
Sec.
3191. General statement of requirements for extradition.
3192. Complaint and preliminary proceedings.
3193. Waiver of hearing.
3194. Hearing and order.
3195. Appeal from determination after hearing.
3196. Surrender of a person to a foreign state after hearing.
"See generally M.C. BAssioumN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12.
"S. 220, supra note 7, §§ 3191-3198; S. 1940, supra note 5, §§ 3191-3198; S. 1639, supra note 1, §§ 3191-3198.
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3197. Cooperation with transit through United States for
foreign extradition.
3198. Receipt of a person from a foreign state.
3199. Definitions and general provisions for chapter."
The provisions of the Act are divided and subdivided, ostensibly accor-
ding to the various stages of the extradition process. In fact, however, there
is a great deal of commingling of substantive and procedural aspects in the
same provisions. There are also other confusing aspects in the organization
of the subject. For example, the substantive requirements for extradition are
scattered throughout the Act. A particular anachronism appears in section 3199
of the House version; although its title indicates that it pertains to definitions
and general provisions, it also contains a detailed subsection regarding bail"
which properly belongs in a separate section or at least in section 3192 entitled
"Complaint and Preliminary Proceedings." The confusion of procedural and
substantive matters in the Act results in a lack of clarity and organization which
could have been avoided easily had the Act been structured differently. But
the reason is due essentially to a divergence in perspective. The Senate ver-
sions favored by the Administration were intended to be procedural, leaving
all substantive questions to treaties which the Administration can negotiate with
much more leeway. The House versions on the other hand sought to limit this
approach and provide more uniformity in the substantive aspects of the practice.
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGISLATION AND TREATIES
The relationship between legislative provisions and treaty provisions is of
fundamental importance in United States extradition law and practice because
of the Constitution and the relationship between treaties and legislation. 9
Basically, this relationship can take one of two forms: (1) the legislation can
serve as the basis for all or most substantive and procedural matters while treaties
include exceptional matters not included in the legislation; or (2) the legisla-
tion can serve as a supplement to treaties such that all substantive and pro-
cedural matters are regulated primarily by treaties rather than by the legisla-
tion. The Act is a hybrid of both.
The distinction between these two possible relationships has important
ramifications. If the former approach were followed, then national legislation
would be controlling with respect to all extradition matters and would regulate
its substance and procedure. Treaties would be the exception; that is, they would
regulate matters not included in the legislation or negotiated in the treaty as
"H.R. 3347, supra note 8, §§ 3191-3199; H.R. 2643, supra note 8, §§ 3191-3199; H.R. 6046, supra note
5, §§ 3191-3199; H.R. 5227, supra note 2, §§ 3191-3198. H.R. 5227 contained no provision regarding
transit extradition, which was inserted in subsequent versions of the House legislation as § 3197.
"1H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199(c); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199(c); H.R. 5227, supra note 2,
§ 3199(c). H.R. 3347, supra note 8, includes bail provision in § 3192 regarding the complaint and preliminary
proceedings. See infra notes 169-85 and accompanying text.
"See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
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an exception to the legislation. If the latter approach were followed, however,
then national legislation would not be the general rule. Instead, every treaty
would become a separate substantive and procedural statute more or less dif-
ferent from the legislation. The result of that approach would be to have as
many sets of norms applied by the courts as there are treaties, and there are
at present ninety-six treaties in force applicable to 113 countries.
6 The obvious
consequence would be a lack of consistenty and uniformity in the practice of
extradition and potential jurisprudential confusion leading to increased litiga-
tion and prolongation of the process. Precedents would therefore usually affect
the interpretation of the provisions of each treaty, thus stimulating increased
judicial recourses and delays through the review process. In addition to the
obvious advantages of uniformity, reduction of litigation, and shortening of
delays in the process, a truly national legislation would also reduce the burden
on the United States government in renegotiating with every foreign govern-
ment basic substantive and procedural matters already contained in the national
legislation. Furthermore, the existence of national legislation, while it would
not preclude the government from negotiating treaty provisions that might be
contrary to it, would nevertheless strengthen the government's position in its
negotiations with foreign governments regarding provisions urged by the foreign
government that would differ from national legislation. It would thus main-
tain greater uniformity among treaties and conformity between treaties and
the legislation. The more the legislation in its specific language allows for treaties
to regulate certain substantive and procedural matters, the more likely it is that
foreign governments will insist on particular clauses which may differ from
the legislation. Furthermore, national legislation that is comprehensive, covering
substance and procedure, would allow extradition to be performed on the basis
of "executive agreement" and "reciprocity," 6 ' which the Act excludes,
presumably in reliance on longstanding and established jurisprudence, 62 although
nothing in the Constitution would prevent it.6 3
Regrettably, the general orientation of the Act is that it is a supplement
to treaties or that it otherwise applies in the absence of contrary treaty provi-
sions, but only when a treaty does exist between the requesting state and the
United States. Consequently, all substantive and procedural matters which can
of course be regulated by treaties will tend to be precisely that. This approach
"OSee 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (1984 Supp.). See also I. Kauass & A. Sprudes, Extradition Laws and Treaties;
United States (2 vols. 1979 and 1982 update).
"See 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. II § 3, pp. 6-9.
"See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), in which the Court stated:
It is only in modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon themselves the obligation
of delivering up these fugitives from justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for
trial and punishment. This has been done generally by treaties .... Prior to these treaties, and
apart from them ... there was no well-defined obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives
to another, and though such delivery was often made, it was upon the principle of comity .... [It]
has never been recognized as among those obligations of one government towards another which
rest upon established principles of international law.
Id. at 411.
"See 1 M.C. BASsIouNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. II, § 1, p. 3.
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differs from that of many countries which attempt to conform their treaties
to national legislation and in fact specify in their treaties that they are applicable
in accordance with national legislation. 64
In addition, the Act is unclear as to reliance on multilateral international
criminal law conventions as the basis for a relator's extradition.6 5 These treaties
provide, inter alia, that state parties are obligated to prosecute or extradite in-
dividuals who have allegedly committed the proscribed conduct. 66 They con-
tain no provision for the mechanism by which extradition is to be accomplish-
ed, because they remand to the applicable nation. In the instance where the
basis for the extradition request is such a multilateral international criminal
law convention, the provisions of the Act are applicable. By structuring the
Act as an adjunct to treaties rather than as the generally applicable norm, the
legislature neglected to take into account the way in which this would affect
reliance upon multilateral international criminal law conventions which con-
tain extradition clauses. Thus, in this respect the Act is ambiguous. Since one
of Congress' avowed primary objectives in its reform of existing extradition
law and practice is to permit the United States to cooperate internationally in
combatting international and transnational criminality, 67 the Act's failure to
specifically provide for reliance upon multilateral international criminal law
conventions containing an extradition clause is particularly unfortunate. Yet
because of the ambiguity of the relevant language of the Act, the courts could
construe it as applicable in such cases, as is discussed below.
VI. TREATY REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTRADITION
Section 3191 of both the Senate version and the House version essentially
provide that the United States may lawfully extradite an individual only pur-
suant to a formal request made by another state in reliance upon a treaty con-
cerning extradition between the United States and the requesting state.68 This
"These observations were made by this writer before the Senate and House Judiciary Committee hearings
on their respective proposed bills. See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 20-23 (testimony
of M. Cherif Bassiouni); House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 101-102 (testimony
of M. Cherif Bassiouni).
"For a bibliography of international criminal law conventions, see M.C. BAssIOUlI, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 12, at xix-xxx.
"'See 1 M.C. BASsIOuNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. I, § 3; BASSIOUNI, The
Common Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, supra note 12. See also Bassiouni,
General Report on the Juridical Status of the Requesting State Denying Extradition, XIth International
Congress of Comparative Law, Caracas, Venezuela 20 August-5 September 1982, PROCEEDINGS OF XITH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (in print) (comparative analysis of state law and practice
regarding duty to prosecute or extradite).
"Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 4; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra
note 23, at 3-4.
"The specific language of both bills is as follows:
§ 3191. Extradition in general
The United States may extradite a person to a foreign state pursuant to this chapter only if -
(a) there is a treaty concerning extradition between the United States and the foreign state; and
(b) the foreign state requests extradition within the terms of the applicable treaty.
S. 220, supra note 7, § 3191; S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3191; S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3191.
§ 3191. General statement of requirements for extradition
The United States may extradite a person to a foreign state in accordance with this chapter
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has been the consistent practice of the United States69 with only a few excep-
tions early on in its practice.7" To this extent, therefore, the Act conforms with
existing law and practice. Regrettably the Act does not contemplate reciprocity
as a basis for extradition without a treaty. This could have been accomplished
with an "executive agreement" as a valid legal basis for extradition in the absence
of a treaty and on the basis of the national legislation."1
The Act appears, however, to alter current practice by permitting reliance
on multilateral treaties as well as bilateral extradition treaties as a legal basis
for extradition. The term "treaty" in the Senate bill is defined as "a treaty,
convention, or international agreement, bilateral or multilateral, that is in force
after advice and consent of the Senate."" The House Bill defines "treaty"
as "a treaty, convention or other international agreement that is in force after
advice and consent of the Senate." 73 It must be noted that the original Senate
version of the 1981 Extradition Act, S. 1639, did not intend reliance on
multilateral international criminal law conventions containing an extradition
clause, but the version reported out by the Judiciary Commimttee did.' This
inclusion was carried forward in the subsequent versions of the Senate bill7
only if -
(1) There is an applicable treaty concerning extradition between the United States and
such foreign state;
(2) the foreign state requests extradition in accordance with the terms of that treaty; and
(3) the appropriate court issues an order under this chapter that such person is
extraditable.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3191; H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3191; H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3191; H.R.
5227, supra note 2, § 3191.
"See Valentine v. U.S. ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259 (6th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957); Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 566 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954).
"See 1 J.B. MOORE, supra note 42, at 33-35 (1891) (Arguelles case); 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 744-45 (1968) (Koveleskie case) [hereinafter referred to as M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST].
"See 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. II, § 3, pp. 6-9 (review
of U.S. law and practice regarding reciprocity as a legal basis for extradition in the absence of a treaty).
'IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3198(a)(4); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3198(a)(4); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3198(a)(4).
In its report on S. 1940, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that this expansion should not be interpreted
such that the chapter would also regulate alternative methods of rendition through Status of Forces
Agreements and deportation proceedings. See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 5-6.
For a review and appraisal of these alternative methods, see 1 M.C. BASsiOuNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION, supra note 12, ch. 1I, § 3, pp. 9-13, chap. IV, § 1.
7"H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3199(a)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199(a)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3199(a)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3198(a)(2). The House Judiciary Report specifically noted
that the term "treaty" is defined so as to exclude executive agreements. See House Judiciary Report on
H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 6. The Committee also stated that this provision should not be construed
such that the Act would regulate rendition under Status of Forces Agreements or deportation proceedings.
See id. at 8 n. 15.
"See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 5, wherein it is noted that Section 3191 "refers
to a treaty 'concerning extradition' rather than an 'extradition treaty' because an obligation to extradite
a particular class of offenders is sometimes included in international agreements other than extradition
treaties." The Report then refers in a footnote to the same conventions listed infra in note 78.
"See S. 1940 as reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its Report, supra note 20, at 16
et seq.; S. 220, supra note 4, § 3198(a)(4).
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and the House bills.76 Both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees
specifically noted77 that these definitions include both bilateral and multilateral
treaties, as well as treaties which do not deal specifically with extradition but
contain an extradition clause such as conventions on international criminal law,"
whether they are in force at the time this legislation has entered into effect or
enter into force subsequent thereto. This interpretation would be warranted
in recognition of the fact that international criminal law is in a developing state79
and that new conventions can be anticipated. If this provision did not exist
there would be a need for future revision of the Act.
This provision offers the United States the opportunity to comply with
those provisions in multilateral treaties to which it is a signatory which allow
reliance on the applicable extradition provisions in these treaties instead of,
or in addition to, bilateral treaties."
Curiously, although multilateral treaties ratified by the Senate are as binding
on the United States as bilateral treaties, the Department of State has never
relied on multilateral treaties for extradition, clinging to bilateral treaties as
the only basis for extradition. There is of course no merit to this position,8"
but it is the existing practice, and this provision of the Act raises the question
as to whether it should be abandoned altogether, or relied upon only when
a bilateral treaty exists with a requesting state which is also a signatory to the
multilateral convention in question. These multilateral conventions, however,
"See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3199(a)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3199(a)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3199(a)(2) as reported by the House Judiciary Committee in its report, supra note 23, at 6; H.R.
2643, supra note 8, § 3199(a)(2).
"Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 5; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra
note 23, at 6.
"E.g., Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 30 March 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S.
No. 6298; Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 25, 1972, U.N. Doc.
E/Conf. 63/9, 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, February
21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175, 32 U.S.T. 543, T.I.A.S. No. 9725; OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish
the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of
International Significance, February 2, 1971, OAS Doc. Ag/doc. 88 rev. 1 corr. 1, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S.
No. 8413; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, December 14, 1973, G.A. Res. A/3166 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30) 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532; Tokyo Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, September 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, 20 U.S.T.
2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December
16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; Montreal Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, September 25, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 24 U.S.T.
564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570. For a list of international instruments on international criminal law and a
bibliography of international crimes, see M.C. BASsioumN, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note
12, at xix-xxx.
"See, e.g., id. at 19-22. See also I M.C. BAssIOUNI & V.P. NANDA, supra note 12, at 1-158.
'"This expansion of the legal basis of extradition to include multilateral international criminal law conventions
containing an extradition clause was suggested by this writer before Senate and House hearings on proposed
versions of the Act. See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 21; House Judiciary Hearings
on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 98, 102. In written statements submitted to both Committees, specific
reference was made to those treaties listed supra in note 78.
"For a critical view of the practice, see Bassiouni, International Procedures for the Apprehension and
Rendition of Fugutive Offenders, 74 PRoc. Am. SocY' INT'L L. 273 (1980).
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do not contemplate that they will be supplementary to bilateral extradition
treaties; they are intended to permit reliance upon their extradition provisions
only in the absence of a bilateral treaty.
Although the provision of the Act defining "treaty" can be read to permit
reliance upon multilateral international criminal law conventions as a legal basis
for extradition, it could also be given a contrary interpretation, namely that
multilateral conventions would be relied upon only where in addition thereto
there is a bilateral extradition treaty between the requesting state and the United
States. Thus the multilateral convention containing an extradition clause would
merely supplement the list of extraditable offenses under the bilateral treaty.
The lack of clarity as to the legislature's intent is as regrettable as is the absence
of a clear intent to rely on such multilateral conventions without the need for
a further bilateral treaty, and the applicability in such an event of the Act to
extradition proceedings initiated on this basis.
Section 3191 of the Act states that the requirements of the applicable treaty
must be found to have been satisfied." This emphasizes that the treaty provi-
sions whether substantive or procedural prevail over the provisions of the Act.
Unlike the House bill, the Senate version does not explicitly require that
a court order finding the relator extraditable be issued in order for extradition
to be appropriate. Instead, it provides that there be "a treaty concerning extra-
dition between the United States and a foreign state" and that "the foreign
state request extradition within the terms of the applicable treaty." 3 The Senate
Judiciary Committee Report, however, noted that previous federal law implicitly
required a court order before extradition could be performed. Presumably
the Senate version carries forward this implicit requirement as well.
VII. FORM OF THE REQUEST IN GENERAL
Both the Senate and House bills contain a similar section which provides
that a "request" from a foreign government (hereinafter referred to as requesting
state) must be made in form and in substance according to the requirements
"S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 require that "the foreign state request extradition within the terms of the
applicable treaty." S. 220, supra note 7, § 3191(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3191(b); S. 1639, supra note
1, § 3191(b). H.R. 3347, H.R. 2643, H.R. 6046, and H.R. 5227 require that "[tihe foreign state request
extradition in accordance with the terms of [the applicable] treaty .. " H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3191(2);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3191(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3191(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3191(2).
The House Judiciary Committee stated in its report that the language "in accordance with the terms of"
was chosen instead of "within the terms of" in order to "achieve greater clarity" but was intended to
have the same meaning as that of the Senate bill. See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note
23, at 6.
"S. 220, supra note 7, § 3191(a), (b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3191(a), (b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3191(a),
(b). The House version states that "the appropriate court [must] issue an order under this chapter that
such person is extraditable." H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3191(3); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3191(3);
H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3191(3); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3191(3).
"Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 5. The provisions of S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639
are identical regarding this point. See S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3191(a), (b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3191(a),
(b); S. 220, supra note 7, § 3191(a), (b).
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of each treaty.8 This provision subordinates the legislation with respect to the
form and substance of a request to the requirements of each and every treaty.
Thus the substantive and formal requirements of each request will depend on
the relevant provisions of the applicable treaty; only where the applicable treaty
is silent will the Act apply. This situation will of course, create as much diver-
sity in form and substance of requests as there are treaties. Clearly a better
approach would have been to have the Act control with respect to substance
and form, or at least with respect to form, particularly the type of documenta-
tion required and certification thereof. Such an approach would have insured
uniformity in the practice and would have made the task easier for those en-
trusted with the administration of extradition proceedings. It can be argued,
however, that because of the diversity of the legal systems of states with which
the United States has extradition relations it is difficult for the United States
to impose by legislation a uniform set of requirements that will satisfy all the
states with which it has or may entertain such relations. Also, even though
such requirements, though formal, have substantive legal significance they are
not therefore readily acceptable by all states with which the United States seeks
to have extradition relations. In this respect the Act preserves existing legisla-
tion and practice.86
VIII. RENEWED REQUESTS
The question of renewed requests is dealt with in the House versions8" but
not in the Senate versions.8 " It is not present in existing legislation but has been
the subject of litigation when the applicable extradition treaty contains what
is now commonly termed a "double jeopardy" clause.89 Such a provision is
"common to most extradition treaties"90 and usually states that extradition shall
not be granted "[w]hen the person whose surrender is sought is being proceeded
against or has been tried and discharged or punished in the territory of the
'IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3191(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3191(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3191(b); H.R.
3347, supra note 8, § 3191(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3191(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3191(2);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3191(2). This includes the substantive requirements discussed below and the
documentation and evidence needed to be presented as well as the certification of all necessary documents.
See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(c);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(g); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(g); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(g);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(g), discussed infra at notes 249-68 and accompanying text.
"See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 5; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046,
supra note 23, at 6.
"The provision states:
If the Attorney General has previously sought an order that a person is extraditable under this
chapter with respect to a specific extradition request of a foreign state the Attorney General may
not file another complaint under this section based upon the same factual allegations as a previous
complaint, unless the Attorney General shows good cause for filing another complaint.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3192(a)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(a)(2).
"See S. 220, supra note 7; S. 1940, supra note 5; S. 1639, supra note 1.
"See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980); Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1977).
"06 WHITEMAN, DIGEST, supra note 70, at 1054.
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requested Party for the offense for which his extradition is requested. ' 9 The
new House provision is thus in the nature of a statutory double jeopardy clause
embodying the traditional doctrine of res judicata. It provides that if the
Attorney General has previously sought an order for the extradition of an in-
dividual for a given offense based on a request by a given state and that re-
quest was denied (by the court) he cannot make a new request for the same
individual based on the same offense at the request of the same state except
upon a showing of good cause. Presumably this means that the same or substan-
tially same issues,"2 save in the case of discovery of new evidence unknown
at the time of the first request, cannot be relitigated unless the Attorney General
shows good cause to the satisfaction of the court. Thus, a new request based
on new factual allegations can be presented.
It is unclear from the legislative history as to whether this provision is to
be construed in the nature of a statutory double jeopardy clause to be govern-
ed by relevant federal criminal precedents arising out of national criminal
jurisprudence or whether it partakes of the civil doctrine of resjudicata because
of the sui generis nature of extradition. The legislative history as expressed in
the House Judiciary Committee report is that a new request cannot be based
solely on the fact that the requesting state has failed to produce evidence of
probable cause sufficient to satisfy the court when such evidence was available
to it at the time of the hearing resulting in the court's refusal to grant the
request."'
It is assumed by this writer, therefore, that the new request should be based
on: (1) newly discovered evidence not available at the time of the first lhearing,
and (2) a showing of due diligence and good faith on the part of the requesting
state and on the part of the United States government presenting the case on
behalf of the requesting state, all of which are implicit in a showing of good
cause. Thus the negligence, lack of due diligence, lack of good faith, pro-
"Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and Italy, January 18, 1973, 26 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S.
No. 8052, (Article VI(I)). See also Convention on Extradition Between the United States and Sweden,
October 24, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496 (Article V(I)); Convention Relating to Extradition
Between the United States and Israel, December 10, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476 (Article
VI (1)); Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and New Zealand, January 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1, T.I.A.S. No. 7035 (Article VI(l)); Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and Spain, May
29, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7136 (Article V(I)); Treaty on Extradition Between the United
States and Argentina, January 21, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510 (Article 7(a)); Treaty on
Extradition Between the United States and Paraguay, May 24, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7838
(Article 5(1)); Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and Denmark, June 22, 1972, 25 U.S.T.
1293, T.I.A.S. No. 7864 (Article 7(1)); Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and Australia,
May 14, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 957, T.I.A.S. No. 8234 (Article VII(l)).
"For an analysis of the concept of "same or substantially the same offense," see M.C. BASsIoUNl,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 452-59 (1974), relied upon on this issue in Sindona
v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1980). See also 2 M.C. BAssiouNi, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VIII, § 4, pp. 4-12.
"See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 8. The provision regarding renewed requests
is the same in H.R. 5227, H.R. 6046, H.R. 2643, and H.R. 3347. See H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(a)(2);
H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 3347, supra note 8,
§ 3192(a)(2).
EXTRADITIONSpring, 1984]
17
Bassiouni: Extradition
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
secutorial strategy of withholding evidence, and the political nature of the case
or the relator would not be considered within the meaning of "good cause,"
and the government would be barred from presenting a renewed request under
these circumstances.
IX. PRIORITY IN REQUESTS
Unlike existing legislation, this question, which is dealt with in the House
version94 but not in the Senate one,95 sets forth a hierarchy in the priority of
requests whenever more than one state presents a request for the same individual
and for the same or different offenses. In this instance it is the Secretary of
State and not the Attorney General who has the unreviewable discretion,
presumably because of the foreign relations implications of the decision, to
determine which request to honor. In so doing, the House bill requires that
the Attorney General take into consideration the following relevant factors:
(A) those set forth in an applicable treaty concerning extradition;
(B) the nationality of the individual;
(C) the state in which the offense is alleged to have occurred; and
(D) if different offenses are involved, which offense is punishable
by the most severe penalty, and if the penalties are substantially equal
the order in which the requests were received. 96
This necessary provision, however, subordinates the ranking of jurisdictional
priorities to the applicable treaty. 97 Curiously, it favors the active personality
theory" over the territorial principle, 99 ignores the passive personality theory'00
entirely and introduces a new jurisdictional notion based solely on the severity
of the penalty. This last notion is new in United States law and practice °l but
is found in the European Convention on Extradition. 102
"See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(3); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(3); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3192(a)(3). A section regarding multiple requests was not included in the original House bill, H.R.
5227, but was inserted in the bill's "mark up" and thus included in H.R. 6046.
"See S. 220, supra note 7; S. 1940, supra note 5; S. 1639, supra note 1.
"H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(3); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(3); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3192(a)(3).
"See 1 M.C. BASSIouN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ExTRADION, supra note 12, at ch. VI; FELLER, Jurisdiction
over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in 2 M.C. BASSiOUNI & V.P. NANDA, supra note 12, at 5 et seq.;
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) (Tentative Draft No. 2), §§
401-404, 441-443 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)
(Tentative Draft No. 3), §§ 401, 419-420, 431-433 (1982). See also Henkin, Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Tentative Draft No. 2, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 987 (1981);
Henkin, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Tentative Draft No.
3, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 653 (1982).
"The active personality (nationality) theory of jurisdiction confers jurisdiction to prosecute upon the alleged
offender's state of nationality. See I M.C. BASSIOuNi, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12,
at ch. VI, § 3.
"The territorial theory confers jurisdiction to prosecute upon the state in which the alleged offense occurred.
See 1 id. at ch. VI, § 2.
'"The passive personality theory confers jurisdiction to prosecute upon the state of nationality of the victim
of the alleged offense. See 1 id. at ch. VI, § 4.
°See 1 id. at ch. IV.
"'E.T.S. No. 24, Article 2 (1957).
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X. INITIATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This section is similar in both the Senate and House versions. It provides
that extradition proceedings are to be initiated by the Attorney General as the
complainant.'0 3 Thus, no action can be commenced by any other party pur-
porting to represent the requesting state. This changes existing practice which
authorizes the action to be brought not only by the Attorney General but also
by a representative of the requesting state, including private counsel. 114 This
aspect of current United States practice is anachronistic; most major legal
systems of the world require that the requesting state be represented by the
government of the requested state.II5 Present United States practice is incom-
patible with the policy considerations upon which extradition is based, since
extradition involves the foreign relations of the United States and its treaty
obligations, and the proceedings are criminal in nature rather than civil. The
Act remedies these aspects of current practice.
0 6
The Act also states that these actions must be commenced in the federal
district court in whose district the individual is believed to be found. 7 Thus,
"
3The Senate version states that "[t]he Attorney General may file a complaint charging that a person
is extraditable." S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(a); S. 1639, supra note
1, § 3192(a). The House version provides that "[t]he United States District Court for the district in which
the person sought to be extradited is found may issue an order in accordance with this chapter that such
person is extraditable, upon a complaint filed by the Attorney General." H.R. 3347, supra note 8, §
3192(a)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(a)(1); H.R. 5227, supra
note 2, § 3192(a)(1).
"'Present federal law does not specify who can file a complaint on behalf of the requesting state. This
has forced the court to determine who is "authorized" to represent the requesting state on a case-by-case
basis. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Capputo v. Kelley, 92 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 635
(1938) (consular representatives).
"'See 2 M.C. BAssIouNi, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. IX, § 1, p. 3.
'"The Senate and House Judiciary Committee Reports also noted that in recent years it has become common
practice for the Attorney General to represent the requesting state, either because this is called for in the
applicable extradition treaty or because it is required in treaties regarding mutual assistance in legal matters.
See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 6; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra
note 23, at 7.
"'The Senate bill provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall file the complaint in the United States district
court - (1) for the district in which the person may be found; or (2) for the District of Columbia, if
the Attorney General does not know where the person may be found." S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(a)(1),
(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(a)(1), (2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(a)(1), (2).
The House bill states that
[tihe United States district court for the district in which the person sought to be extradited
is found may issue an order in accordance with this chapter that such person is extraditable ....
The Attorney General may file a complaint under this chapter in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia if the Attorney General does not know where the person sought
may be found.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, §§ 3192(a)(1), 3192(c); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, 3192(a), 3192(c); H.R. 6046,
supra note 5, §§3192(a)(1), 3192(c); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(c).
S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 define "court" as
(A) a United States district court established pursuant to section 132 of title 28, United States
Code, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District Court
of the Northern Mariana Islands; or
(B) a United States Magistrate authorized to conduct an extradition proceedings ....
S. 220, supra note 7, §§ 3198(a)(l)(A), 2198(a)(l)(B); S. 1940, supra note 5, §§ 3198(a)(l)(A), 3198(a)(1)(B);
S. 1639, supra note 1, §§ 3198(a)(l)(A), 3198(a)(1)(B).
H.R. 6046, H.R. 3347, H.R. 2643, and H.R. 5227 provide that "the term 'United States district court'
includes the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the District Court of
the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands are,
respectively, the districts for such district courts." H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3199(a)(4); H.R. 2643, supra
note 8, § 3199(a)(4); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199(a)(4); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3198(a)(4).
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under the Act, unlike existing legislation, no proceedings may be commenced
before state judges.'0" Current legislation represents another historical
anachronism, since the federal system of the United States and the foreign rela-
tions nature of extradition make it so obvious that the matter should be ex-
clusively within federal jurisdiction although it has not been so in practice.
The Act also provides that the Attorney General may commence an action
and seek a warrant in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
if the whereabouts of the person sought are not known to him at that time. ,09
This change adds a helpful new dimension to existing legislation which per-
mits warrants to be issued only in the district where the relator is believed to
be found. Thus until his whereabouts are discovered no warrant can be issued.
Under the Act, if the person sought has been arrested on the basis of a
warrant issued by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, the
matter will then be transferred to the district court in whose district the arrest
has been performed. Provision for transfer of the proceedings from the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia to the district court where the relator
is found is specifically included in the House version but not in the Senate bill.
The House bill states that "[w]hen the person is found, the matter shall be
transferred to the United States district court to which the person arrested is
taken under subsection (d) of this section."" 0 Subsection (d) specifies that the
relator upon arrest "shall be taken . . . before the nearest available United
States district court . . . . "I" The Senate version contains no provision for
transfer of the proceedings, although it does state that upon arrest the relator
"should be taken ... before the nearest available court .... ," I, The Senate
Judiciary Committee's Report, similarly, makes no reference to transfer of the
proceedings." 3 It would appear that nothing would preclude such transfer to
the district court which is geographically closest to the place of arrest, as opposed
to the one which would have jurisdiction by virtue of the geographical limits
established in the judicial organization of the federal district courts.""
"'Under existing legislation, state judges are authorized to hear extradition cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
'See supra note 107.
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(c); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(c); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, §
3192(c); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(c).
'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, §
3192(d); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d).
"'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(c).
"'With respect to this subsection, which is the same in S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639, the Senate Judiciary
Committee preferred to give an explanation of the term "found," by stating, "[T]he word 'found' is
intended to have its usual, non-technical meaning and permits extradition proceedings to be initiated in
any district in which the fugitive can be physically apprehended, without regard to the manner in which
the fugitive entered the district." Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 7.
'"This view is supported by a statement in the House Judiciary Report regarding the House bill's provision
on arrest, which requires that the relator be brought before the "nearest available United States district
court." H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d)(1). The House Judiciary Report notes that this
provision:
permits the government to take the detained person before a district court in a district other than
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The purpose for this provision is to have the arrested person brought before
a magistrate or a judge without unnecessary delay'I 5 although it may appear
to provide an opportunity to the government for limited forum shopping." 1 6
The Act does not provide for the docket-setting of the action which to
date is part of the civil docket. Presumably this practice would continue unless
changed by Supreme Court rule as provided for in section 3199(f) of the House
bill." 7
XI. THE COMPLAINT
A complaint is the basis for commencing extradition proceedings and is
the basis upon which the arrest warrant may be issued. All subsequent pro-
ceedings, such as the hearing and the order of the court, are based on the com-
plaint. A complaint may therefore be amended or dismissed by order of the
court, by stipulation of the parties, or by the government based on prosecutorial
discretion.
Under the Act, the complaint must be made by the Attorney General under
oath or affirmation. This is similar to verified complaints in civil matters''
and to informations in criminal matters,II9 although the Act does not specify
which of the two practices is the analogous one. This section provides that the
form of the request is subject to the requirements of the applicable treaty;
nonetheless, the same provision also requires the Attorney General to verify
the complaint, irrespective of treaty provisions. This requirement which appears
essentially to be an internal legal procedure is nonetheless controlling even if
a treaty does not require verification of a complaint. This is the only provision
in the Act which subordinates a treaty to the Act. In the unlikely event of a
the one in which the person is fo'ind if a court in another location is closer. This authority is granted
for the convenience of the government and the person sought. It should not be read as authority
for the government to choose the court in which to proceed based on factors other than convenience.
House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 10.
The Senate Judiciary Report, similarly, notes with regard to the requirement that the relator be brought
before the "nearest available court," S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(c), S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(c),
S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(c), that "[tihere is no requirement that the extradition hearing take place
in the State in which the fugitive is found .... " Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 8.
"Both congressional versions of the Act rquire that the relator be brought before the district court without
unnecessary delay. See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(c); S. 1639, supra
note 1, § 3192(c); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R.
6046, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d). This aspect of the extradition hearing
is given more detailed considerations. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
"'The House Judiciary Committee specifically stated, however, that the provision should not be used
by the Government to engage in forum shopping. See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note
23, at 10, quoted supra note 114.
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3199(f); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199(f); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3199(f); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3198(f). See infra note 423 and accompanying text.
"'See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (secondary action by shareholders); FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a) (depositions to
perpetuate testimony); FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (injunctions); FED. R. Civ. P. 66 (receivers). See generally 2A
J. MooRE, 8 J. Lucas, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.03 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE].
"'See FED. R. CriM. P. 7 (information as basis for prosecution); FED. R. CRiM. P. 3 (complaint as basis
for arrest). See generally 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 118, at chs. 3, 7.
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conflict between a treaty provision and this provision of the Act, under establish-
ed constitutional jurisprudence the treaty will prevail if it is subsequent to the
Act. 12
0
A practical problem could arise with respect to the verification require-
ment in the event that a treaty does not require the requesting state to verify
its request to the United States, or to have its supporting documents presented
under oath or affirmation, while this section requires the Attorney General
to present a complaint on oath or affirmation which would certainly have to
be based on the representations of the requesting state. This would place the
Attorney General in a position of having to present a complaint under oath
or affirmation based upon a request by a foreign state and upon documents
that such a state might present without being under oath or affirmation. The
Secretary of State of course could refuse to accept the request unless verified,
and could return it through diplomatic channels to the requesting state for com-
pliance. The requesting state could object if the applicable treaty did not con-
tain a general clause which would require compliance with national legislation
in matters not specifically within the treaty in question.
Both the Senate and House bills contain a detailed subsection setting forth
the required contents of the complaint and supporting documents.'2 ' A distinc-
tion exists between the requirements for a complaint to support an arrest warrant
and for a complaint to support a provisional arrest warrant. This distinction
is specifically stated in the legislative history of the bills, but not in the Act
itself.' 2 Under both bills, the complaint to support an arrest must specify the
offense for which extradition is sought and be accompanied by a copy of the
request for extradition and the evidence and documents required by the
applicable treaty.'23
A complaint which will support a provisional arrest warrant under the
House version of the Act must contain the following:
(i) information sufficient to identify the person sought;
(ii) a statement -
(I) of the essential factual allegations of conduct constituting the
offense that the person sought is believed to have committed; or
"'See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 465 (1913); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 191 (1902); The Head
Monkey Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
2
'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(b);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(b); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(b); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(b);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(b).
'
2
'See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 7-8; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046,
supra note 23, at 9-10.
123S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(b)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(b)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(b)(1);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(b)(2), (b)(4)(A); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(b)(2), (b)(4)(A); H.R.
6046, supra note 5, § 3192(b)(2), (b)(4)(A); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(b)(2), (b)(4)(A). The House
bill further provides that the complaint shall also "contain any matter not otherwise required by this chapter
but required by the applicable treaty concerning extradition." H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(b)(3); H.R.
2643, supra note 8, § 3192(b)(3); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(b)(3); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(b)(3).
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(II) that a judicial document authorizing the arrest or detention of
such person on account of accusation or conviction of a crime is outstan-
ding in the foreign state seeking extradition; and
(iii) a description of the circumstances justifying such person's arrest.' 24
The Senate version of the Act is substantially similar to that of the House,
in that it requires the information and documentation specified above.' The
Senate's requirement is different in that it provides an alternative to these re-
quirements. Thus, if the specified information and documentation are not pro-
vided, the complaint will nonetheless be deemed sufficient if it contains "such
other information as is required by the applicable treaty .... ,,126
The hybrid legislative approach to extradition proceedings is once again
manifested in this provision which describes the requirements of the complaint
partly as if it were a criminal information,'27 and partly as a verified civil
complaint.'2 8 The legislature's approach fails to take into account that courts
must characterize the nature of the complaint in order to determine its suffi-
ciency. Because of the mixed nature of the requirements stated in the Act, courts
will have to grapple with a lack of clarity as to which characterization is con-
trolling. If the House provision in section 3199(f) is ultimately enacted, a lack
of uniformity between the circuits regarding the sufficiency of complaints could
result until the Supreme Court decides the question either by decision or under
its rule-making authority.
The fact that this provision is a codification of existing jurisprudence'29
does not obviate the difficulties presented by its mixed nature. The jurisprudence
upon which courts rely in order to review the sufficiency of that which has
evolved through prior practice is not identical to it new task of statutory inter-
1"1H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(b)(4)(B); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(b)(4)(B); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3192(b)(4)(B); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(b)(4)(B).
"'Section 3192(b)(2) of the Senate bill states that a complaint for a provisional arrest
shall contain -
(i) information sufficient to identify the person sought;
(ii) a statement of the essential facts constituting the offense that the person is believed to have
committed, or a statement that an arrest warrant for the person is outstanding in the foreign state; and
(iii) a description of the circumstances that justify the person's arrest; or
(B) shall contain such other information as is required by the applicable treaty; and shall be
supplemented before the extradition hearing by the materials specified in paragraph (1).
S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(b)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(b)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(b)(2).
"'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(b)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(b)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(b)(2).
The Senate versions also differ from those of the House in that the Senate bills do not provide that the
appropriate documents from the requesting state may prove the relator's conviction, rather than his
indictment or other form of accusation, of the offenses for which his extradition is requested. It is assumed
that this is a mere technical oversight of drafting which does not imply that an extradition request cannot
be based upon the relator's conviction of the offenses in question in the requesting state.
"'See supra note 119.
"'See supra note 118.
"'See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 7-8; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046,
supra note 23, at 9-10. See generally 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note
12, at ch. IX, § 2, pp. 4-5.
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pretation in light of new legislation. Thus, previously valid precedent may
become the subject of new controversy, unless the new legislation is clear or
made clear thereafter.
This provision also contains certain substantive requirements for extradi-
tion which are couched in terms of elements of the complaint, the absence of
which could presumably become grounds for dismissal of the complaint. The
provision is also formulated in terms of procedural norms applicable to this
stage of the proceedings. The mixture within this provision between substan-
tive requirements, procedural norms, and formal rules of practice is unfor-
tunate because it lumps together requirements of such divergent legal significance
which should be formulated separately. This confusion is all too frequent in
a number of other provisions of the Act, as discussed contextually in this article.
This provision also raises a problem with respect to the sufficiency of the
complaint and the consequences deriving from a lack of sufficiency. The substan-
tive requirements stated in this section are the same requirements which are
reiterated in subsequent sections of the Act as necessary for a finding of
extraditability. 13 0 The question arises, however, as to whether these requirements
are indispensable elements of the complaint, the absence of which would be
grounds for dismissal, and if so whether dismissal would be with or without
prejudice.' 3' In other words, it is unclear whether the complaint would be con-
sidered as governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on complaints'
or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on informations. I3" An additional
problem arises under the House version, which restricts the Attorney General's
ability to file new complaints, under section 3192(a)(2).' 3 , It would appear that
the House version would require dismissal with prejudice in order for the court
to give effect to the requirements of section 3192(a)(2) precluding a new filing
as discussed in Part VIII of this article.
In grappling with these issues, courts will obviously have to determine the
predominance of either the civil or the criminal aspects of this hybrid legislative
approach. If the court's inquiry is varied from section to section, it is likely
that this section regarding complaints will be characterized as partaking of civil
procedure rather than criminal. If the court's inquiry is broadened to consider
this section in the context of the overall nature of the Act, however, it is more
likely to conclude that the criminal nature of the process is predominant over
'"See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(d); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(d); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(d);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(d)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(d)(1).
"'See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (dismissal of complaint with prejudice); FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c), 12 (dismissal
of indictment or information for error or omission which misled defendant to his prejudice). Neither the
Senate nor the House Judiciary Report addresses this issue.
"'See supra notes 118, 131.
"'See supra notes 119, 131.
1'See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 2643; supra note 8, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d)(2). See also supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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its civil aspects. This contradictory result could have been avoided had the Act
been more specific on this and similar issues.
Nothing in the Act or any of the various bills refers to prosecutorial discre-
tion in presenting, amending, or withdrawing a complaint. It is assumed that
such discretion as is now practiced in criminal cases will apply."'
XII. JUDICIAL ACTION UPON FILING OF A COMPLAINT: SUMMONS,
ARREST AND PRELIMINARY HEARING
The Senate and House versions of the Act contain similar though not iden-
tical provisions regarding summons, arrest warrants, and the preliminary
hearing.' 36 The major difference between the versions is in their treatment of
the bail aspects of this phase of the practice. Both provide that upon the filing
of a complaint the district court shall issue a warrant for the individual's arrest
or, if the Attorney General so requests, a summons for the individual's
appearance at the extradition hearing. The summons for appearance is a new
feature that does not exist under the present legislation."'3 The Act does not,
however, provide standards for distinguishing between those cases in which
a summons can be issued and those in which an arrest warrant is more appro-
priate. The Attorney General apparently has complete discretion, but the ques-
tion of abuse of discretion is likely to be the subject of litigation."'
Under existing legislation a warrant for provisional arrest can be issued
'"See generally 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. IX, § 2.
"'S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 contain the following provision on these aspects:
(c) ARREST OR SUMMONS. - Upon receipt of a complaint, the court shall issue a warrant
for the arrest of the person sought, or, if the Attorney General so requests, a summons to the person
to appear at an extradition hearing. The warrant or summons shall be executed in the manner
prescribed by rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. A person arrested pursuant
to this section shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available court for an
extradition hearing.
S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(c).
The comparable sections of H.R. 3347, H.R. 2643, H.R. 6046, and H.R. 5227 state the following:
Upon the filing of a complaint under this section, the court shall issue a warrant for the arrest
of the person sought, or if the Attorney General so requests, a summons to such person to appear
at an extradition hearing under this chapter. The warrant or summons shall be executed and returned
in the manner prescribed for the execution and return of a warrant or summons, as the case may
be, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. A person arrested under this section shall be
taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available United States district court for further
proceedings under this chapter.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3192(d)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d). H.R. 3347 provides that the "warrant shall be issued,
executed, and returned in the manner prescribed for the issuance, execution, and return of a warrant or
summons, as the case may be, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." H.R. 3347, supra note
8, § 3192(d)(1) (emphasis added).
'"Current legislation provides only for the issuance of an arrest warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
"'Such discretion can be inferred from the language of both versions of the Act, which provide for the
issuance of a summons "if the Attorney General so requests." S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(c); S. 1940,
supra note 5, § 3192(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(c); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R.
2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d).
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only if the applicable extradition treaty provides for it; 19 under the new Act
such authority is also statutorily derived. 140 Consequently under the Act, a person
could be provisionally arrested even if the applicable treaty does not specifically
permit it. Because many of the more recent extradition treaties provide for pro-
visional arrest, however, this subsection is not a major reform of existing prac-
tice. Nevertheless, it does provide both a legislative basis for the practice and
limits thereto of sixty days with subsequent extensions of fifteen days each upon
a showing of good cause.'" The constitutionality of this provision in the absence
of probable cause is very questionable.'4 2
The Senate version provides that the procedures for issuing an arrest
warrant are those set forth in Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,' 3 even though the federal rules of criminal procedure do not other-
'"18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). See 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at
ch. IX, § 2, pp. 28-37. See also, e.g., Extradition Treaty, United States-Canada, entered into force March
22, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237, art. 11. Both the Senate and House Judiciary Reports noted
that the provision is a codification of existing practice. See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra
note 15, at 7-8; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 9-10.
1'0See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(d); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(d); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(d);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(d);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d).
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(d)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1,§ 3192(d)(2); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(3); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(e); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3192(e); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(e).
" 
2 See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
" 
3 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 states:
Arrest Warrant or Summons Upon Complaint
(a) Issuance. If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with
the complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer
authorized by law to execute it. Upon the request of the attorney for the government a summons
instead of a warrant shall issue. More than one warrant or summons may issue on the same complaint.
If a defendant fails to appear in response to the summons, a warrant shall issue.
(b) Probable cause. The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in
whole or in part.
(c) Form.
(1) Warrant. The warrant shall be signed by the magistrate and shall contain the name
of the defendant or, if his name is unknown, any name or description by which he can be identified
with reasonable certainty. It shall describe the offense charged in the complaint. It shall command
that the defendant be arrested and brought before the nearest available magistrate.
(2) Summons. The summons shall be in the same form as the warrant except that it shall
summon the defendant to appear before a magistrate at a stated time and place.
(d) Execution or Service; and Return.
(1) By Whom. The warrant shall be executed by a marshal or by some other officer
authorized by law. The summons may be served by any person authorized to serve a summons
in a civil action.
(2) Territorial Limits. The warrant may be executed or the summons may be served at
any place within the jurisdiction of the United States.
(3) Manner. The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. The officer
need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest, but upon request he shall
show the warrant to the defendant as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant
in his possession at the time of the arrest, he shall then inform the defendant of the offense charged
and of the fact that a warrant has been issued. The summons shall be served upon a defendant
by delivering a copy to him personally, or by leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein and by mailing a copy
of the summons to the defendant's last known address.
(4) Return. The officer executing a warrant shall make return thereof to the magistrate
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wise apply to extradition save for some specific exceptions discussed contex-
tually below. Thus, the application of this rule is limited to the execution and
return of arrest warrants and summons. The House version provides only that
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are applicable.'"
Both the Senate and House bills state that upon arrest the relator must
be brought without unnecessary delay to the nearest available federal district
court. I4 5 Availability is based on geographic proximity rather than jurisdictional
competence, since both bills permit the government to select a district court
other than the one having jurisdictional competence. '46 This rule is analogous
to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'"
4  However, there is
or other officer before whom the defendant is brought pursuant to Rule 5. At the request of the
attorney for the government any unexecuted warrant shall be returned to the magistrate by whom
it was issued and shall be cancelled by him. On or before the return day the person to whom a
summons was delivered for service shall make return thereof to the magistrate before whom the
summons is returnable. At the request of the attorney for the government made at any time while
the complaint is pending, a warrant returned unexecuted and not cancelled or a summons returned
unserved or a duplicate thereof may be delivered by the magistrate to the marshal or other authorized
person for execution or service.
"'The House Judiciary Committee justified this lack of specificity on the grounds that future amendments
to the Rules might change the numerical designation of the rule regarding arrests. The Committee 
noted,
however, that Rule 4(d) is currently applicable to this subsection. See House Judiciary Report on H.R.
6046, supra note 23, at 10.
" S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(c); H.R.
3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(1);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d).
1'"See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
"'FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 states:
Initial Appearance Before the Magistrate
(a) In General. An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any
person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay
before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event that a federal magistrate is not
reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041. If
a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate, a complaint shall be filed forthwith
which shall comply with the requirements of Rule 4(a) with respect to the showing of probable
cause. When a person, arrested with or without a warrant or given a summons, appears initially
before the magistrate, the magistrate shall proceed in accordance with the applicable subdivisions
of this rule.
(b) Misdemeanors. If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor triable by a United
States magistrate under 18 U.S.C. § 3401, the United States magistrate shall proceed in accordance
with the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Misdemeanors Before United States Magistrates.
(c) Offenses Not Triable by the United States Magistrate. If the charge against the defendant
is not triable by the United States magistrate, the defendant shall not be called upon to plead. The
magistrate shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him and of any affidavit filed
therewith, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assignment of counsel if he is
unable to obtain counsel, and of the general circumstances under which he may secure pretrial release.
He shall inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement
made by him may be used against him. The magistrate shall also inform the defendant of his right
to a preliminary examination. He shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to
consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided by statute or in these rules.
A defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination, unless waived, when charged with any
offense, other than a petty offense, which is to be tried by a judge of the district court. If the defendant
waives preliminary examination, the magistrate shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district
court. If the defendant does not waive the preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule
a preliminary examination. Such examination shall be held within a reasonable time but in any
event not later than 10 days following the initial appearance if the defendant is in custody and
no later than 20 days if he is not in custody, provided, however, that the preliminary examination
shall not be held if the defendant is indicted or if an information against the defendant is filed
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no indication as to whether or not a failure to bring the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest federal district court judge or magistrate
would result in any invalidity of a confession or inadmissibility of evidence
obtained from the arrested person during this period.1 4 8
XIII. ARREST AND RELEASE ON BAIL
Arrest and release on bail are two of the most important and difficult areas
of extradition law and practice. While probable cause is required for an arrest
in district court before the date set for the preliminary examination. With the consent of the defendant
and upon a showing of good cause, taking into account the public interest in the prompt disposition
of criminal cases, time limits specified in this subdivision may be extended one or more times by
a federal magistrate. In the absence of such consent by the defendant, time limits may be extendedby a judge of the United States only upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and
that delay is indispensable to the interests of justice.
In addition, Rule 5.1 provides:
Preliminary Examination
(a) Probable Cause Finding. If from the evidence it appears that there is probable cause tobelieve that an offense has been committed and that the defendant conunitted it, the federal magistrate
shall forthwith hold him to answer in district court. The finding of probable cause may be based
upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against
him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. Objections to evidence on the ground that it
was acquired by unlawful means are not properly made at the preliminary examination. Motions
to suppress must be made to the trial court as provided in Rule 12.(b) Discharge of Defendant. If from the evidence it appears that there is no probable cause
to believe that an offense has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the federal
magistrate shall dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant. The discharge of the defendant
shall not preclude the government from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.(c) Records. After concluding the proceeding the federal magistrate shall transmit forthwith
to the clerk of the district court all papers in the proceeding. The magistrate shall promptly make
or cause to be made a record or summary of such proceeding.
(1) On timely application to a federal magistrate, the attorney for a defendant in a criminal
case may be given the opportunity to have the recording of the hearing on preliminary examination
made available for his information in connection with any further hearing or in connection with
his preparation for trial. The court may, by local rule, appoint the place for and define the conditions
under which such opportunity may be afforded counsel.
(2) On application of a defendant addressed to the court or any judge thereof, an order
may issue that the federal magistrate make available a copy of the transcript, or of a portion thereof,
to defense counsel. Such order shall provide for prepayment of costs of such transcript by thedefendant unless the defendant makes a sufficient affidavit that he is unable to pay or to give security
therefor, in which case the expense shall be paid by the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts from available appropriated funds. Counsel for the government may move
also that a copy of the transcript, in whole or in part, be made available to it, for good cause shown,
and an order may be entered granting such motion in whole or in part, on appropriate terms, except
that the government need not repay costs nor furnish security therefor.
The analogy to Rule 5 was specifically recognized by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. SeeSenate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 8; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra
note 23, at 16.
"'See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); FED.R. CRIM. P. 5. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.§ 3501 (1976), purports to repeal the McNabb-Mallory rule; in light of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), however, the constitutional effect of this repeal is questionable.
The Senate Judiciary Report noted that this subsection "is not intended to require the dismissal of
the extradition proceedings solely on the ground that the fugitive arrested for extradition was taken without
unnecessary delay before a judge or magistrate later determined not to be the 'nearest' one." Senate Judiciary
Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 8.
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by virtue of the fourth amendment,'4 9 release on bail is controversial because
the sixth amendment has not been held applicable to extradition proceedings,
althouth a qualified right to bail exists." '
The government's request for an arrest warrant must specify the offense
for which extradition is sought, and be accompanied by a copy of the request
for extradition and the evidence and documents required by the applicable
treaty.' 5 ' The Act on its face does not require probable cause in regard to the
issuance of an arrest warrant before an extradition hearing. However, this
does not affect the constitutional requirement of probable cause under the fourth
amendment. As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is well established that
when a statute is ambiguous, "construction should go in the direction of con-
stitutional policy." I52 Therefore, the Act should be interpreted as requiring a
showing of probable cause in order for an arrest warrant to issue. The broad
language of the fourth amendment, that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause,"' 53 includes warrants for arrest for purposes of extradition.
Although extradition is a form of international judicial assistance, it is still
subject to United States constitutional provisions.5 4 For a given aspect of legal
proceedings, no matter of what nature, to touch upon the foreign relations
of the United States is not a sufficient basis upon which to displace basic con-
stitutional guarantees.
Because of the fourth amendment the government acting on behalf of a
state requesting extradition would have to present to the magistrate issuing an
arrest warrant allegations of "facts and circumstances 'sufficient to warrant
a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing
an offense,' 'II before a warrant could be issued. Since the "simple assertion
of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for a magistrate's finding of
"'Probable cause for arrest in an extradition proceeding is required according to the statement in Collins
v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922), that the magistrate is to determine whether or not there is "competent
legal evidence which, according to the law of [the state wherein the relator is found], would justify his
apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had been committed in that [sitate." Id. at 315 (emphasis
added).
"
0Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d at 742. See Valencia v. Limbs, 655 F.2d 195, 196 (9th Cir. 1981); Hu
Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981) Antunes v. Vance,
640 F.2d 3, 4 (4th Cir. 1981); Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1976).
"IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(b)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(b)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(b)(1);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(b)(2), (b)(4)(B); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(b)(2), (b)(4)(B); H.R.
6046, supra note 5, § 3192(b)(2), (b)(4)(A); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(b)(2), (b)(4)(A).
12United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944); quoted in Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974).
'In full, the fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
'"See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1976), which states: "A person may not be compelled to give his testimony
or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege."
'Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
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probable cause,"" 6 the issuance of arrest warrants for extradition hearings must
follow these constitutional standards. Furthermore, the applicability of con-
stitutional standards to extradition arrest procedures would include the well-
known "four-corners rule" that in passing upon the validity of a warrant a
reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate's
attention. 7 Therefore, additional information possessed by the United States
government which is not communicated to the magistrate in its request for an
arrest warrant may be excluded from subsequent considerations on constitu-
tional grounds.I58 Should the courts construe the Act to not require a showing
of probable cause before an arrest warrant is issued, then this portion of the
Act would be held unconstitutional. With respect to non-United States citizens,
the absence of a probable cause requirement cannot be justified on the basis
of the diminished protections afforded aliens, since they may raise fourth amend-
ment claims. 1 9 Furthermore, since both citizens and aliens are extraditable under
the Act,'6 ° the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment applies.
The paradox in this area is that should it be held that the fourth amend-
ment requires that probable cause exist before a person is arrested and brought
into custody for an extradition hearing, then the warrant procedures set out
in the Act are no longer required at all times, since it is well established that
a warrantless arrest is not invalid as long as the officers had probable cause
at the time of arrest.'6 ' Furthermore, the necessity of an initial, before-arrest
showing of probable cause is particularly acute in the extradition area because
of the peculiarities of release on bail available to relators.'
62
The Act does not distinguish between provisional arrest and other arrests
insofar as the required standards of probable cause for arrest, although the
fourth amendment requires it in both cases. Presumably the same standards
will apply although clearly provisional arrests which are ostensibly based on
grounds of emergency may not allow the government to produce the type of
"'Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969), rev'd sub noma., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983) reh'g. den., 104 S. Ct. 33 (1983).
"Id. at 413 n.3; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964). Of course, the probable cause standard
for arrest warrants is the same as for search warrants. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112 n.3.
"'Other questions raised by the incorporation of fourth amendment probable cause in extradition arrest
procedures are considered in relation to the showing of probable cause to extradite. See infra notes 269-92
and accompanying text.
'United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974) (alien may challenge legality of wiretap
on fourth amendment grounds); Au Yi Lau v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 445 F.2d 217,
223 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971) (in deportation proceeding, alien may challenge
legality of arrest on fourth amendment grounds).
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3196(a);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3196(a); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(a); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3196(a);
H.R. 5227, supra note 7, § 3196(a).
"'United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975). Of
course, warrants to enter the relator's home, or the home of another, are still necessary. See generally
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
"'For example, in Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, the court noted that the relator had been held,
without probable cause that he had committed any crime, 97 days from his arrest until the Second Circuit
acted. Id. at 749.
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probable cause that would otherwise be required for an arrest. 63 In other words,
some type of probable cause is still required for a provisional arrest irrespec-
tive of the applicable treaty, 6' but no standards therefore are established in
the Act. Clearly, the purpose of provisional arrest is to avoid flight before the
filing of a complaint and the issuance of an arrest warrant. If the Attorney
General files or intends to file a motion for issuance of summons the emergency
basis justifying a provisional arrest could be challengeable.
With respects to standards of probable cause for provisional arrests and
arrest warrants, the Act does not specifically change existing jurisprudence which
requires for arrest warrants the same type of probable cause required for any
other arrests in criminal cases which are included in the protection of the fourth
amendment. '65 The same applies to provisional arrests, although the tests applied
are different because of the emergency and temporary nature of the arrest.
66
However, it must be noted that in the absence of a fair bail provision, a sixty
day period of provisional arrest provided for in the Act6 7 without adequate
probable cause is unconscionable. 68
Release of persons who are subject to a provisional arrest or arrest warrant
has been the subject of controversy in existing jurisprudence which does not
recognize a constitutional right to bail but provides for bail whenever the relator
can show "special circumstances.' ' 69 The House version provides for an
elaborate scheme for bail which rejects the verbatim incorporation of the Bail
Reform Act, "' but nevertheless sets forth substantially similar criteria against the
"'See Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980).
'6"See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739.
"'Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d at 742. See Valencia v. Limbs, 655 F.2d at 196; Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia,
649 F.2d at 915; Antunes v. Vance, 640 F.2d at 4; Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956. Probable cause for
arrest is required according to the statement in Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, that the magistrate is to
determine whether or not there is "competent legal evidence which, according to the law of [the state
wherein the relator is found], would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had
been committed in that state." Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
"'See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739.
'7See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(d)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1,
§ 3192(d)(2); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(e); H.R. 2643, supra note, 8, § 3192(e); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3192(e); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(e).
"'Such a provision would allow an individual to be held upon merely a telex from the requesting state
containing the unsupported assertion that the individual has been charged, prosecuted, or sentenced for
a criminal offense. In light of Caltagirone, 629 F.2d 739, this provision would likely be unconstitutional.
This writer made similar observations before the Senate and House Judiciary Committees on their respective
proposed bills. See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 22; House Judiciary Hearings
on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 98, 103.
6'See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U. S. 40 (1903). See also Heu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914 (youthfulness
of relator and lack of appropriate detention facility sufficiently "special"); United States v. Williams,
611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (that relator's brother was released on bail pending extradition
on same crime not sufficiently "special"); Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(no "special" circumstances shown); In re Klein, 46 F.2d 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (discomfort of confinement
not a "special circumstance").
"18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3141-43, 3146-52, 3568 (1976).
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inexplicably strong opposition of the Administration.'II In addition, the House
version allocates different burdens of proof to the relator and the government
depending upon a certain time schedule, particularly with respect to provisional
arrests. Under the House bill, a relator has the burden of showing eligibility
for release on bail after his provisional arrest. The burden is on the relator
for ten days to show his eligibility by a preponderance of evidence. Thereafter,
the burden shifts to the government to show that the relator should not be
free pending the extradition hearing.' 72 The relator can satisfy his burden of
proof during the ten-day period by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that his release will not present a substantial risk of flight, that if released he
will not be a danger to another person or to the community, and that his release
will not jeopardize a United States treaty obligation.' 7 At the end of the initial
ten-day period following arrest, the House bill overturns the existing
jurisprudence, places the burden of proof on the government, and specifies
the factors that a magistrate is to consider in determining eligibility for, and
the conditions of, release pending the extradition hearing. 74 Having done away
"'See House Judiciary Report on H. R. 6046, supra note 23, at 10-11; House Foreign Affairs Report
on H.R. 6046, supra note 27, at 2-3. The Departments of State and Justice proposed amendments to H.R.
6046 to reinsert a "special circumstances" requirement for bail rather than criteria enumerated in the bill.
Id. at 3-5 (Congressman Hughes' response in support of enumerated criteria).
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3192(d)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d)(2). Upon a showing of "good cause" by the government,
the proposed legislation permits the extension of this ten-day period for successive five-day periods. H.R.
2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(3); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(3); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d)(2).
H.R. 3347 provides for extensions of ten days, rather than five. H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(3).
Thus, during provisional arrest for the first ten days the burden of proof is on the relator by a preponderance
of the evidence. For the subsequent extensions, it is on the government by a showing of good cause. For
release after an arrest warrant has been served, the burden of proof is on the relator by a preponderance
of the evidence. For release on appeal, it is the same.
"'H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note
1, § 3198(c)(2). Under H.R. 3347, the relator is not obligated to show that his release will not jeopardize
a treaty obligation of the United States. Instead, this is one factor which the court must take into account
in reaching a determination of the relator's release. See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(2), (d)(4).
"The House bills provide for the following criteria and conditions:
(c)(1) A person arrested or otherwise held or detained under this chapter shall to the extent
practicable, be confined in a place other than one used for the confinement of persons convicted
of crime. A person arrested or otherwise held or detained in connection with any proceeding under
this chapter shall be treated in accordance with this subsection and chapter 207 of this title, except
sections 3141, 3144, 3146(a), 3146(b), 3148, and 3150. H.R. 3347 contains identical language, but
deletes the requirement that the court deny release if it determines that this will not "carry out
the obligations of the United States under the applicable treaty concerning extradition" in subsections
(c)(2) and (c)(3), see H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(f)(1), and instead provides that in determining
the conditions of release which will give the required assurances, the court take into account "whether
the release of such person would jeopardize a relationship with a foreign state with respect to a
treaty concerning extradition." H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(2)(J). Proceedings under this
chapter shall be deemed criminal proceedings for the purposes of this application of chapter 207
of this title and the release of a person under this subsection shall be deemed to a release under
second 3146(a) for the purposes of such application.
(2) Any person arrested or otherwise held or detained in connection with any proceeding under
this chapter shall, at such person's appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered and released
pending a proceeding under this chapter on personal recognizance or upon the execution of an
unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer
determines that at a hearing the Government has shown by the preponderance of the evidence that
such a release will not assure the appearance of the person as required, assure the safety of another
person or the community, or carry out the obligations of the United States under the applicable
treaty concerning extradition. If the judicial officer so determines, the judicial officer may, either
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with the presumption against release prior to the hearing, the House bill, con-
sistent with existing legislation, reinstates the rule concerning a relator's appeal
of a determination of eligibility to bail. Thus, bail is available to a relator-
appellant only if he makes the evidentiary showing required during the initial
ten-day period, and additionally shows that he has a "great" chance of success
on appeal. I75
Under existing jurisprudence, there is a strong constitutional policy, based
upon the eighth amendment's prohibition against excessive bail,176 in favor of
in lieu of or in addition to such methods of release, order such person detained after a hearing
on a motion for detention or impose any of or any combination of the following conditions of
release which will give the required assurances and carry out such obligations:
(A) Place the accused person in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing
to supervise such accused person.
(B) Place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person during
the period of release.
(C) Require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the deposit
in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a sum not to exceed 10
per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be returned upon the performance of
the conditions of release.
(D) Require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit
of cash in lieu thereof.
(E) Impose any other conditions deemed reasonably necessary to give the required assurances
and carry out such obligations, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody
after specified hours.
(3) In determining which conditions of release will give the required assurances and carry out
the obligations of the United States as required, the judicial officer shall, on the basis of available
information, take into account -
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, and the weight of the evidence
against the person accused;
(B) such person's family and local ties, financial resources, character, and mental conditions;
(C) the length of such person's residence in the community;
(D) such person's record of convictions;
(E) such person's record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution
or failure to appear at court proceedings;
(F) whether such person is employed or is attending an educational institution;
(G) whether such person is lawfully within the United States;
(H) the existence of any other requests for the extradition of such person other than the
one with respect to which release is sought; and
(I) whether such a person is currently on probation, parole, or mandatory release under
State or Federal law.
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199(c)(1)-(3); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199(c)(l)-(3). These detailed criteria
and conditions were not included in the original House bill, which contained only a general statement
regarding bail. See H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3198(c)(2).
"'1H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(A); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(A); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3195(a)(3)(A); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(a)(3)(A). Under domestic law, a defendant appealing
a conviction is denied release on bail if it appears that there is a risk of fight, a risk of danger to others,
or if "it appears that an appeal is frivolous or taken for delay." 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976). The burden
of proving or negating these factors is not allocated by the statute. However, according to FED. R. APP.
P. 9(c), the burden is placed upon the defendant. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94-95
(3d Cir. 1979), which discusses, but accepts, this allocation of the burden of proof which seems clearly
contrary to the congressional intent behind the Bail Reform Act to place the burden of proof upon the
government to demonstrate that release should not be granted.
"'The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments imposed." U.S. CONST.. amend. VIII.
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a person's release until his case is finally determined.' 77 The explicit recogni-
tion of the right to bail pending the extradition hearing is, as far as it goes,
consistent with this constitutional policy and the Bail Reform Act, although
the latter is not incorporated per se in the House bill provisions on bail. Never-
theless, the degree of similarity between the House bill provisions regarding
bail after the initial ten-day period and the Bail Reform Act provisions is so
substantial that it supports the conclusion that the jurisprudence of the Bail
Reform Act may be held applicable to these similar provisions of the House
bill. 78
The legislative history of the House bill indicates that the placement of
the burden of proof on the relator during the ten days after his arrest was thought
to be justified because the United States is frequently asked by foreign states
to arrest certain persons provisionally and hold them until the necessary
background information is provided. Under these circumstances, without any
background information, the United States would be unable immediately after
the arrest to show the inappropriateness of release on bail. ' 79 The House ver-
sion also grants release on bail pending appeal and places the burden of show-
ing eligibility on the relator. 80 Unfortunately, among these is a provision re-
... Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 12 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1961); Fernandez v. United States,
81 S. Ct. 642, 645 (Harlan, Circuit Justice 1961); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981); Cobb
v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 962 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) ("[Blail
... is basic to our system of law"); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (the "traditional right" to bail
"serves to prevent infliction of punishment prior to conviction").
"'This conclusion is warranted in spite of the fact that the House Judiciary Committee ostensibly rejected
the per se incorporation of the Bail Reform Act. See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note
23, at 5. First, in spite of the House bill's statement that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141, 3144, 3146(a), (b), 3148 and
3150 (i.e., provisions of the Bail Reform Act) do not per se apply although all other sections of Chapter
207 do per se apply (including other sections of the Bail Reform Act), see H.R. 3347, supra note 8,§ 3192(0(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199(c)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199(c)(1), the bill nevertheless
goes on to provide that "the release of a person under this subsection shall be deemed a release under
section 3146(a) .... " See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(f)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199(c)(1);
H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199(c)(1). 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) is a major provision of the Ball Reform Act
setting forth conditions of release which the court may impose. Second, the language of this section of
the Bail Reform Act and 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b), also from the Ball Reform Act which-sets forth criteria
the court is to use in setting conditions of release, are virtually identical to the corollary provisions of
the House bill.
In further support of the conclusion that the House version intends the applicability of thejurisprudential interpretations of the Bail Reform Act in spite of the bill's ostensible rejection of certain
provisions of the Act per se, the following should also be noted: (1) There was no need to incorporate
the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3141 into extradition proceedings since this section establishes the general
power of courts and magistrates to release persons on bail, and such authority in extradition proceedings
is explicitly stated in the House bill at § 3199(c)(1); (2) There was no need to incorporate the applicability
of 18 U.S.C. § 3144 into extradition proceedings since this section establishes the power of courts and
magistrates to impose additional bail if it appears that bail is insufficient to prevent the person from fleeing
the jurisdiction, and such authority in extradition proceedings is provided for in the House bill in § 3199(c)(7);(3) There was no need to incorporate the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3148 regarding release in capital
cases or after conviction into extradition proceedings since neither of these kinds of situations arises in
an extradition proceeding; (4) There was no need to incorporate the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3150
regarding penalties for failure to appear into extradition proceedings since this provision allocates the
penalties according to distinctions as to charge, conviction, etc., that are not readily applicable to extradition
proceedings.
"'See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 11.
'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3195(a)(3).
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quiring a showing that such release would not jeopardize extradition relations
with another state.' 81 This provision introduces an unconscionable political
dimension into the processes of criminal justice which courts are ill equipped
to assess. If a relator were to challenge the constitutionality of the bail provi-
sions under the House bill, the federal courts would have to weigh the impor-
tance of these governmental interests.' 82
The Senate version continues existing practice of allowing bail only for
special circumstances which the relator must prove. '83 Though it does not
specifically provide for bail during the sixty days of potential provisional arrest,
presumably the special circumstances standards apply. 8 The same standards
apply to bail pending appeal.' 5
Neither the Senate nor the House versions refer to discovery by the relator,
and it is presumed that the existing limited practice of discovery will continue
to apply.'
8 6
XIV. WAIVER OF HEARING
The Senate and House bills contain similar sections regarding waiver, under
section 3193. It is a novel procedure whereby a relator may waive a hearing
on extradition and any and all requirements under the treaty or the legislation.
This requirement is imposed in order to avoid allowing the relator to waive
some of the charges and not others and therefore to benefit selectively from
the rule of specialty.'87 This would obligate the requesting state to prosecute
him only for the crime or crimes for which the order predicated on the waiver
was actually issued, thus precluding prosecution or punishment for any other
crime, even one that was part of the extradition request but which was not
the object of the waiver.
111H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(A)(ll); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3195(a)(3)(A)(III). H.R. 3347
deletes this requirement, and instead provides that the court is to consider this factor in determining whether
the relator should be released pending appeal. See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(4).
"'Such a challenge would first require a reconsideration of the rationale of Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S.
40 (1903). Given the increased general availability of international travel created by jet airplanes, it no
longer seems reasonable to assume that persons suspected of having committed crimes in foreign countries
are more likely to flee the United States than persons suspected of having committed crimes within the
United States. A challenge to bail procedure on appeal would entail a challenge to the domestic procedure
as well. Although FED. R. APP. P. 9(c) has been rather ably criticized by one commentator (see Note, Bail
Pending Appeal in Federal Court: The Need for a Two-Tiered Approach, 57 TEX. L. REV. 275 (1979))
it has been accepted by the courts. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 n.50 (3d Cir. 1979).
"IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(d)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(d)(1).
1"See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739; Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40.
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(b)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(b)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1,
§ 3195(b)(1).
'6See 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. IX, § 4.
"'See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 12. The rule of specialty
stands for the proposition that the requesting state which secures the surrender of a person can
prosecute that person only for the offense for which he or she was surrendered by the requested
state or else allow that person an opportunity to leave the prosecuting state to which he or she
had been surrendered.
1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 6, p. 1.
EXTRADITIONSpring, 1984]
35
Bassiouni: Extradition
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
The Senate version states that the waiver is irrevocable. '88 The House ver-
sion, however, allows for revocation when there is an "extraordinary change
of circumstances.' I9 Presumably this would include instances such as a change
in government in the requesting state or the discovery of evidence indicating
that the relator would not receive a fair trial in the requesting state. The court
can make such a determination in the best interests of justice, which allows
it enough latitude to use the analogy of withdrawal of guilty pleas in federal
criminal cases. ,90
Both versions state that the waiver must be with full knowledge of its legal
consequences and with advice of counsel, whether retained by the relator or
appointed in case of indigency.' 9 ' Although the section requires the court to
inform the relator of his rights under the legislation and the implications of
his waiver,' 92 it does not state what sanction will apply in the event the court
fails to do so. Presumably failure to do so would be grounds for revocation
of the waiver and vacation of an order based thereon, but that is left to future
jurisprudential determination.""
"'S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 state that, "[Tihe court, upon being informed of the person's consent
to removal, shall.., address the person to determine whether his consent is... given with full knowledge
of its consequences, including the fact that it may not be revoked after the court has accepted it." S.220, supra note 7, § 3193(b)(2)(B); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3193(b)(2)(B): S. 1639, supra note 1,
§ 3193(b)(2)(B).
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3193(a); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3193(a); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, §
3193(a); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3193(a).
'See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 13.
"IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3193(b)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3193(b)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3193(b)(1);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3193(b)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3193(b)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,§ 3193(b)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3193(b)(1).
""S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 require that:
[t]he court, upon being informed of the person's consent to removal, shall -(1) inform the person that he has a right to consult with counsel and that, if he is financially
unable to obtain counsel, counsel may be appointed to represent him pursuant to section 3006A; and(2) address the person to determine whether his consent is -(A) voluntary, and not the result of a threat or other improper inducement; and(B) given with full knowledge of its consequences, including the fact that it may not
be revoked after the court has accepted it.S. 220, supra note 7, § 3193(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3193(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3193(b).
H.R. 2643, H.R. 6046, and H.R. 5227 contain a similar requirement, by providing that:
[tihe court shall -(1) inform a person making a waiver under this section of such person's right to representation
by counsel, including counsel appointed without cost to such person if such person is financially
unable to obtain counsel; and
(2) inquire of such person and determine whether such waiver is -(A) voluntary and not the result of threat or other improper inducement; and(B) given with full knowledge of its legal consequences.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3193(b); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3193(b); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3193(b);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3193(b).
'"Neither the Senate nor the House Judiciary Report addresses this issue. See Senate Judiciary Report
on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 10-11; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 12-13. TheSenate Report merely notes that the provision was included to be consistent with 18 U.S.C. §§ 4107-08(1976) regarding "a prisoner's voluntary consent to transfer-to his country of nationality under treaties
on the execution of penal sanctions." Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 10. The House
Report notes that the requirements that the consent be voluntary with knowledge of its legal consequences
is derived from domestic law regarding acceptance of guilty pleas. House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046,
supra note 23, at 13. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the samesanction would attach for failure
to satisfy these requirements - i.e., revocation of the consent and vacation of the order.
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The Act implicitly requires that a relator consent to a waiver after he has
informed the court of his willingness to consent and has been advised by the
court of the charges against him for which his extradition was requested. Specific
language should have been included, however, in order to ensure that a relator's
consent is made with full knowledge of the charges against him and that the
court record reflects the charges for which the individual was extradited."9 This
latter guarantee would have preserved the rule of specialty,'" and could have
been accomplished through the insertion of explicit language in the Act that
waiver of the extradition hearing is linked to the rule such that the relator,
upon return, can be prosecuted in the requesting state only for the offense for
which the extradition hearing was waived. It is important to bear in mind that
the rule benefits not only the relator but also the United States government
by ensuring that its processes have not been used for a purpose other than the
one specified in the treaty. Theoretically the United States government can waive
the rule without the need for a judicial hearing, provided the requesting state
has probable cause for other offenses and is not seeking to prosecute the relator
for political, racial, religious, or ethnic reasons.'96 The Act does not alter existing
jurisprudence and governmental practice on this subject.',
The Senate and House versions fail to provide for bail when the relator
has waived his right to the extradition hearing. The Senate bill provides no
guidelines for a relator's release pending surrender. 198 The House version pro-
vides standards for bail only in section 3199, the final section in the bill.' 99
There is no specific provision for bail when the relator has waived the extradi-
tion proceeding.2"'
The Senate version provides specific time limitations on detention in its
section regarding waiver.20 ' It requires that the relator be removed within thirty
."These observations were also made by this author at congressional hearings on the bills. See Senate
Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 23, at 20; House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note
4, at 103; House Foreign Relations Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 27.
"'See 1 M.C. BAssIoum, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 6.
"'See id. These observations and suggestions were made by this writer at hearings on S. 1639, H.R. 5227,
and H.R. 6046. See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 20; House Judiciary Hearings
on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 99, 103; House Foreign Relations Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 27.
"'See 1 M.C. BAsslouNi, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 6.
"'In fact, the Senate bill requires that "[the court shall order that the person be held in official detention
until surrendered." S. 220, supra note 7, § 3193(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3193(c); S. 1639, supra note
1, § 3195(c). The Senate Judiciary Report made no reference to whether a relator should be released pending
delivery when he has waived the extradition hearing. See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note
15, at 10-11.
"'H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199 (c); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199(c); H.R. 5227, supra note 2,
3198(c). H.R. 3347, however, includes bail in its section regarding the complaint and preliminary proceedings.
See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(0.
"'The House Judiciary Report made no reference to whether a relator should be released pending delivery
when he has waived the extradition hearing. See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23,
at 12-13.
"'The bill provides:
LIMITATION ON DETENTION PENDING REMOVAL -
A person whom the court orders surrendered pursuant to subsection (c) may, upon reasonable notice
to the Secretary of State, petition the court for release from official detention if, excluding any
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days from the date of waiver. If not removed with this period, the relator may
petition for release. The burden is placed upon the Attorney General
to show good cause why the relator should not be released. The standard of
"good cause" is not defined anywhere in the bill.20 2 The House bill requires
that the relator be removed within thirty days from the court's certification
of the transcript.20 3 If not removed within this time limitation, the relator may
petition the court for dismissal of the complaint against him and dissolution
of the court's order of extraditability. 04 As in the Senate bill, the House ver-
sion permits the Attorney General to show good cause why the relator's peti-
tion should not be granted, and again, the standard of "good cause" is not
defined. 205
Both versions of the Act require that the Attorney General consent to the
relator's waiver of the extradition hearing. 2 6 The Senate Judiciary Committee
noted that this requirement was included to prevent the relator from leaving
the United States in order to avoid prosecution or punishment in this country.
It also gives the requesting state the latitude to prosecute and punish the relator
for all of the offenses specified in the complaint, thus preserving the rule of
specialty, 20 as noted in the Report of the House Judiciary Committee.20 8 The
time during which removal is delayed by judicial proceeding, the person is not removed from the
United States within thirty days after the court ordered the person's surrender. The court may grant
the petition unless the Secretary of State, through the Attorney General, shows good cause why
the petition should not be granted.
S. 220, supra note 7, § 3193(d); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3193(d); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3193(d).
2 2No standard for "good cause" is provided in the Judiciary Committee's Report. See Senate Judiciary
Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 10-11.
"'This requirement is stated not in the section regarding waiver, but in the section regarding surrender
of the relator after the hearing. In full, the subsection provides:
The court shall, upon petition after reasonable notice to the Secretary of State by a person
ordered extraditable under this chapter, dismiss the complaint against the person and dissolve the
order of extraditability if that person has not been removed from the United States by the end
of thirty days after -
(1) surrender has been ordered by the Secretary of State in the case of a person ordered
extraditable after a hearing under this section; or
(2) certification of transcript under section 3193 of this title in the case of a person making
waiver under such section;
unless the Attorney General shows good cause why such petition should not be granted.
H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3196(c); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3196(c); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(c).
The original House bill contained no provision to limit the period of the relator's detention in the event
he had waived the extradition hearing and consented to removal.
2'Id.
"'This is true in the Senate and House Judiciary Committees' Report on the bill as well. See Senate Judiciary
Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 10-11; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 12-13.
" S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 state this requirement in subsection (c), which provides that the court,
upon finding that the relator's "consent to removal is voluntary and given with full knowledge of its
consequences, shall, unless the Attorney General notifies the court that the foreign state or the United
States objects to such removal, order the surrender" of the relator. S. 220, supra note 7, § 3193(c); S.
1940, supra note 5, § 3193(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3193(c). H.R. 3347, H.R. 2643, H.R. 6046, and
H.R. 5227 provide for this requirement in subsection (a), which states that the relator may waive the
extradition hearing "with the consent of the Attorney General .... " H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3193(a);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3193(a); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3193(a); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3193(a).
.. 'See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
"'See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 12.
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Senate Report also states that the "Secretary of State does not have the discre-
tionary authority to refuse to surrender a person who has waived the proceeding
under this chapter. 2 0 9 Thus, the relator's waiver of the extradition hearing
is understood to be a bar to the Secretary of State's executive discretion to
deny extradition. This is erroneous, since that discretion is inherent in the Con-
stitution's separation of powers and not derivative from the legislature. Nothing
in the Act, nor any of its drafts, refers to partial waiver by the relator. In practice
this might well be the case, and presumably the government in consultation
with the requesting state could stipulate to it with the relator.
Much like the guilty plea in criminal proceedings, the waiver procedure
will provide an opportunity for negotiations prior to the formal entry of a
waiver. 10 If a person sought for extradition waives a hearing and an appeal
by right, it is common sense to expect that such a person will seek to obtain
some quid pro quo; this is the opportunity for it, as it has been in criminal
proceedings. However, in extradition it is difficult to see how the government
can compromise the rights of the requesting state. It can, of course, amend
the complaint and delete certain charges or reduce them, but this implies con-
sent of the requesting state and that of the Secretary of State. It can be argued
that once a request is made by a state all procedural aspects thereafter, including
waiver, are subject to national law. If such law gives the Attorney General ex-
plicit or implicit discretion it cannot be subjected to the approval of the re-
questing state, except in cases of specific treaty requirement. Nevertheless, the
prior consent of the Secretary of State should be obtained for two reasons:
(1) it is a matter affecting foreign affairs for which the Secretary of State is
accountable to the requesting state, and (2) under the rule of specialty the
Secretary of State will have to enforce a court order which is based on something
other than what the requesting state submitted its request for and he should
be in a position to do so effectively by sharing in the original decision.
The waiver procedure is, however, intended to accelerate the processes
of extradition' 2 and will very likely accomplish this, although it will also result
in increased negotiations and plea bargains.
XV. EXTRADITION HEARING AND ORDER
Section 3194 of both the Senate and House bills provides for procedural
and substantive aspects regarding the extradition hearing, evidence which can
be presented by the Attorney General and the relator, defenses which the relator
20'Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 10.
"°See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) reh'g
denied 435 U.S. 918 (1978). See also Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken
Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978). It is important in this context to also consider the role of
the judge in this process. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1059 (1976).
"'The provision regarding appeal, § 3195, is discussed infra at notes 339-74 and accompanying text.
"'See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 10; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046,
supra note 23, at 12.
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may raise as a bar to extradition, the findings of the court, and the certifica-
tion of the court's findings. It thus contains a mixture of substantive and pro-
cedural requirements and formalities.
A. The Hearing
Both the Senate and House bills structure the extradition hearing such that
it is sui generis, partaking of both criminal and civil characteristics. Although
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
are not applicable per se in an extradition hearing,213 all versions of the bill
make specific reference to the applicability of these Rules214 and implicitly in-
corporate the Rules on numerous occasions. 2I 5 The characterization of extradi-
tion as a sui generis matter was developed by the courts primarily to fill legislative
gaps caused by piecemeal amendments to the United States extradition laws
between 1848 and 1968.216 Although the Act is portrayed by its supporters as
a "complete reform and revision" of United States law and practice,2"7 it is
in many respects a codification of current jurisprudence and practice in the
extradition hearing.21  However, it leaves many gaps, as indicated in this article.
It is unfortunate that the "Act" continues the sui generis characterization of
the extradition process developed by jurisprudence instead of giving it a more
distinguishable procedural nature. In so doing, the "Act" missed an oppor-
tunity to dispel the ambiguity inherent in existing practice which is likely to
pose problems in the court's interpretation of this section.
Both versions of the Act require that the court shall hold the extradition
hearing as soon as practicable after the service of summons or arrest of the
"'See FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5); FED. R. EVID. l101(d)(3).
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192(c)
(applicability of FED. R. CIuM. P. 4(d) to arrest warrant standards); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 1,
§ 3192(d)(1) (applicability of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to arrest warrant standards); H.R. 3347,
supra note 8, § 3194(g)(1)(B); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(1)(B); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, §
3194(g)(1)(B); H.R. 5227, supra note 1, § 3194(g)(1)(B) (applicability of Federal Rules of Evidence to
admissibility of authenticated documents).
"2'See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 8 (FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(d) applicable to arrest
warrants; FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 applicable to requirement that relator appear before court without
unnecessary delay); id. at 17 n.6 (FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 applicable to determination of probable cause to
extradite); id. at 16 (FED. R. EVID. 901(a) and 902(3) applicable to authentication of documents); House
Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 10 (FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(d) applicable to arrest warrants);
id. at 16 (FED. R. CRiM. P. 5 applicable to requirement that relator appear before court without unnecessary
delay); id. at 15 (Federal Rules of Evidence applicable to extradition hearings). See also Senate Judiciary
Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 15 (relator's right to counsel analogized to 18 U.S.C. § 3401); id.
at 18 (Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure applicable to appeal section); House Judiciary Report on
H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 13 (consent to waiver analogized to guilty pleas); id. at 16 (relator's right
to counsel analogized to 18 U.S.C. § 4214); id. at 17 (federal probable cause for arrest standard applicable
to extradition proceedings); id. at 28 (Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure applicable to appeal section).
"2"See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
2"'See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 3-5; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046,
supra note 23, at 2-5.
"'See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 11-13, 15-17; House Judiciary Report
on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 13-20.
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person requested. 19 The Senate bill states that the court is "to determine whether
the person against whom a complaint is filed is extraditable as provided in
subsection (d)," 22 ° while the House bill provides that the court is "to deter-
mine issues of law and fact with respect" to the complaint. 22' The Senate bill
further specifically states that "[tihe purpose of the hearing is limited.1 22 2 No
such equivalent statement is included in the House bill. In addition, the Senate
bill notes that
It]he court does not have jurisdiction to determine -
(1) the merits of the charge against the person by the foreign
state;
(2) whether the foreign state is seeking the extradition of the
person for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person for his
political opinions, race, religion, or nationality; or
(3) whether the extradition of the person to the foreign state
seeking his return would be incompatible with humanitarian
considerations .223
The House bill, however, simply states that "[tihe guilt or innocence of the
person sought to be extradited . . . is not an issue before the court. 224
The two versions of the Act also specify the rights of the relator at the
extradition hearing. Both are virtually identical in their provision of the relator's
right to representation by counsel, and the relator's right to court-appointed
I"S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(a); H.R.
3347, supra note 8, § 3194(a); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(a); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(a);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(a).
"'*S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(a). S. 1940 and S. 1639 did not include the phrase "as provided in subsection
(d)." See S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(a).
"'IH.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(a); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(a); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, §
3194(a); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(a).
"IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(a).
"'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(a)(1)-(3). S. 1940 and S. 1639 stated that "[t]he court does not have jurisdiction
to determine the merits of the charge," or whether the requesting state "is seeking the extradition of the
person ... for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person for his political opinions." S. 1940,
supra note 5, § 3194; S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194. Thus, it did not provide here for the relator's persecution
because of his race, religion, or nationality. In addition, S. 1940 and S. 1639 did not provide in this subsection
that the court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the relator's return would be incompatible
with humanitarian considerations. Instead, they simply stated in another subsection that such determination
is solely within the discretion of the Secretary of State. S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(2); S. 1639, supra
note 1, § 3194(e)(2). The earlier Senate bills also did not state the limitations on the court's jurisdiction
as separate subsections; this was provided for in a single paragraph. S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(a);
S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(a). The originally enacted version of S. 1940 published in the Congressional
Record also included language in this section that the court did not have jurisdiction "to determine whether
the foreign state is seeking the extradition of the person for a political offense, [or] for an offense of
a political character." 128 CONG. REc. S10,882 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982). This language first appeared
in S. 1639, and was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940,
supra note 15, at 33. It was deleted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See Senate Foreign Relations
Report on S. 1940, supra note 20, at 18.
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3194(b)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(b)(2).
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counsel if he is financially unable to obtain one.22 However, the Senate bill
makes specific reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A226 with regard to the relator's
right to court-appointed counsel, while the House bill makes no reference to
any source of this right.227 In addition, the Senate version does not specifically
provide that the relator's right to representation by counsel arises at the extra-
dition hearing;228 the House version, on the other hand, provides that the right
arises at the hearing.
229
Both versions of the Act also provide for the relator's right to cross-examine
witnesses. They differ, however, as to the scope of this right. The Senate bill
provides only that the relator "may cross-examine witnesses who appear against
him. ' 230 The House bill goes beyond this, by stating that the relator has the
right "to confront and cross-examine witnesses." 23' It contains no qualifying
22
'The Senate bill provides for the following:
(b) RIGHTS OF THE PERSON SOUGHT.
The court shall inform the person of the limited purpose of the hearing, and shall inform him that -
(1) he has the right to be represented by counsel and that, if he is financially unable to
obtain counsel, counsel may be appointed to represent him pursuant to section 3006A; and
(2) he may cross-examine witnesses who appear against him and may introduce evidence
in his own behalf with respect to the matters set forth in subsection (d).
S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(b).
The House version states the relator's rights in these terms:
(b)(l) At a hearing under this section, the person sought to be extradited has the right -
(A) to representation by counsel, including counsel appointed without cost to such person
if such person is financially unable to obtain counsel;
(B) to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and
(C) to introduce evidence with respect to the issues before the court.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(b)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(b)(1).
II'See supra note 225. Oddly, the Senate Judiciary Report notes that this subsection of the bill is governed
by 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1979) regarding the jurisdiction of United States magistrates to try persons accused
of misdemeanors. See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 15.
"'The House Judiciary Report similarly makes no reference to other legislation or case law which would
provide guidelines as to the scope and limitations of this right. See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046,
supra note 23, at 16.
"'See supra note 225.
229H.R. 3347, H.R. 2643, H.R. 6046, and H.R. 5227 state: "At a hearing under this section, the person
sought.., has the right - (A) to representation by counsel .... "H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1)(A);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1)(A); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(b)(l)(A); H.R. 5227, supra
note 2, § 3194(b)(l)(A).
2S°S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(b)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(b)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(b)(2).
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(l)(B); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1)(B); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(b)(1)(B); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(b)(l)(B). The House Judiciary Report noted that
this term was taken from 18 U.S.C. § 4214 (1976) relating to revocation of parole. See House Judiciary
Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 16. Section 4214(a)(2), regarding the hearing to determine whether
parole should be revoked, provides that the Parole Commission shall conduct the hearing according to
the following procedures:
(A) notice to the parolee of the conditions of parole alleged to have been violated, and the
time, place, and purposes of the scheduled hearing;
(B) opportunity for the parolee to be represented by an attorney (retained by the parolee, or
if he is financially unable to retain counsel, counsel shall be provided pursuant to section 3006A)
or, if he so chooses, a representative as provided by rules and regulations, unless the parolee knowingly
and intelligently waives such representation;
(C) opportunity for the parolee to appear and testify, and present witnesses and relevant evidence
on his own behalf; and
(D) opportunity for the parolee to be apprised of the evidence against him and, if he so requests,
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statement to the effect that this right is limited to a cross-examination of only
those witnesses who appear against him.232 None of the versions refer to com-
pulsory attendance of witnesses favorable to the relator.
Finally, both bills give the relator the right to introduce certain evidence,
although neither refers to discovery. The Senate bill provides that the relator
"may introduce evidence in his own behalf with respect to the matters in sub-
section (d)"1 Subsection (d) is a statement of the findings the court must make
in ordering the relator's extradition."" They are substantially similar to those
required under the House version.3 The House bill provides that the relator
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the Commission specifically finds substantial
reason for not so allowing.
18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(2)(A)-(D) (1976) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Caldera, 631 F.2d 1227
(5th Cir. 1980) (failure to provide parolee with adequate cross-examination required new evidentiary hearing);
Ready v. United States Parole Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 1273 (D.C. Pa. 1980) (parolee's right to cross-examine
witnesses can be denied upon a showing of "good cause"); Galante v. United States Parole Comm'n,
466 F. Supp. 1266 (D. C. Conn. 1979) (good cause shown where witness' appearance would subject him
to risk of harm).
2'The House Judiciary Report indicated, however, that "[tihis right obviously does not expand the right
of the person being sought to call as witnesses persons who prepared documents, because in many situations
the ordinary rules of evidence allow the use of documents without requiring the presence of the author."
House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 16.
2"S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(b)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(b)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(b)(2).
1"'Subsection (d) provides:
(d) FINDINGS. - The court shall find that the person is extraditable if it finds that -
(1) there is probable cause to believe that the person arrested or summoned to appear is
the person sought in the foreign state;
(2) the evidence presented is sufficient to support the complaint under the provisions of
the applicable treaty;
(3) no defense to extradition specified in the applicable treaty, and within the jurisdiction
of the court, exists; and
(4) the act upon which the request for extradition is based would constitute an offense
punishable under the laws of -
(A) the United States;
(B) the State where the fugitive is found; or
(C) a majority of the States.
The court may base a finding that a person is extraditable upon evidence consisting, in whole or
in part, of hearsay or of properly certified documents.
S. 220 supra note 7, § 3194(d); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(d); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(d).
'The House bill requires the following findings:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the court shall order a person extraditable after
a hearing under this section if the court finds -
(A) probable cause to believe that the person before the court is the person sought;
(B) (i) probable cause to believe that the person before the court committed the offense
for which such person is sought; or
(ii) the evidence presented is sufficient to support extradition under the provisions of
the applicable treaty concerning extradition; and
(C) the conduct upon which the request for extradition is based -
(i) would be punishable under the laws of -
(I) the United States;
(II) the majority of the States of the United States; or
(III) the State where the fugitive is found; and
(ii) (I) at least one such offense is punishable by a term of more than one year's
imprisonment, in the case of a person before the court who is sought for trial; or
(II) more than one hundred and eighty days of imprisonment remain to be served
with respect to such offense; in the case of a person before the court who is sought for
imprisonment.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(d)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(d)(1).
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has the right to "introduce evidence with respect to the issues before the
court." 36 Both versions require that the court inform the relator of his rights
and of the purpose of the hearing. 2 " The Senate bill states this latter aspect
as a "limited purpose. '238
There are numerous parts of this section which will present novel, and
potentially difficult, issues of interpretation and implementation. First, the re-
quirement in both versions of the Act that the hearing be held promptly is
analogous to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 239 However,
the legislation provides no sanctions for those instances when a hearing is not
held promptly.2"' Presumably this embodies a form of statutory speedy trial
right which, though guaranteed under the sixth amendment, has not heretofore
been held applicable to extradition proceedings.2 The same situation prevails
under section 3195 with respect to expedited appeals;242 again, there are no
sanctions for unreasonable delays. The judiciary may therefore find that the-
federal standards and sanctions for speedy trial are applicable 2 3 and rely on
the spirit of the legislation to accomplish this objective. The Act does not refer
in any way to pre-trial discovery and it is assumed that existing jurisprudence
would apply.244
In addition, the House version's provision for the relator's right to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses is unclear, since the bill does not state whether
1"H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1)(C); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1)(C); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(b)(1)(C); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(b)(1)(C).
"'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(b);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(c); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(c): H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(c):
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(c).
13 S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(b).
"2"FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, quoted at supra note 147. The House Judiciary Committee explicitly recognized
the analogy to Rule 5, elaborating that "It]he requirement of a prompt hearing parallels the right of a
criminal defendant to obtain a prompt determination of probable cause." House Judiciary Report on
H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 16. The Senate Judiciary Committee's observation of the analogy to Rule
5 was made regarding the bill's requirement that the relator "be taken without unnecessary delay before
the nearest available Federal court for an extradition hearing" in § 3192(c). See Senate Judiciary Report
on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 8. The Report made no observation on § 3194(a)'s requirement that the
hearing be held "as soon as practicable" after the relator's arrest or the issuance of a summons. Even
though the Report notes that one of the purposes of the new bill is to "codif[y] the right of a fugitive
to legal representation and to a speedy determination of an extradition request," id. at 5, it can be reasonably
inferred that the Commitee intended the analogy to Rule 5 to apply to this latter section of the bill as well.
1"In addition, there is no mention of sanction in either.the Senate or House Judiciary Report. See Senate
Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 14, at 13-14; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note
22, at 16.
"'See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739; Sabatier v. Dambrowski, 453 F. Supp. 1250 (D.R.I. 1978);
Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
"'The provision regarding appeal, § 3195, is discussed infra notes 336-71 and accompanying text.
"'See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (concerning imprisoned
defendants); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969 (7th
Cir. 1972), aff'd 412 U.S. 434 (1973). See also Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle,
72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376 (1972); Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STANFORD
L. REV. 575 (1975). Concerning the rights of defendants to speedy disposition, see United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
'"See 2 M.C. BAssiouNi, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 17, at ch. IX, § 4.
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or not the court can compel the appearance of witnesses who are outside the
United States."4 5 This provision is analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 4214 applicable
to federal criminal proceedings,2' 6 even though, as stated above, the legislative
history of the Act specifies that such rules do not per se apply to extradition
proceedings.4 7 Nevertheless, such analogies are appropriate if one seeks guidance
from the legislative intent. Moreover, the bill does not provide for the right
of the relator to compel the appearance of any affiant or person who prepared
any of the affidavits presented by the government on behalf of the requesting
state.24 Thus, while certain procedural rights of the defense are specified which
are analogous to those existing by statute and case law to federal and state
criminal proceedings, none of the remedies or sanctions for their violation are
specified in the Act. This problem is recurring throughout the Act, which does
not refer to these counterpart constitutional rights and standards applied in
federal and state criminal proceedings. Nevertheless the Act creates sufficient
inferences for courts to reach the conclusion that some analogy exists between
procedural norms under the Act and their counterpart in federal criminal pro-
ceedings. This may well result in the increased litigation of these questions.
B. Evidence and the Authentication of Documents
Both versions of the Act provide that properly authenticated documents
may be admitted. Essentially, the Act provides that such documents are
admissible if they have been properly authenticated under either the terms of
the applicable treaty, the laws of the United States, or the laws of the state
requesting extradition.24 9 The House version differs from that of the Senate
in that it specifies that authentication, if being established under the laws of
the United States, must be performed in accordance with "the Federal Rules
of Evidence for proceedings to which such rules apply." 250 The Senate bill re-
quires only that authentication in this instance be performed in accordance with
the "applicable... law of the United States." 25' In addition, the Senate bill
states that documents not authenticated according to the requirements of one
of the three methods listed above are nonetheless admissible if there is a show-
ing of "other evidence ... sufficient to enable the court to conclude that the
document is authentic." '252
"'See supra note 232.
1"'See supra note 231.
"'See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 10; House Judiciary Report on 6046, supra
note 23, at 14.
"'In fact, the House Judiciary Committee posited that the Act does not give the relator any greater right
to do so than that provided for in current jurisprudence. See supra note 232.
"'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(c)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(c)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(c)(1);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(g)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(g)(1).
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(1)(B); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(1)(B); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(g)(1)(B); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(g)(1)(B).
"IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(c)(1)(A); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(c)(1)(A); S. 1639, supra note 1,
§ 3194(c)(1)(A).
"IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(c)(1)(C); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(c)(1)(C); S. 1639, supra note 1,
§ 3194(c)(1)(C).
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Both versions of the Act also provide that the existence of a treaty may
be established through an "affidavit by an appropriate official of the Depart-
ment of State. ' 253 The Senate version also provides that a certificate from such
an official, rather than an affidavit, may establish the existence of a treaty
between the United States and the requesting state.25 ' In addition, the Senate
bill states that such certificate or affidavit is admissible to establish not only
the existence of a treaty, but also to establish the treaty's interpretation. 2"1 The
House bill simply states that such affidavit is admissible to prove "the existence
of a treaty relationship between the United States and a foreign state.
256
Both versions of the Act state that the court may consider hearsay evidence
as well as properly authenticated documents in making its decision. 257 In addi-
tion, both the Senate and the House versions state that if the applicable treaty
requires that such evidence be presented on behalf of the foreign state
as would justify ordering a trial of the person if the offense were com-
mitted in the United States, the requirement is satisfied if the evidence
establishes probable cause to believe that the offense was committed and
that the person sought committed the offense.258
A better, simpler, and more expeditious formula would have been to allow
authentication in accordance with the Hague Convention. 25 9
C. Substantive Requirements: Double Criminality and Probable Cause
The Act essentially provides that the court determine issues regarding the
requirement of double criminality and probable cause. The Senate and House
bills vary in their treatment of these two requirements, one of which (double
criminality) is of a truly substantive nature, while the other (probable cause)
is to this writer more of a procedural, constitutional dimension.
1. The Requirement of Double Criminality
Traditionally the most important substantive requirement for extradition
"IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(c)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(c)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(c)(2);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(g)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(g)(2).
254S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(c)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(c)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(c)(2).
25,id.
211H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3194(g)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(g)(2).
2'IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(d); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(d); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(d);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(3); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(3); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(g)(3); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(g)(3).
"S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(c)(3); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(c)(3); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(c)(3);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(h); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(h); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(h);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(h).
"'Convention abolishing the Requirements of Legalization of Foreign Public Documents, signed at the
Hague, Oct. 5, 1961, 527 UNTS 189, - UST - , T.I.A.S. No. 10072 (entered intoforce with respect
to the United States Oct. 15, 1981).
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is that the crime for which the relator is sought be an offense listed in the extra-
dition treaty and that such an offense constitute a crime under the laws of
the state wherein the individual was found or under federal criminal law.26 0
This is known as the rule of double criminality.16 1
Both the Senate and House versions of the Act broaden this requirement
by establishing that the offense must be punishable under the laws of: (1) the
United States; (2) the majority of the states; or (3) the state where the relator
was found. 62
This provision states that if the offense is punishable under the laws of
"the majority of the states," it will be deemed to have satisfied the rule of
double criminality. Assuming the government is proceeding on this basis, it
is obvious that such a provision causes a problem in determining what con-
stitutes a crime under the majority of the states - whether this is a numerical
standard or simply a general conceptual one.2 63 This also poses a problem with
respect to establishing "probable cause." Which state law will be relied upon
to, first, determine the elements of the crime, and, second, to apply these
elements to the facts of the case to determine probable cause? In addition, it
is unclear what standards will be relied upon. This may pose a challenge for
the courts to arrive at a workable solution. It is not likely that there will be
uniformity in the different circuits until the Supreme Court decides the ques-
tion. With the large number of states that have adopted, in one form or another,
the American Law Institute Model Penal Code,164 there may be more uniformity
in United States criminal laws than one would expect in light of historical dif-
ferences in state criminal laws.165
The House version, unlike the Senate's, at this writer's suggestion166 intro-
duced a new dimension to the rule of double criminality by requiring that the
offense in question be punishable by at least one year's imprisonment in the event
the person is sought for trail; or, in the event the person is sought for imprison-
ment, that the sentence that remains to be served with respect to such offense
216 See Caplan v. Yokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d at 916-18;
Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 562-63 (5th
Cir. 1962). See also Matter of Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1245 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938
(1981) (treaty provision allowing extradition for offense which is not a crime in United States is permissible).
2
'See generally 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI. U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 3.
"'1H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1)(C); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1)(C); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(d)(1)(C); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(d)(1)(C). S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 list these
same three sources, but state them as: (1) the laws of the United States; (2) the laws of the state where
the relator is found; or (3) the laws of the majority of states. S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(d)(4); S. 1940,
supra note 5, § 3194(d)(4); S. 1639, supra note 2, § 3194(d)(4).
...See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 22 (testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni); House
Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 99 (testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni).
'.MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (1980).
2'See generally M.C. BAsstoum, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW (1978).
"'.See House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 103.
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exceed 180 days.267 This will avoid using the lengthy and costly extradition pro-
ceedings for minor criminal matters.
The Act wisely dispenses with the unnecessary historical practice in United
States extradition treaties of specifically listing extraditable offenses. This prior
practice only meant that a determination of the extraditability for the offense
charged had to conform to the crime as listed in the treaty. This was the object
of delaying litigation when the terms used in the list did not conform exactly
to the offense charged or became obsolete (i.e., does larceny mean theft, does
theft include embezzlement, etc.).268 It also gave rise to the need to renegotiate
treaties for inclusion of new forms of criminality (i.e., computer crime today,
hijacking some few years ago), with all of the lengthy Senate ratification that
this process entails.
2. The Requirement of Probable Cause and Evidentiary Standards
a. Probable Cause
Both the Senate and House bills state that the Attorney General must show
the existence of "probable cause to believe that the person before the court
is the person sought," in order for the court to grant extradition.269 The two
bills differ, however, as to the requirement that there be probable cause to believe
that the relator committed the offense for which he is sought.
The Senate bill makes no explicit statement regarding probable cause that
the relator committed the offense(s) specified in the complaint. Instead, it merely
states that the evidence presented must be "sufficient to support the complaint
under the provisions of the applicable treaty." 27
The House version states that the Attorney General must show either that
there is "probable cause to believe that the person before the court committed
the offense for which such person is sought; or [t]he evidence presented is suf-
ficient to support extradition under the provisions of the applicable treaty con-
cerning extradition . . 27
Current United States extradition practice requires a showing of probable
"'The House bill requires that at least one offense must be punishable by "a term of more than one year's
imprisonment, in the case of a person before the court who is sought for trial; or [that] more than one
hundred and eighty days of imprisonment remain to be served with respect to such offense, in the case
of a person before the court who is sought for imprisonment." H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1)(C)(ii);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1)(C)(ii); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(d)(1)(C)(ii). This provision
was not included in the original House bill, H.R. 5227, and was inserted in the subsequent drafts.
"'See 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 5.
269H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1)(A); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1)(A); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(d)(1)(A); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(d)(l)(A). S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 state that
"[t]he court shall find that the person is extraditable if it finds that - (1) there is probable cause to believe
that the person arrested or summoned to appear is the person sought in the foreign state . 5..." S. 220,
supra note 7, § 3194(d)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(d)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(d)(1).
'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(d)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(d)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(d)(2).
'
1 1H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1)(B); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(1)(B); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(d)(1)(B); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(d)(1)(B).
[Vol. 17:4
48
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss4/1
cause that the relator committed the offense for which his extradition is
requested. 72 It would appear that the Senate version implicitly eliminates this
requirement if an extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting
state provided that probable cduse need not be established. Since such language
in a treaty would draw public attention and criticism, and if ratified would
risk being declared unconstitutional, the administration has phrased this pro-
vision of the Senate version in such a way that a treaty could simply be silent
on the requirement of probable cause (as is the case in a new treaty with Italy
signed in 1983 but not yet ratified by the Senate). The government could then
argue that the lack of explicit statutory language eliminates the requirement
of probable cause unless required by treaty. The constitutionality of the re-
quirement of probable cause for extradition will certainly arise in this instance.
Surely if the fourth amendment requires probable cause for the relator's arrest
it is difficult to conceive how that same requirement will not be deemed con-
stitutionally necessary for extradition,273 unless the relator waives it under sec-
tion 3193 of the Act.
Under the House version's provision, however, it could be argued that
the requirement of probable cause need not be met if the applicable treaty ratified
subsequent to the Act specifically excludes it. However, the legislative history
of the bill notes that the provision is intended to incorporate the constitutional
dimension of probable cause into the extradition procedure by stating that such
incorporation is "consistent with constitutional requirements under domestic
law." ' 274 Thus, for the House, unlike the Senate, the requirement of probable
cause is presumably a minimum standard below which an extradition treaty
cannot fall. This is an issue which is very likely to be litigated for some time
to come. Nevertheless, even in the House version it is not explicitly stated in
the text in order to accommodate the administration's desire to eliminate the
requirement if not by legislation then by treaty, or through ambiguity permit-
ting such judicial interpretation.
The applicablility of the requirement of probable cause also raises ques-
tions under the Act where the basis of the extradition request is a multilateral
international criminal law convention containing an extradition clause and to
272See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309,
and Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, the appellate courts have consistently required a showing of probable
cause without expressly making that showing a constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 390 (1982); Antunes v. Vance, 640 F.2d 4-5;
Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g. denied, 451 U.S. 934 (1981); Brauche
v. Raiche, 618 F.2d at 854; Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 932 (1978); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir. 1976), reh'g. denied, 429 U.S. 988
(1976).
"'At hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this writer noted that such a provision would likely
be found unconstitutional, as the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for a relator's arrest. It
is difficult to conceive how the relator could be arrested only upon a showing of probable cause but could
be subsequently extradited without probable cause. See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note
3, at 21.
17"House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 17.
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which the United States is a party. 3 If such a treaty is deemed applicable, 76
presumably no probable cause would be required and the constitutionality of
such a practice would be questionable."' The Senate version would allow such
a situation, while the House version would not for reasons stated above. A
further complication can arise if probable cause is not statutorily required: if
the offense for which extradition is requested is not included in the bilateral
extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting state, but the
treaty requires probable cause, and the said offense is found in an applicable
multilateral international criminal law convention which does not require pro-
bable cause, will the bilateral extradition treaty control with regard to probable
cause? The answer is likely to be in the positive even though the Act does not
address this question on the theory that the basis for the request is the bilateral
treaty, and the multilateral treaty is merely in the nature of a supplement to
the list of extraditable offenses. While this writer does not favor this eventual
approach, as a better one would be to rely on the multilateral treaty and the
legislation without regard to the bilateral treaty, it is most likely to be urged
by the Administration.
b. Evidentiary Standards
The essence of probable cause lies in the evidentiary standards applied.
In this respect the Act and the legislative history of all versions in the Senate
and House give very sparse consideration to this important question upon which
most extradition cases turn.
Both versions of the Act allow the court to consider hearsay evidence. 8
This is merely a codification of existing extradition practice" 9 and is consis-
tent with federal and state criminal procedures for the issuance of warrants. 8
However, in relying on hearsay for probable cause, courts may be faced with
new constitutional tests. 8 '
In the typical extradition case, reliability and credibility of the source will
usually pose no problem as long as the statements submitted from the requesting
state were made under oath. However, courts have not been true to the con-
stitutional requirements where they have considered unsworn statements without
"'See supra note 78.
'6See supra notes 65-81 and accompanying text regarding the use of multilateral international criminal
law conventions.
1"'See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739.
17'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(d); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(d); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(d);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(g)(3); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, 3194(g)(3); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(g)(3); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(g)(3).
... E.g., Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1980); O'Brien v. Rozman, 554 F.2d 780, 782 (6th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Magisano v. Locke, 545 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1976).
"'Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 412; McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967).
"See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108. See also Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978).
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even mentioning the credibility of the source.2"' A review of the jurisprudence
concerning the test of "underlying circumstances," which allows the judge to
exercise independent judgment of the sufficiency of the evidence presented,
reveals that this burden has generally been met."' It remains to be seen what
test is formally incorporated into the determination of probable cause to extra-
dite, and whether or not the evidentiary standard is more or less stringently
applied.1 4 The question, however, is not so much what the government has
to prove and by what legal standard, for that has not been a serious problem
for the government (although it has caused delays and difficulties in relations
with requesting states not accustomed to common law requirements of "pro-
bable cause"), but what evidence the relator is entitled to present in defense
or rebuttal.
The critical distinction between the magistrate's initial finding of probable
cause to arrest and the magistrate's determination of probable cause to extradite
is that at the extradition hearing a relator may not introduce evidence to rebut
probable cause which is in the nature of a defense. He may only introduce
evidence which clarifies or explains the evidence presented against him.285 The
existing standard which the Act ostensibly establishes statutorily is that a relator
cannot introduce evidence which would tend to show that he is not guilty of
the crime charged either by contradicting the evidence submitted against him
or by establishing an alibi. 2"
The House version of the Act broadens existing jurisprudence by expressly
allowing a relator "to introduce evidence with respect to the issues before the
court." 8 7 The legislative history indicates that this statutory provision is in-
tended to permit the introduction of evidence relevant to the issues before the
"'E.g., O'Brien v. Rozman, 554 F.2d at 783; Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir. 1976); United
States ex rel. Sakaguchi v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 1975); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478
F.2d 894, 901-902 (2d Cir. 1973). But see Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. at 1256 ("the question
of reliability may come into focus").
'"E.g., Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336; In re Williams, 496 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
"'See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d
1189 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 989 (1972); In re Extradition of David, 395 F. Supp. 803 (E.D.
Ill. 1975), aff'd sub nom. David v. United States, 699 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1983).
"'Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 511; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d at 905. At the extradition hearing
the government also has the opportunity to introduce additional information in order to support the
information which accompanied the initial request for the arrest warrant. Thus in determing whether or
not there exists probable cause to extradite, the hearing magistrate is not limited to the four corners of
the arrest warrant.
"'Section 3194(b)(2) of the House bill states that "[t]he guilt or innocence of the person sought to be
extradited of the charges with respect to which extradition is sought is not an issue before the court."
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(b)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(b)(2). The Senate version states that "[t]he court does not
have jurisdiction to determine the merits of the charge against the person by the foreign state .... " S.
220, supra note 7, § 3194(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(a). See also
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d at 1368; Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 903 (1970). Of course, evidence relevant to establishing a defense available under the applicable
treaty is admissible.
2'7H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1)(C); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(b)(1)(C); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(b)(1)(C); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(b)(1)(C).
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court.2"' Although there is no indication as to the precise meaning of "rele-
vant," reference by analogy would have to be made to the Federal Rules of
Evidence to explain the breadth and application of such relevant evidence." 9
Since the only issue expressly not before the court is the guilt or innocence
of the relator, both versions of the Act erode by inference the existing judicially
created rule that disallows contradictory evidence. Thus, a relator may be per-
mitted to introduce evidence which attacks the truthfulness of the factual allega-
tions presented by the United States government on behalf of the requesting
state. In addition to this statutory interpretation, there is strong constitutional
authority, in Franks v. Delaware,"29 to support the proposition that a relator
has the right to introduce evidence to contradict falsehoods which are contain-
ed in affidavits presented against him, if the defendant makes a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement was knowingly and intentionally,
or with a reckless disregard for the truth, included by the affiant, and if the
allegedly false statement was necessary to the issuing magistrate's finding of
probable cause. In that case a hearing must be held; if the defendant then
establishes the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard by a preponderance
of the evidence, and if the remaining content of the affidavit is insufficient
to establish probable cause, then the warrant must be voided. 9' It must be
noted, however, that falsehoods due to negligence or innocent mistake are not
susceptible to challenge.192 Franks-like situations have not arisen in extradition
proceedings, if for no other reason than the fact that no court has ever allow-
ed the relator the opportunity to present evidence or seek discovery leading
to such a conclusion because of the narrowly interpreted evidentiary openings
for the relator. Under the House version such evidence would be relevant and
thus admissible, and if relevant, it might open an avenue for discovery that
the court could not deny the relator.
D. Defenses to Extradition
Although there are a number of defenses to extradition which could have
been included in the Act,293 the Senate and House bills provide for only a few.
Both contain a provision regarding the political offense exception to
"House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 16.
"'1FED. R. EVID. 401 states: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."
"'438 U.S. 154 (1978).
"'Id. at 155-56, 171-72.
291Id. at 171.
"'See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 3 (testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni); House
Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 101, 106 (testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni). See generally
2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. IX, § 1.
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extradition29 ' and for defenses included in the applicable treaty. 9 ' The House
version also allows for the defense of lapse of the statute of limitations, even
if not included in the applicable treaty. 96
The Act's provisions for so few defenses is contrary to the practice of most
countries in the world. 97 In addition, it is silent with respect to a controversial
issue which has been argued before a number of federal district and circuit
courts, namely opposition to the court's exercise of jurisdiction when the
presence of the relator is due to an unlawful seizure abroad.29'  The Act
presumably leaves this question to the development of United States
jurisprudence.
1. The Political Offense Exception
The political offense exception was the most extensively debated issue at
congressional hearings on all the proposed bills.2 99 Both versions define the
"See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(e); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(e); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(e);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(e); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(e);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(e).
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(d)(3); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(d)(3); S. 1639, supra note 1, §
3194(d)(3); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(2)(B); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(2)(B); H.R. 6046,
supra note 5, § 3194(d)(2)(B); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(d)(2)(B).
"
6See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(2)(A); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(2)(A); H.R. 6046,
supra note 5, § 3194(d)(2)(A); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(d)(2)(A). H.R. 3347 also provides for the
defenses of (1) "prosecution or punishment because of.. . race, religion, sex, nationality, membership
in a particular social group or political opinion," and (2) "fundamental unfairness" as a result of extradition.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(d)(2)(D). The bill further states:
The Government shall disclose to the court any information in the possession of the Government
that would tend to establish the validity of a defense against extradition, unless such disclosure
is prohibited by law.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(1)(C).
"'See generally 2 M.C. BAsslouNi, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VIII, § 1.
"'See 1 id. at ch. V, § 1. See also David v. United States, 699 F.2d 41; United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d
314 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1970; Waits
v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975); United Stats v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir., cert. denied, 423
U.S. 847 (1975); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975); United States v. Herrerra, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267.
"'See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 2 (testimony of M. Abbell, Dep't of Justice);
id. at 8 (testimony of D. McGovern, Dep't of State); id. at 20 (testimony of M. C. Bassiouni, DePaul
University College of Law); id. at 29 (testimony of W. Hannay); House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227,
supra note 4, at 25 (testimony of R. Olsen and M. Abbell, Dep't of Justice); id. at 31 (testimony of D.
McGovern, Dep't of State); id. at 49 (testimony of D. Carliner, International Human Rights Law Group);
id. at 64 (testimony of R. Falk, Princeton University School of Law); id. at 71 (testimony of W. Henderson,
ACLU); id. at 85 (testimony of W. Goodman, Topel & Goodman); id. at 98 (testimony of M. C. Bassiouni,
DePaul University College of Law); id. at 108 (testimony of S. Lubet, Northwestern University School
of Law); id. at 141 (testimony of K. O'Dempsey, Brehon Law Society, R. Capulong, Alliance for Philippine
Concerns); id. at 209 (prepared statement of C. Pyle, Mount Holyoke College); House Foreign Affairs
Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 26. The Senate Judiciary Committee version of S. 1940 placed the
political offense exception outside the jurisdiction of the federal court. Instead, it gave the Secretary of
State the authority to determine the applicability of the exception. It also established criteria by which
this determination was to be made, and provided for appeal of the Secretary's decision, such appeal to
be successful if the federal court found that the Secretary's decision was not based on substantial evidence.
See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 14, at 33-36. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
amended S. 1940 by placing the exception under the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and establishing
criteria by which the court's determination is to be made. See Senate Foreign Relations Report on S. 1940,
supra note 20, at 19-20.
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political offense exception by listing those acts which cannot be considered a
political offense. In both the Senate and House bills, the following offenses
may not be considered political offenses:
(A) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Supression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on December 16,
1970;
(B) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal
on September 23, 1971;
(C) a serious offense involving an attack against the life, physical
integrity, or liberty of internationally protected persons (as defined in
section 1116 of this title), including diplomatic agents;
(D) an offense with respect to which a multilateral treaty obligates
the United States to either extradite or prosecute a person accused of the
offense;
(E) an offense that consists of the manufacture, importation, distribu-
tion, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs;
(F) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described
[above] . . . ., or participation as an accomplice of a person who com-
mits, attempts, or conspires to commit such an offense.3"'
The offense of rape may not be considered a political offense under any
circumstances in the Senate bill. Under the House bill, however, rape may be
300S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(e)(1)(A)-(E), 3194(e)(l)(G); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(1)(A)-(E),
3194(e)(l)(G); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(2). The prior House bill, H.R. 6046, provided that these
offenses could be deemed "political offenses" in "extraordinary circumstances." See H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(e)(2)(A)-(D), 3194(e)(2)(G), 3194(3)(2)(H). In addition, this prior bill stated that an offense
could not be deemed a political offense if it were "an offense with respect to which a treaty obligates
the United States to either extradite or prosecute a person accused of the offense," id. § 3194(e)(2)(D)
(emphasis added), rather than requiring that such duty to prosecute or extradite be included in a multilateral
treaty, as both Senate bills and the subsequent House bill provide. See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(e)(l)(D);
S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(l)(D); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(2)(D).
The original House bill, H.R. 5227, stated that these crimes would not normally be considered political
offenses. H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(e)(2)(B). The original Senate bill, S. 1639, did not include a
listing of crimes outside the definition of the "political offense exception," since under this bill the entire
issue was outside the court's jurisdiction. See S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(a).
H.R. 3347 provides that the last four offenses listed above cannot be deemed political offenses. In
addition, the bill states that "forcible sexual assault" is not a political offense, as well as "an offense
that consists of intentional, direct participation in a wanton or indiscriminate act of violence with extreme
indifference to the risk of causing death or serious bodily injury to persons not taking part in armed
hostilities." H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(2). Moreover, the bill deletes the distinction between those
offenses which could never be considered political offenses and those which could be so deemed under
"extraordinary circumstances." Instead, the bill provides in subsection (3):
The inclusion in paragraph (2) of this subsection of certain offenses does not preclude the
exclusion of other offenses from the political offense category. In determining whether an offense
is a political offense the court shall consider, as of the time of the offense -
(A) the status (whether civilian, governmental, or military) of any victims of the alleged offense;
(B) the relationship of the alleged offender to a political organization;
(C) the existence of a civil uprising, rebellion, widespread civil unrest, or insurrection within
the State requesting extradition;
(D) the motive of the alleged offender for the conduct alleged to constitute the offense;
(E) the nexus of such alleged conduct to the goals of a political organization; and
(F) the seriousness of the offense.
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considered a political offense in extraordinary circumstances.30' Both versions
of the Act provide that the following conduct may be considered a political
offense in extraordinary circumstances: "(1) an offense that consists of homicide,
assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury, kidnapping, the taking of
a hostage, or serious unlawful detention; (2) an offense involving the use of
a firearm (as such term is defined in section 921 of this title) if such use endangers
a person other than the offender; (3) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an
offense described [above] ... , or participation as an accomplice of a person
who commits, attempts, or conspires to commit such an offense." 302
By defining the political offense exception through examples rather than
through generic definitions, both versions may force the courts into a difficult
position due to insufficient flexibility in determining the validity of the relator's
political motives in committing the offense. Instead, the Act should define the
purely political offense as a general defense and the relative political offense
as a qualified defense, with the exclusion of international crimes except for
exceptional circumstances as the House version did.30 3
A purely political offense is still a defense under the Act, but only by
implication. The offense itself is labelled a crime because it constitutes a sub-
jective threat to the state's political, religious or racial ideology or its suppor-
ting structure, or both.3" ' The offense has none of the elements of a common
crime, where a private wrong has been committed through the injury to private
persons, property or interests. Treason, sedition, and espionage are offenses
directed against the state itself and are, therefore by definition, a threat to the
state's existence, welfare, and security. If such an act is linked to a common
crime, however, it loses its purely political character and no longer benefits
from the defense.
In contrast the relative political offense" 5 is almost entirely eliminated in
the Senate version because it contains an element of violence which creates a
private wrong. The relative political offense can be an extension of the purely
political offense, or it can be a common crime prompted by ideological motives.
"'IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(e)(1)(F); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(3)(C); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3194(e)(2)(E); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(e)(2)(E). H.R. 3347 states that "forcible sexual assault"
may not be deemed a political offense, subject to the factors of subsection (3). See supra note 300. S.
1940, similar to H.R. 6046, provided that the offense of rape could be considered a political offense in
extraordinary circumstances. See S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(2)(A).
302S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(e); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(e); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(3);
H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(2)(E), (F), (H); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(e)(2)(E), (F), (H).
H.R. 3347 does not make the distinction between those offenses which may be considered political in
exceptional circumstances. See supra note 300.
""1This position was advocated by this writer at Congressional hearings on the Act. See Senate Judiciary
Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 20; House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 105-106;
House Foreign Affairs Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 27. See also 2 M.C. BAssIouNI, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. ViII, § 2, pp. 1-106; VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE
POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION, supra note 39. H.R. 3347 approximates this approach moe than previous
versions of the Act. See supra note 300.
3041d"
3*SId"
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In determining whether an act consitutes a relative political offense, four factors
should be taken into account: (1) the degree of the actor's political involve-
ment in the ideology or movement on behalf of which he has acted, his per-
sonal commitment to and belief in the cause on behalf of which he has acted,
and his personal conviction that the means (the crime) are justified or necessitated
by the objectives and purposes of the ideological or political cause; (2) the ex-
istence of a link between the political motive (as expressed above) and the crime
committed; (3) the proportionality or commensurateness of the means used
(the crime and the manner in which it was performed) in relationship to the
political purpose, goal, or objective to be served; and (4) whether the relator's
political motives and goals predominate over his intention to commit the com-
mon crime.30 6 These criteria embody the jurisprudence of the United States
on the political offense exception,0 7 but both the Senate and House versions
seem to ignore the need for simplicity, clarity, and preservation of basic human
rights, protections which, when abused, may leave the individual no other
recourse than to engage in an act of violence and thus be extraditable.
International crimes are the exception to the political offense exception
they are extraditable offenses which are not to benefit from the political
offense exception.30 8 But the question still arises as to whether or not there
are some "exceptional circumstances" (as the House version describes it) which
would warrant exclusion. International crimes are offenses against the Law
of Nations or delictijus gentium and by their very nature affect the world com-
munity as a whole. As such, they should fall within the political offense ex-
ception because, even though they may be politically connected, they are in
derogation to international law.3 09
International crimes are those declared to be so, explicitly or implicitly,
in multilateral international conventions. At present these crimes are: aggres-
sion, war crimes, unlawful use of weapons, genocide, crimes against humanity,
apartheid, crimes relating to international air communications, threat and use
of force against internationally protected persons, taking of hostages, unlawful
use of the mails, drug offenses, falsification and counterfeiting, theft of national
and archaeological treasures, bribery of foreign public officials, interference with
submarine cables, and international traffic in obscene publications. 10
Theoretically, international crimes are excluded from the political offense ex-
ception irrespective of the circumstances under which they occurred, but it cer-
tainly can be conceived that under certain circumstances they could be subject
to some special consideration. One such example is where an individual is
persecuted for political, racial or religious reasons and his life or liberty is in
See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504. See.also H.R. 3347, supra note 300.
"'See 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI. U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. ViII, § 2, pp. 1-19.
"'See supra note 303.
.. 'Id. See also Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27 (1983).
"'"See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 12, at 52-106.
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serious jeopardy, and such individual by seeking to escape commandeers an
aircraft without causing risk or harm to others. Should that type of situation,
which could technically be labelled hijacking, receive some consideration ex-
cluding it from the exception to the exception? The Senate version makes no
such consideration, while the House version does.
History teaches us that certain regimes at times create conditions which
are so deprivatory of minimum standards of human rights that a person sub-
jected to such conditions has no alternative but to seek redress or even escape
by means of some violent conduct. Under the legislation, such persons sub-
jected to these conditions would not benefit from the political offense excep-
tion and would be returned to the requesting state where they are likely to be
subjected to prosecution.
Only those international crimes embodied in treaties ratified by the United
States come under this category in the Act. In addition, both bills provide that
except in extraordinary circumstances, a violent act shall not constitute a political
offense if it is "an offense with respect to which a treaty obligated the United
States to either extradite or prosecute a person accused of the offense." The
offense of war crimes - i.e., grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949111 - are not included in the enumerated exceptions, but should
have been. Such offenses could be interpreted as within the ambit of this sub-
section, because the United States is a party to the Geneva Conventions, which
obligate the United States to prosecute or extradite individuals who have com-
mitted grave breaches of the Conventions. To avoid unnecessary ambiguity,
a specific statement should have been made to exclude such violations, namely:
"grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and any amend-
ments thereto to which the United States may become a party.3'
2
Prescinding from certain aspects of the customary law of armed conflicts,"'
"'Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949:
No. I, For the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces of the Field,
6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
No. II, For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
No. III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 135;
No. IV, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
"'The reference to "amendements to the Geneva Conventions" is to provide for the United States' eventual
ratification of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, June 10, 1977,
U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977).
"'Hague Conventions of October 18, 1907: Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 360, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536; Convention (II) respecting
the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(3d) 414, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537; Convention (III) relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 3 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (3d) 437, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 538; Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 461, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Convention (V) respecting
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(3d) 504, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540; Convention (VI) relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships
at the Outbreak of Hostilities, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 533; Convention (VII) relating to the
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the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 differentiate between various levels
of hostilities and distinguish between two general types of hostilities: interna-
tional armed conflicts, and non-international armed conflicts (i.e., internal
conflicts).
Under the Conventions, acts of violence committed in the context of inter-
national armed conflicts cannot be considered political crimes for which extra-
dition may be denied through the application of the political offense excep-
tion. Instead, violent acts in this context are either justified and therefore not
criminal, or they are unjustifiable and are grave breaches or war crimes for
which extradition or prosecution is required. Whether the violent act is to be
deemed a crime depends on whether the act violated the terms of the Geneva
Conventions. If the act of violence conforms to the requirements of the Con-
ventions, it is not a crime. Thus, extradition of an individual who has commit-
ted such an act cannot be granted because it is justifiable under international
law and, therefore, could not be a crime under United States law, so the re-
quirement of dual criminality, section 3194, would not be fulfilled.
Acts of violence which are committed in the contexts of internal conflict,
on the other hand, may be considered within the scope of the political offense
exception. These contexts include internal armed conflicts and internal civil strife.
Acts of violence committed in the context of internal armed conflicts are
regulated by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This article pro-
hibits acts such as killing, torturing, or taking hostage individuals who are not
actively engaged in the armed conflict such as the wounded, sick, shipwrecked,
and civilians. Article 3 does not provide that such acts are to be considered
criminal acts, nor does it provide that other acts of violence are to be deemed
justifiable. Instead, it leaves this determination to states' application of their
national criminal laws and to their definitions of the political offense excep-
tion in extradition treaties.31" Thus, the political offense exception becomes rele-
vant when an act of violence which does not violate Article 3 has been com-
mitted. Because the United States is a party to the Geneva Conventions, the
Act should have been drafted so that it was consistent with these Conventions.
Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships, 3 Martens Nouvau Recueil (3d) 557; Convention (VIII)
relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 580, 36
Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541; Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War,
3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 604, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542; Convention (X) for the Adaptation
to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Conention of July 6, 1907, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(3d) 630, 36 Stat. 2371, T.S. No. 543; Convention (XI) relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to
the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 663, 36 Stat. 2396,
T.S. No. 544; Convention (XII) relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, 3 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (3d) 688; Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War,
3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 713, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545; Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting the
Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 745, 36 Stat.
2439, T.S. No. 546.
1
1 4See, e.g., Veuthey, Some Problems of Humanitarian Law in Non-International Conflicts and Guerrilla
Warfare, in 1 BAssIouNi & NANDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 422; Veuthey, Les
Conflicts Armes de Caractere Non International et le Droit Humanitaire, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (E. Cassese ed. 1975).
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It should provide that extraordinary circumstances include those situations
wherein an act of violence has been committed in the course of an internal
armed conflict, as provided under Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949, and is deemed permissible under the terms of these
Conventions.
Acts of violence which are committed during periods of civil strife are
not regulated by the Geneva Conventions. Instead, they are regulated solely by
national criminal laws and are therefore subject to the existing meaning of the
section's exceptions to the political offense exception. Thus, the Act's treat-
ment of the political offense exception is inadequate. The Senate version pro-
vides for the purely political offense exception only by implication, and
eliminates entirely the relative political offense when connected with a crime
of violence. This is, with the exception of totalitarian regimes, one of the most
restrictive legislative formulations in the world," 5 and was severely criticized
by almost every witness before the Senate316 and House3"7 except for govern-
ment representatives,318 and, of course those witnesses suggested by them.3"9
As to international crimes, they too are entirely excluded from consideration
as a political offense exception in the Senate version and the later House version,
but included in the House version under the condition that it be due to extra-
ordinary circumstances. 2 The House bill does not define "extraordinary cir-
cumstances," leaving the definition open for future jurisprudential develop-
ment which, by examining the House legislative interpretation, would not change
existing judicial standards.32" '
2. The Lapse of Statute of Limitations
Although the House bill provides for the defense of the statute of limita-
tions, the Senate version limits the defenses available to those enumerated in
the treaty. Nevertheless, it can be presumed that if the applicable treaty does
not specify a particular defense, the courts could rely on scattered precedents
Id. On the "relative political offense" exception generally, see VAN DEN WIJNGAERT. THE POLITICAL
OFFENCE EXCEPTION, supra note 39, at 108-11.
"'See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings on S. 1940, supra note 20.
"'See House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 49 (testimony of D. Carliner, International
Human Rights Law Group); id. at 64 (testimony of R. Falk, Princeton University School of Law); id.
at 71 (testimony of W. Henderson, ACLU); id. at 85 (testimony of W. Goodman, Topel & Goodman);
id. at 98 (testimony of M. C. Bassiouni, DePaul University College of Law); id. at 108 (testimony of S.
Lubet, Northwestern University School of Law); id. at 141 (testimony of K. O'Dempsey, Brehon Law
Society, R. Capulong, Alliance for Philippine Concerns); id. at 209 (prepared statement of C. Pyle, Mount
Holyoke College); House Foreign Affairs Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 26.
"'See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 2, 4, 8, 14 (testimony of M. Abbell, Dep't
of Justice; D. McGovern, Dep't of State); House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 26-27
(testimony of R. Olsen and M. Abbell, Dep't of Justice); id. at 32 (testimony of D. McGovern, Dep't
of State).
"'See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 30 (testimony of William J. Hannay).
"'See supra note 300.
"'See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 22, at 23-27.
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and follow the emerging contemporary trend of relying on United States law322
in order to determine the applicability of a particular defense.
3. Double Jeopardy
The Act does not include an explicit provision on the defense of double
jeopardy,323 failing to recognize jurisprudential holdings that the defense of
double jeopardy is validly raised as a bar to extradition when the extradition
request is based on the same or substantially the same crime as that for which
the relator has been prosecuted, convicted or acquitted. 2 " Whether the legal
basis of this defense in United States law is found in the eighth amendment
or the doctrine of resjudicata, it embodies the principle ne bis in idem recognized
in various multilateral conventions. 2 5
4. Immunity from Prosecution
In addition, the legislation does not take into account current United States
case law holding that a relator cannot be extradited if he was granted immunity
or entered a negotiated guilty plea with respect to conduct which is the same
or substantially the same as the one giving rise to the criminal charge for which
extradition is sought. Because constitutional rights supersede obligations under
a treaty, extradition in such an instance cannot be granted unless the plea is
vacated.326
XVI. BURDEN OF PROOF
The House version provides for detailed allocation of burden of proof
concerning various issues, unlike existing legislation and unlike the Senate
version. It places the burden of proving probable cause on the government by
a preponderance of the evidence but places the burden of raising a defense
on the relator in accordance with Federal Rules of Evidence,3"7 if the evidence
"'See 1 M.C. BASsIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 5, p. 24.
"'The House bill contains such a defense implicitly, in that it bars new requests for the "same factual
allegation as a previous complaint." See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note
8, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3192(a)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(a)(2). This defense
is severely weakened, however, by the bill's provision that the Attorney General may nonetheless file such
a complaint upon a showing of good cause.
'4See M.C. BAssioumt, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 452-59 (1974), relied upon
on this issue in Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1980). See also 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VIII, § 4, pp. 4-12.
"'See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, Art. 14(7); American Convention on Human
Rights, November 22, 1969, OAS T.S. No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. 2/V/II. 23, doc. 21,
rev. 6 (english 1979), Art. 8(4). See also Bassiouni, Hertzberg, Zammutto, The Protection of Human Rights
under International Instruments and National Constitution, 4 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 57, 84 (IAPL,
1982).
"'See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257; Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1975), on
remand Petition of Geisser, 414 F. Supp. 49 (S.D. Fla. 1976), vacated on other grounds Petition of Geisser,
554 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Pihakis, 545 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1977); Scrivens v. Henderson,
525 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); Dugan v. United States, 521 F.2d 231 (5th
Cir. 1973).
"'See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 20, at 19.
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supports a reasonable belief of the existence of the defense. Thereafter, the
burden shifts to the government to disprove the defense, although no stan-
dard is provided. The government has the duty to prove the existence of a treaty
for which the court is not required to take judicial notice, but no standard
is provided. In the Senate version there is no such allocation of the burden
of proof except in bail where it rests on the relator to prove, presumably to
the satisfaction of the court that special circumstances exist. 2 The House version
places the burden of proof for release on the relator.329 Nothing in the Act
refers to the seizure and introduction of evidence in violation of constitutional
rights and standards applicable to federal and state criminal proceedings.
XVII. CERTIFICATION OF COURT'S FINDINGS OF EXTRADITABILITY
Unlike existing legislation, 0 the Act requires the court, upon completion
of the hearing, to state its reasons for its findings as to each charge or convic-
tion contained in the complaint.3"' This is a very laudable provision in that
it establishes the basis for the appeal. " 2
Upon a finding of extraditability the court must certify a transcript of
the proceedings to the Secretary of State.333 Thus, it is not only the court's
order, containing an opinion which includes findings of facts and conclusions
of law, which must be sent to the Secretary of State, but also a certified copy
of the transcript of the entire proceedings.
Under the Senate bill, if the court finds that the relator is not extraditable,
it must certify its findings and an appropriate report to the Secretary of State.334
In this instance, certification of the transcript of the proceedings is not required.
Under the House version, the court must certify its findings to the Secretary
of State. The House bill accords to the judiciary the discretion to send to the
Secretary of State either a transcript of the proceedings or an appropriate
report. 3"
The House version further provides that the relator can petition the court
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192(d)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3192(d)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1,
§ 3192(d)(1).
"2'See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3192(d)(2); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3192(d)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3192(d)(2). See supra notes 169-84 and accompanying
text regarding bail.
3"18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976) requires only that the court certify its findings and a copy of the transcript
to the Secretary of State.
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(0; S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(0; S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(0;
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(0; H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(0; H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(0;
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(0.
"'The provision regarding appeal, Section 3195, is discussed infra at notes 339-74 and accompanying text.
33See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(0(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(0(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(0(1);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(0(1); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(0(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(0(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(0(1).
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3194(e)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(e)(2).
"'See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(0(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(0(2); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3194(0(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(0(2).
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to dissolve its order and dismiss the complaint if the Secretary of State does
not reach a decision as to his surrender within forty-five days from the date
of the Secretary's receipt of the certified order and transcript of proceedings
(excluding any delays caused by judicial proceedings). 3 6 The court is required
to grant such a petition "unless the Attorney General shows good cause why
such petition should not be granted." 337
The Senate bill contains a somewhat different provision regarding limita-
tions on detention pending removal. It states that the relator may petition the
court for his release, but not a dissolution of the court's order and a dismissal
of the complaint, if "the Secretary of State does not order the person's sur-
render, or declines to order the person's surrender, within forty-five days after
[the Secretary's] receipt of the court's findings and the transcript of the
proceedings . ".. 3"
In effect this is another statutory provision akin to a right to a speedy
trial, though in this case it is after adjudication. It is mandatory and not
peremptory, which means that the release by virtue of petition for dissolution
of the order can be automatically granted, unless the court grants the Secretary
of State a reasonable extension of time to achieve the surrender or good cause
is shown. This provision places a higher burden on the Secretary of State to
effectuate the transfer even though in some instances the circumstances may
be beyond the control of the Secretary. The court may, of course, grant the
Secretary a reasonable extension of time. A problem with this provision is that
it does not allow the Secretary enough time to take into account considera-
tions within his executive discretion such as matters pertaining to conditional
extradition and other humanitarian factors or political factors (stated specifically
in other sections of the Act in addition to his general authority under constitu-
tional executive discretion), nor does it allow enough time for the Secretary
of State to conclude negotiations on these matters with the appropriate
governments.
XVIII. REVIEWABILITY
Unlike existing legislation which does not provide for appeals, the Act
in section 3195 provides that review of extradition decisions are by means of
an appeal.339 This is a novel feature of the Act. What is meant by review is,
of course, a decision by the judiciary after a hearing with findings holding that
the requested person is extraditable. Whereas under existing jurisprudence,
review is limited to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, this section establishes
..H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(i); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(i); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, §
3194(i); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(i).
337Id.
33S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3196(c).
"'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195; S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195; S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195; H.R. 3347,
supra note 8, § 3195; H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195; H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3195; H.R. 5227, supra
note 2, § 3195.
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appeal for the relator and for the government as a matter of right, and thus
purports to exclude habeas corpus as a means for review. Constitutional require-
ments however stand in the way of excluding habeas corpus entirely.140 The
legislative intent is to achieve three objectives: (1) to afford the government
a right of appeal; (2) to exclude habeas corpus; and (3) to expedite the review
process. 
3 4 1
The section gives the government an opportunity it did not have in the
past to have a decision of non-extraditability reconsidered.3 42 The Senate bill
specifies that the appeal is to be taken in accordance with Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure 3 and 4(b).3 43 The House version provides simply that the
3'4U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." See also House Judiciary
Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 29.
'See Senate Judiciary Report, supra note 15, at 17-19; House Judiciary Report, supra note 23, at 28-29.
"
2See Matter of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). See also Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra
note 15, at 17-19.
"'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(a) state:
IN GENERAL. - Either party may appeal, to the appropriate United States court of appeals,
the findings by the district court on a complaint for extradition. The appeal shall be taken in the
manner prescribed by rules 3 and 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and shall be
heard as soon as practicable after the filing of the notice of appeal. Pending determination of the
appeal, the district court shall stay the extradition of a person found extraditable.
FED. R. App. P. 3 and 4(b) provide:
Rule 3.
APPEAL AS OF RIGHT - HOW TAKEN
(a) Filing the Notice of Appeal. An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court
to a court of appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court
within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the court of appeals deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. Appeals
by permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and appeals by allowance in bankruptcy shall be taken
in the manner prescribed by Rule 5 and Rule 6, respectively.
(b) Joint or Consolidated Appeals. If two or more persons are entitled to appeal from a judgment
or order of district court and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file
a joint notice of appeal, or may join in appeal after filing separate timely notices of appeal, and
they thereafter proceed on appeal as a single appellant. Appeals may be consolidated by order of
the court of appeals upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties
to the several appeals.
(c) Content of the Notice of Appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from; and shall
name the court to which the appeal is taken. Form 1 in the Appendix of Forms is a suggested form
of a notice of appeal.
(d) Service of the Notice of Appeal. The clerk of the district court shall serve notice of the
filing of a notice of appeal by mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party other than
the appellant, or, if a party is not represented by counsel, to the party at his last known address;
and the clerk shall transmit forthwith a copy of the notice of appeal and of the docket entries to
the clerk of the court of appeals named in the notice. When an appeal is taken by a defendant
in a criminal case, the clerk shall also serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon him, either by
personal service or by mail addressed to him. The clerk shall note on each copy served the date
on which the notice of appeal was filed. Failure of the clerk to serve notice shall not affect the
validity of the appeal. Service shall be sufficient notwithstanding the death of a party or his counsel.
The clerk shall note in the docket the names of the parties to whom he mails copies, with the date
of mailing.
Rule 4
APPEAL OF RIGHT - WHEN TAKEN
(b) Appeals in Criminal Cases. In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall
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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure applicable to criminal cases shall apply,
without specification to particular rules.34 4 It is interesting to note once more
how the Act brings extradition proceedings within the fold of criminal pro-
ceedings, though it goes to great lengths in its provisions as well as in the
legislative history to assert that extradition proceedings are sui generis and are
not in the nature of criminal proceedings.
34 5
The section provides that an appeal is initiated by way of a notice of an
appeal.34 6 Both versions of the Act require that the appeal is to be heard "as
soon as practicable' 34 7 after the filing of such notice. The House bill, in addi-
tion, requires that the appeal is to be heard "promptly" when the relator has
not been released pending determination of the appeal*.3 4 These requirements
that the appeal be held on an expedited basis indicate the legislative intent that
the extradition process be handled in a swifter manner than it has been
heretofore. 4 9
Both the Senate and House bills provide for the relator's release pending
the appeal. 0 Generally, if the relator was found extraditable by the lower court,
he cannot be released unless he satisfies specified criteria.3 ' If he is found not
be filed in the district court within 10 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, sentence or order but before entry
of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after each entry and on the day thereof. If a
timely motion in arrest of judgment or for a new trial on any ground other than newly discovered
evidence has been made, an appeal from a judgment of conviction may be taken within 10 days
after the entry of an order denying the motion. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of
newly discovered evidence will similarly extend the time for appeal from a judgment of conviction
if the motion is made before or within 10 days after entry of the judgment. When an appeal by
the government is authorized by statute, the notice of appeal shall be filed in the district court
within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. A judgment or order is
entered within the meaning of this subdivision when it is entered in the criminal docket. Upon a
showing of excusable neglect the district court may, before or after the time has expired, with or
without motion and notice, extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed
30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivision.
The Senate Judiciary Committee noted in its Report that other federal rules of appellate procedure should
also apply to matters such as briefing, oral argument, etc. See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra
note 15, at 18.
'"See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(1); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3195(a)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(a)(1). The House Judiciary Committee made no
further specification of which rules should apply. See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note
23, at 28.
1"'See supra notes 215 and 216.
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(a);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3195(a)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(a)(2).
347id.
1'1H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(5); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(4); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3195(a)(4); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(a)(4).
"4'See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 19; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046,
supra note 23, at 29.
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(b);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3195(a)(3); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(a)(3).
3'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(b)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(b)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(b)(1);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(A); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(A); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3195(a)(3)(A).
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extraditable by the lower court, however, he is to be released unless the Attorney
General satisfies specified criteria.5 2 The two versions of the Act differ on these
applicable criteria.
Under the Senate bill, if the relator was found extraditable by the lower
court, he will be held in detention unless he can demonstrate special
circumstances.353 Under the House bill, if the relator was found extraditable
by the lower court and the appeal has been taken by either party, he will be
held in detention unless he can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) he "does not present a substantial risk of flight"; (2) he "does not
present a danger to any other person or the community"; (3) "no relationship
with a foreign state will be jeopardized with respect to a treaty concerning ex-
tradition"; and (4) the probability of success of his appeal is "great.",",
If the relator is found not extraditable by the lower court, the Senate ver-
sion provides that he is to be released pending the appeal "unless the court
is satisfied that [he] is likely to flee or endanger the safety of any other person
or the community." '355 In this instance, the court is also directed to "impose
conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required and the safety of any other person and the community." ' 6 The
House bill states that if the relator was found not extraditable by the lower
court and if the appeal is brought by the government, the relator is to be released
unless the government shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the relator,
if released: (1) presents a substantial risk of flight; (2) presents a danger to
any other person or the community; (3) will jeopardize a relationship with a
foreign state with respect to a treaty concerning extradition; and (4) that the
probability of success of the government's appeal is great. 3"
32S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(b)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(b)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(bX2);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(B); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(B); H.R. 6046, supra
note 5, § 3195(a)(3)(B); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(a)(3)(B).
"IS. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(b)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(b)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(b)(1).
The Senate Judiciary Report stressed its desire that
this authority to release a fugitive on bail will be utilized even more sparingly than the power to
grant bail before the extradition hearing, and only after the most thorough and searching examination
of the claimed need for release. It is expected that the courts of appeal will keep in mind that "no
amount of money could answer the damage that would be sustained by the United States if [the
fugitive] were to be released on bond, flee the jurisdiction, and be unavailable to surrender .... "
Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 18-19, quoting Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 314 F.2d
649. Although the Report does not cite to the particular page on which the quoted material appears in
Jimenez, it can be found on page 653 of the court's opinion.
"I'H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(A); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3195(a)(3)(A). H.R. 3347, supra
note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(A) deletes the requirement that the relator prove that no U.S. treaty relationship will
be jeopardized. Instead, the bill provides in subsection (a)(4) that the court consider this factor in making
its determination of release. The origial House bill, H.R. 5227, simply stated that the relator should be
held pending appeal if the Attorney General, upon motion, proved that the relator presented a risk of
flight or posed a danger on appeal, and that the problem of success in appeal was great. See H.R. 5227,
supra note 2, § 3195(a)(3). The provision did not place upon the relator any burden of proving that release
was appropriate.
"5S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(b)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(b)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(b)(2).
3361d.
I"H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(3)(B); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3195(a)(3)(B). H.R. 3347 does
not require proof that release will jeopardize a U.S. treaty relationship. See supra note 354.
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Both versions of the Act provide that the circuit court of appeals shall
have jurisdiction to review on appeal all matters pertaining to extraditability. " '
Thus the appellate courts can consider whether or not the lower court had subject
matter jurisdiction to conduct an extradition hearing, whether or not the lower
court had in personam jurisdiction over the relator, whether or not there is
a treaty currently in force which applies to the request for extradition, and
whether or not the crime charged falls within the terms of the applicable treaty.
These issues are all presently considered under habeas corpus review.", The
new direct appellate procedure should not change their reviewability, including
the review of the lower court's determination of the existence of probable cause
to believe that the relator has committed the crime charged and the sufficiency
of the evidence.
Under the existing standard of habeas corpus review, stated in Fernandes v.
Phillips, a magistrate's finding of probable cause will not be overturned if there
is "any evidence" in the record which supports that finding.36 Under the Act
when an appellate court considers the probable cause issue on direct appeal,
the standard of review applicable to all warrant cases will be used, and a
magistrate's finding of probable cause will be given "great deference." 36' The
change in reviewing standard is not evidenced by the differing verbal formula-
tion, but by the more searching appellate examination of probable cause found
in cases raising the question in the context of the fourth amendment362 rather
than the extradition context.36 Presumably such matters are limited to ques-
tions of law though there will inevitably be some mixed questions of law and
fact. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the jurisprudence of United
States courts concerning reviewability of issues on appeal in criminal cases will
likely be controlling.3 6
While purporting to restrict reviewability by means of petitions for habeas
.. 'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(a);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3195(a)(1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(a)(1). In addition, both bills provide that the district court
shall stay its order pending the appeal. S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(a);
S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(a); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(a)(2);
H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3195(a)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(a)(2).
" Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. at 312; Valencia v. Limbs, 655 F.2d at 197; Antunes v. Vance, 640
F.2d at 4-5; In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1240-41.
'"Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. at 312. The phrase "finding of probable cause," although commonly
used, is misleading since the existence of probable cause is not a finding of fact, but rather a legal judgment
which is made based upon certain facts which are found or allegations which are accepted as true.
"'Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 419.
"'See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. at 312; Valencia v. Limbs, 655 F.2d at 197; Antunes v. Vance,
640 F.2d at 4-5.
"'See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 407-08; Antunes v. Vance, 640 F.2d at 4-5; Escobedo v. United
States, 623 F.2d at 1102; Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d at 854; Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d at 1367, 1369;
Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d at 485.
"'See generally FED. R. App. P. 3, 4(b) (standards and notice of appeal); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 (harmless
error and plain error); FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (findings by district court will not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous).
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corpus, the Act does not entirely preclude it if "the grounds for the petition
or other review could not previously have been presented. 3 6' In this respect
it is assumed that federal rules and the court's interpretation thereof concern-
ing petitions for habeas corpus would apply as with other criminal cases.
36
The House version provides for an additional ground for habeas corpus, if
"the court finds good cause existed for not taking the appeal." '367 The House
bill does not define "good cause"; presumably the analogy to criminal cases
would be appropriate. 68 The second ground concerns issues that have not been
presented on appeal or have been discovered subsequently.
Habeas corpus petitions will also be the means resorted to for challenging
probable cause for arrest and bail prior to the extradition hearing. 69 As a result,
the legislation's provision will unduly lengthen extradition proceedings by allow-
ing for an appeal which concededly benefits the government, to which habeas
corpus proceedings will be added.
The Act does not discuss any post-trial motions which exist under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,37 ° and it is unclear what the courts might
do about their applicability." Surely there are sufficient references to these
rules in the legislation and its history for the court to find authority to fill the
gap between the hearing's order and the appeal.1 2 On the other hand the courts
may apply the construction rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 373 Under
the House version, the Supreme Court could resolve this problem under its
rule-making authority stated in section 3199(f)."
XIX. ExEcuTivE DISCRETION TO DENY EXTRADITION
The Act unlike existing legislation" 5 specifically provides for executive
"'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3195(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3195(c); H.R.
3347, supra note 8, § 3195(b)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(b)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3195(b)(2);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(b)(2).
"'See supra notes 362-64.
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3195(b)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195(b)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3195(b)(2); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3195(b)(2).
"'The House Judiciary Committee offered no specification in this regard. See House Judiciary Report
on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 29. Given the Committee's numerous references to criminal jurisprudence
and legislation in other sections where clarification was offered, it is likely the Committee intended such
an analogy.
"'On the necessity of probable cause to arrest prior to the extradition hearing, see supra notes 151-68
and accompanying text.
"'°See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (after trial by court' without jury, upon motion of defendant, district
court may vacate judgment, hear additional evidence, and enter new judgment); Rule 34 (motion in arrest
of judgment to contest jurisdiction); Rule 36 (motion to correct clerical mistake).
"'Neither the Senate or House Judiciary Report considered the question.
"'See supra notes 215 and 216.
""'That which is explicitly stated excludes anything else by implication." For the application of this rule
in the interpretation of extradition treaties, see 1 M.C. BASSOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra
note 12, at ch. II, § 4, pp. 25-26.
"'This section is discussed infra at note 421 and accompanying text.
"'Current legislation contains no provision for executive discretion to deny extradition. Such discretion
is currently derived from the executive's constitutional authority to direct foreign affairs, in U.S. CONST.,
art. II, § 2.
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discretion to deny a foreign state's extradition request if either: (1) the foreign
state is seeking extradition in order to prosecute or punish the requested in-
dividual because of his political opinions, race, religion, or nationality;7 6 or
(2) the relator's extradition would be incompatible with humanitarian
considerations.3 " Such executive discretion is to be exercised by the Secretary
of State and is not subject to judicial review. The Act thus specifically formalizes
executive discretion even though such discretion is within the executive's con-
stitutional authority in that it is a matter of foreign relations.3 78
These provisions are complementary to the rule of non-inquiry, recogniz-
ed in the United States through judicial case law. The rule of non-inquiry re-
quires that the extradition judge or magistrate cannot inquire into the political
motives of the requesting state and the punishment to which the relator may
be subjected upon return.3 79 The inclusion of such provisions, however, creates
anomalies in United States law which could lead to incongruous or unjust results.
Both the Senate and House bills contain identical provisions that the
Secretary of State has the discretion to determine whether a requesting state
is seeking extradition for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person
because of "such person's political opinions, race, religion, or nationality." 3 10
Such a decision is nonreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.381
The content of such a judgment and its application to a person about whom
such a decision is to be made are the same as under the terms of the 1967 Pro-
tocol Amending the 1951 Refugee Convention,38 ' which is embodied in the 1980
Refugee Act.383 However, the language of the Act is different from that of
376S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a)(3)(A); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(g)(i); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3196(a);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(4)(A); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(3)(A); H.R. 5227, supra
note 2, § 3194(e)(1)(A). The earlier Senate bill included this provision in its section regarding the hearing
rather than its section regarding surrender. H.R. 3347 permits the court to deny a relator's extradition
on these grounds. See supra note 300.
1"S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a)(3)(B); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(g)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(a);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(4)(B); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(3)(B); H.R. 5227, supra
note 2, § 3194(e)(3)(B). The Senate version also required that in determining these issues the Secretary
of State consult with the Department of State, including the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs. S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(g)(3). The earlier Senate version
provided for these matters in its section regarding the hearing rather than its section regarding surrender.
See S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(g)(3). H.R. 3347 permits the court to deny a relator's extradition on
these grounds. See supra note 300.
"7'U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2.
"'See 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 7.
S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(g)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3194(a)(2);
H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(a)(4)(A); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(3)(A); H.R. 5227, supra
note 2, § 3194(3)(a)(A).
"5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1976). The Senate bill states that the Secretary's decision is "a matter solely
within the discretion of the Secretary and is not subject to judicial review." S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a).
The previous Senate version differed slightly, in that it provided that the Secretary's decision is "final"
rather than "a matter solely within the discretion of the Secretary." See S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(g)(1).
The House bill contains no explicit provision for the finality and reviewability of the Secretary's discretion.
"'Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 1, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
"'s8 U.S.C. § 1101. For an in-depth study, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES (1982
Michigan Yearbook of Int'l Legal Studies).
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the 1967 Protocol and the above-mentioned United States legislation,384 and
this diversity could produce conflicting judicial and administrative results.
Furthermore, the procedures established under the 1980 Refugee Act38 pro-
vide for procedures under the Immigration and Nationality Act3"6 and the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service which precede the use of discretion by
the Secretary of State.
Since there is already an established procedure for the determination of
whether an individual is entitled to be considered a political refugee consistent
with international treaty obligations, it would have been preferable if the Act
had adopted the same substantive requirements and procedures set forth in
other United States legislation. Then, rather than having the Secretary of State
decide the issue at his discretion, after the court decides on the relator's extra-
ditability without considering his claim to status as a political refugee, the court
could direct the relator to file for political asylum under the 1980 Refugee Act.
The court would then withhold the final surrender order pending the deter-
mination of the Immigration and Nationality Service of whether the individual
were entitled to be considered a political refugee within the meaning of United
States law. If he were deemed eligible for the status of political refugee, then
the surrender order would not be issued; the order of extraditability would have
been reopened and a finding of non-extraditability entered. If he were found
ineligible for the status, the court could issue the surrender order. There was
no need for any additional language in the Act to confer discretion upon the
Secretary of State, since he can rely on executive discretion to refuse surrender
of a person certified extraditable by the courts.""
In addition, the bills provide that only the Secretary of State in his own,
unreviewable discretion may deem that the return of a relator to a requesting
state is "incompatible with humanitarian considerations." '388 This provision
"'The Refugee Act provides the following definition of "refugee":
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable
or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
The Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, Title II, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980), codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101 (a)(42)(A).
"'Id. at §§ 208 (asylum), 209 (adjustment of status), 94 Stat. 105-06, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1159.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 (asylum procedures). The Act specifically states that "the Attorney General shall
not deport or return any alien... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. § 203(e), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) [emphasis
added].
..'8 U.S.C. §§ 1100 et seq. (1976).
"'See M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 531-34 (1974). These
observations were made by this writer at hearings on S. 1639, H.R. 5227, and H.R. 6046. See Senate Judiciary
Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 20-25; House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at
105-06; House Foreign Affairs Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 27.
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a)(3)(B); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(g)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1,
§ 3194(a); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(4)(B); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(3)(B); H.R. 5227,
supra note 2, § 3194(e)(1)(B).
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is in keeping with long-standing United States practice that the court not inquire
into the prospective treatment that a relator may face upon return to a requesting
state.389 It is to be noted, however, that certain practices of corporal punish-
ment or cruel and inhuman punishment are contrary to United States public
policy as well as contrary to internationally protected norms of human rights. 90
To specifically state that discretion is given the Secretary of State to make such
determinations (although he has such executive discretion) might place the United
States in a position of embarrassment vis a vis a foreign government and could
burden relations between the United States and that government.
At hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 6046,
this writer suggested three procedures that would shield the United States govern-
ment from having to make such decisions which may impair its foreign rela-
tions with such a state.39' The first procedure is to condition extradition in cer-
tain cases to the non-applicability of such treatment or punishment which would
be contrary to United States law and policy and internationally protected human
rights norms. The analogy in this case is to the practice of a number of states
which prohibit extradition where the death penalty may be imposed. 92 It is
possible in such instances that the requesting state undertakes not to mete out
such a punishment and therefore eliminate the obstacle. The same could be
done with respect to corporal punishment, torture, and the like.
The second alternative is to extradite the relator on the condition that upon
his conviction he would be returned to the United States as a transferred prisoner
so that his sentence would be executed in the United States in accordance with
United States law.3 93 The third alternative is to deny extradition. The Act in-
"'See 1 M.C. BASsiOuN,. U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 7. See also Neely
v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1957). But see Peroff v. Hylton,
563 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1077); U.S. ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1974); Holmes
v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960) (rule of non-inquiry
may be relaxed in compelling circumstances). The House Judiciary Report noted that the rule of non-
inquiry is "not absolute," and may be relaxed in particularly egregious situations. In support, the Report
referred to Gallina. See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 20.
39.Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), article
5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force, March 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, article 7; European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force, September 3, 1953, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. No. 5, article 3; American Delcaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S.
Res. XXX, adopted by The Ninth International Conference of American States (Mar. 30-May 2, 1948),
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965), article XXVIII; American Convention on Human Rights,
opened for signature, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No., 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23,
doc. 21. rev. 6 (english 1979), article 5.
"1'See House Foreign Affairs Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 27. See also Senate Judiciary Hearings
on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 21 (testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni); House Judiciary Hearings on H.R.
5227, supra, note 4, at 100, 104-105 (testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni).
1"See 2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VIII, § 5.
3"See 18 US.C. §§ 4107-08 (1976). The inclusion of a provision regarding conditional surrender was suggested
by this writer at hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1639. See Senate Judiciary Hearings
on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 23 (testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni). The provision was added by the Senate
Judiciary Committee to S. 1940 and S. 220 and was carried over in H.R. 5227 and H.R. 6046. See S.
220, supra note 7, § 3196(a)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196(a)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(a);
H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3196(a).
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cludes all of the above but the determination is still left to the exclusive discre-
tion of the Secretary of State without judicial inquiry.39 The importance of
judicial determination in this case, as in other politically sensitive areas, is that
it shields the executive from the political consequences of such a determina-
tion when made in the face of a foreign state's extradition request.
XX. SURRENDER OF A PERSON HELD EXTRADITABLE
TO A REQUESTING STATE
Both versions of the Act contain similar provisions concerning the pro-
cedure for the surrender of an individual found extraditable.3 95 Both reemphasize
the Secretary of State's discretion to extradite, to condition extradition, or to
deny extradition, thus embodying statutorily the unreviewable discretionary
powers of the Secretary.
The Senate and House bills also clearly state that the Secretary may sur-
render a national of the United States even though such surrender is not
specifically authorized by the applicable extradition treaty.396 The Secretary is
denied such authority only where the applicable treaty or where United States
laws specifically prohibit it.397
The Act provides that the Secretary of State must notify the person held
extraditable, the diplomatic representative of the foreign state, the Attorney
General, and the court which ordered the person extraditable of his decision.398
Under the House version, although it is the Secretary who negotiates the sur-
render and orders it, it is the Attorney General who in accordance with in-
structions from the Secretary of State performs the actual surrender of custody
of the relator to the agent of the requesting government.399 Both versions of
the Act contain time limitations for the relator's surrender. Under the Senate
bill, the Secretary of State must reach his decision within forty-five days after
his receipt of the court's findings and the transcript of the proceedings.
4 0 0 If
the Secretary orders the relator's surrender, he must be removed from the United
States within thirty days following such order.40 ' If either of these time limits
9"4See supra notes 388-90 and accompanying text.
"'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196; S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196; H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3196; H.R.
2643, supra note 8, § 3196; H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3196; H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3196.
" 'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3196(a); H.R.
3347, supra note 8, § 3196(a); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(a); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3196(a);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3196(a).
397Id
"I'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3196(b);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3196(b); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(b); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3196(b);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3196(b). The Secretary of State must also notify the requesting state of the
time limitations for removal if the Secretary has determined that extradition is appropriate.
"'H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3196(b); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(b); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3196(b); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3196(b). The Senate makes no specification of who is to perform
the surrender.
1'0S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(c)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196(c)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3196(c)(1).
*01S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(c)(2); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196(c)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3196(c)(2).
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is not satisfied, excluding any delays for judicial proceedings, the relator may
petition the court for his release . 4 0 The court "may grant this petition unless
the Secretary of State, through the Attorney General, shows good cause why
the petition should not be granted.
' 40 3
Under the House bill, the SeCretary must also reach his decision within
forty-five days from his receipt of the court's findings and the transcript of
the proceedings.40 4 The House version, similarly, also requires that surrender,
if ordered by the Secretary, must be accomplished within thirty days from such
order. 0 5 If either of these time limitations is not satisfied, excluding any delays
for judicial proceedings, the relator may petition the court for dismissal of the
complaint and dissolution of the court's order of extraditability.406 Notice of
such petition is to be made to the Secretary of State.4 0 7 The bill specifies that
the court shall grant the relator's petition, "unless the Attorney General shows
good cause why such petition should not be granted.
4 00
Both versions of the Act thus provide for an unusual and rather rigid re-
quirement which is in the nature of a sanction imposed upon the requesting
state for failure to take custody and remove the relator from the United States.
Although both versions state that petitions can be filed by the relator, nothing
precludes the government - that is, the Attorney General acting on his own
behalf or at the request of the Secretary of State - to petition the court which
held the individual extraditable. It is unfortunate that the Act does not define
"good cause," since this is a nebulous standard. The Act also leaves somewhat
unclear whether the dismissal or release after thirty days is mandatory or peremp-
tory considering that the Attorney General could oppose it upon a showing
of good cause. Furthermore, it is rather unusual that the tolling of the thirty
days does not commence upon notice but upon an act which may not be com-
municated to the party expected to take measures depending upon it. It is also
interesting to note that notice of the relator's petition for dissolution of the
extradition order is to be sent to the Secretary of State, without mention of
the need to also notify the Attorney General.
Thus, although the Act attempts to allocate roles to the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General, it unfortunately is not as clear and comprehensive
42*S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(c); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3196(c); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3196(c).
4 0
3d
'"
4 H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3194(i); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(i); H.R. 6046, supra note 5,
§ 3194(i); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(i).
" H.R. 3347, upra note 8, § 3196(c)(1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(c)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3196(c)(1). iowever, it further requires that surrender be performed within thirty days from the court's
certification of its transcript if the relator has waived the extradition hearing. H.R. 3347, supra note 8,
§ 3196(c)(2); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(c)(2); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3196(c)(2). The original
House bill, H.R. 5227, contained no limitation on the-relator's removal in either situation.
06H.R. 3347, supra note 8, §§ 3194(i), 3196(c); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, §§ 3194(i), 3196(c); H.R. 6046,
supra note 5, §§ 3194(i), 3196(c); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(i).
407Id.
*01d
[Vol. 17:4
72
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss4/1
as it should be in this regard. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that in practice
it will not necessarily create confusion or conflict with respect to the roles of
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.
XXI. TRANSIT EXTRADITION
A section regarding transit extradition is included in the House version4 19
but not in the Senate's. 4 1 1 It provides for cooperation between the United States
and other governments in the transit extradition of persons going through United
States territory. Such a provision is not present in existing legislation. The pro-
cedure applies to individuals who have been found extraditable in a country
other than the United States and who are being delivered to a country other
than the United States, but whose surrender requires passage or transit through
the United States. During such transit the person in question would be in the
custody of agents of a foreign government and therefore held in custody in
the United States without judicial authority. During such transit that individual
could file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus charging that his detention
in the United States is without legal authority. In order to prevent the filing
of such petitions, this provision seeks to create statutory authority for the
Attorney General to hold a person in custody for not more than ten days until
arrangements are made for the continuation of such person's transit. Though
this provision had been recommended to the House and Senate by this writer,'I
it was also recommended by this writer that the Attorney General obtain a court
order based on some documentation and a request from the foreign govern-
ment seeking permission for a transit, but that requirement was not included.
The Act thus gives the Attorney General a right of detention without judicial
process which on its face appears unconstitutional. ' In any event it could be
challenged by means of petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
XXII. RECEIPT OF A PERSON FROM A FOREIGN STATE
The Senate and House versions of the Act contain virtually identical
provisions for the receipt of a person from a foreign state."1 3 The section
in both bills provides for the authority of the Attorney General to appoint
"'The House Bill provides
The United States may cooperate in the transit through the territory of the United States of
a person in custody for extradition from one foreign state to another foreign state. The Attorney
General may hold such person in custody for not more than ten days until arrangements are made
for the continuation of such person's transit.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3197; H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3197; H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3197. There
is no equivalent provision in H.R. 5227.
"A recommendation that the new legislation contain a provision for transit extradition was made by this
writer before the Senate and House Judiciary Committee Hearings on the proposed Act. See Senate Judiciary
Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 23; House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 106.
'"See supra note 410.
"'At the least, the provision would violate the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution requiring
probable cause for an arrest.
'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3197; S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3197; S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3197; H.R.
3347, supra note 8, § 3198; H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3198; H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3198; H.R. 5227,
supra note 2, § 3197.
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an agent to receive from a foreign government custody of a person accused
of a federal, state, or local offense. ' 14 While it would appear that this provi-
sion relates to the receipt of a person held extraditable to the United States
pursuant to a treaty of extradition and a formal process, it is not so specified.4 15
Consequently, this provision may appear to simply allow the Attorney General
to receive custody of any individual irrespective of whether this is accomplished
within the framework of extradition. Presumably the courts in interpreting this
provision will be controlled by the title of the Act and interpret it to be limited
to receipt of custody of a person held extraditable to the United States.
In addition, the provision specifically authorizes receipt of a person accused
of a federal, state, or local offense on the condition that such person shall be
returned to the foreign state upon determination of the criminal proceedings
held against him in the United States."1 6 This procedure has long been advocated
by this writer."1 7 The purpose here is to allow a person who is in the custody
of a foreign government to be brought back to the United States for trial and
to be returned to the foreign government for his detention there without having
to await his release from detention by that government before commencing
criminal proceedings against him in the United States. TIA clearly will assist
prosecutions in the United States which might otherwise become stale if the
individual is permitted to await determination of his sentence in the foreign
country before his return to the United States to face criminal charges.
Regrettably there is no reverse provision which permits the extradition of
a person from the United States to a foreign government for the same purpose,
though nothing precludes the conditional surrender of a person to a requesting
state after an order of extraditability for purposes limited to his trial in that
country and for his return thereafter to the United States for the execution
of his sentence.
XXIII. DISSOLUTION OF AN EXTRADITION ORDER
Under the House bill, if after forty-five days from the date of receipt by
the Secretary of State of the certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings,
the government, in this case the Attorney General, takes no appeal or, if after
forty-five days after the issuance of final order of the appellate court has been
entered, the Secretary of State has not decided to surrender the relator, the
relator can petition the court, with notice to the Secretary of State who informs
" 'S. 220, supra note 7, § 3197(a); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3197(a); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3197(a); H.R.
3347, supra note 8, § 3198(a); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3198(a); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3198(a);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3197(a). Under current practice, it is the Secretary of State rather than the
Attorney General who has the authority to appoint agents. See 18 U.S.C. § 3192 (1976); Exec. Order
No. 11517, 35 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6232.
"'The Senate and House Judiciary Reports, in their commentaries on this section, refer to the process
of extradition, but do not specifically limit the authority to such process. See Senate Judiciary Report
on S. 1940, supra note 15, at 23-24; House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 33.
"'This procedure is now statutorily regulated at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4107-08 (1976).
"'See Bassiouni, International Procedures for the Apprehension and Rendition of Fugitive Offenders,
74 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 273 (1980).
[Vol. 17:4
74
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss4/1
the Attorney General (but no direct notice to the Attorney General), for dissolu-
tion of the extraditability order.4 1 8 The Attorney General may then petition
the court for an extension of time, presumably for good cause though the
grounds are not defined, and the court is admonished not to grant further ex-
tensions of time without causation . ' 9 This provision resembles a speedy trial
provision, ' 2 ° but it is unclear whether it is mandatory or peremptory. While
it appears reasonable for the United States to establish time limits and guidelines
on the surrender of individuals to requesting states, it would seem also appro-
priate that such time limits be couched in more discretionary terms, particularly
if they are so short in duration.
XXIV. RULES OF COURT AND COSTS
The House bill, but not the Senate, contains a provision regarding rules
of the court. 42' This section provides, for the first time in the history of extra-
dition legislation, for the Supreme Court of the United States to prescribe rules
of practice and procedure with respect to any and all proceedings under this
Act. Such rules of procedure and practice are not to take effect until presented
to Congress by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or after the beginning
of a regular session of Congress, but no later than the first day of May and
until the expiration of 180 days after they have been thus reported. This
legislative delegation of authority to the Supreme Court is to follow similar
provisions concerning the Supreme Court's authority with respect to rules of
practice and procedure in civil and criminal matters under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is therefore
assumed that the delegation of authority being the same, its parameters are
also to be the same.
This provision permits the Supreme Court to close the many legislative
gaps in the Act discussed contextually above, and to clarify legislative
ambiguities, thus avoiding protracted litigation and conflicting court decisions
which would keep the early cases under the Act in litigation for a number of
years and defeat its avowed purpose of streamlining and accelerating the pro-
cess. Because of the lacunaes in the legislation as identified above, the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court may truly become supplemental legisla-
tion. However, in view of the many areas of the law competing for the Supreme
"'See H.R. 3347, supra note 8, §§ 3194(i), 3196(C); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, §§ 3194(i), 3196(c); H.R.
6046, supra note 5, §§ 3194(c), 3196(c); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3194(c).
"'Id.
4"'See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
'
2
'The bill states:
The Supreme Court of the United States shall prescribe, from time to time, rules of practice
and procedure with respect to any or all proceedings under this chapter. The Supreme Court may
fix the dates when such rules shall take effect, except that such rules shall not take effect until
they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular
session thereof but not later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of one hundred
and eighty days after they have been thus reported.
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3199(f); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199(f); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199(f);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3198(f).
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Court's attention, it is not very likely that it will intervene before the problems
relating to this Act increase in number and lag in time. Hopefully the Advisory
Committee will have the benefit of experienced scholars and practitioners.
The Act also provides that transportation costs, presumably those of the
relator and witnesses, subsistence expenses of the same and translation costs
incurred by the United States government with respect to an extradition re-
quest shall be borne by the requesting government unless otherwise specified
by the applicable treaty.422 Nevertheless, the Secretary of State has the
unreviewable discretion to direct otherwise, in which case costs may be borne
by the United States. 23
XXV. THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY AND CONDITIONAL EXTRADITION
The Act provides that if the return of the relator to the requesting state
is "incompatible with humanitarian considerations," the Secretary of State will
have the discretion (unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act4 24),
to determine whether the relator should be returned to the requesting state.4 "
It thus adds nothing new to existing law and practice, since the Secretary has
executive discretion in any instance where extradition of a relator from the
United States has been requested. 26
United States courts have so far refused to inquire into the processes by
which a requested state secures evidence of probable cause to request extradi-
tion, or the means by which a criminal conviction is obtained in a foreign state,
or into the penal treatment to which a relator may be subjected upon extradi-
tion. Even habeas corpus is not a valid means of inquiry into the treatment
the relator is anticipated to receive in the requesting state.2 7
The test of the rule of non-inquiry is applied in cases where the relator
is likely to encounter such treatment in the requesting state that it is likely to
4
1S. 220, supra note 7, § 3198(b); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3198(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3198(b);
H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3199(e); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199(e), H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199(e);
H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3198(e).
42
'Id
4245 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1976).
"
2
'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a)(3)(B); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 319 4 (g)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1,
§ 3194(a); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3194(e)(4)(B); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3194(e)(3)(B); H.R. 5227,
supra note 2, § 3194(e)(1)(B). H.R. 3347 also permits the court to deny extradition for this reason. See
supra note 300. This section of the Act is discussed supra at notes 375-94 and accompanying text.
"2'See generally 2 M.C. BASsiouNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at Chap. IX.
"2'See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109. The rule of non-inquiry is brought into sharp focus in the line of
cases dealing with convictions in absentia. In such cases, the United States follows the general practice
in international law that convictions in absentia are not conclusive to the individual's guilt but are regarded
as equivalent to indictments or formal charges against the individual sought to be extradited. A careful
reading of the decisions applying the rule of non-inquiry in such cases reveals that while the courts prefer
not to inquire into the treatment to be received by the relator upon surrender or the quality of justice
he or she is expected to receive, there is nonetheless in some instances a finding of nonextraditability on
"other grounds." See Exparte Fudera, 162 F. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), appeal dismissed, 219 U.S. 589 (1911);
Exparte La Mantia, 206 F. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); In re Mylones, 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
See also Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258.
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be deemed significantly offensive to the minimum standards of justice, treat-
ment of individuals and preservation of basic human rights, as perceived by
the requested state. Thus, the surrender of a relator, whether a United States
citizen or not, is unimpaired by the absence in the requesting state of those
specific safeguards available in the United States legal system and therefore
no judicial inquiry into the requesting state's legal system is permitted.' 28
There is, however, based on increasing dicta in the court opinions reason
to believe that the rule of non-inquiry could be eroded given the appropriate
case.'2 9 This could arise in two types of cases: (1) where the evidence presented
by a requested state is the product of a serious violation of due process (such
as torture), the court could give no weight or even refuse to admit that evidence;
and, (2) where there is evidence that the individual may be subject to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment in the requesting state, the court could refuse
to order the relator's extradition. Such a holding could easily rely on existing
international instruments binding upon the United States. Among these inter-
national instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 30 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,'31 the Inter-American Con-
vention on Human Rights'3 2 and others.'41
Finally, it should be noted that the 1967 Protocol on Refugees no longer
permits a court to rely on the rule of non-inquiry to refuse inquiry into the
possible persecution of the relator once returned to the requesting state.34
Thus, it would have been preferable for the Act to provide for limited
judicial inquiry into the treatment or punishment to which a relator may be
subjected upon return to the requesting state. Such an amendment is suggested
for two reasons: (1) the provision should take into account that certain prac-
tices of corporal punishment or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment are contrary to United States public policy as well as contrary to
internationally protected norms of human rights; and (2) the provision should
not specifically state that discretion is given to the Secretary of State, because
"
2 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211; Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77. A requesting state's internal procedures
will only be examined when they are antithetical to the federal court's sense of decency. U.S. ex rel.
Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925.
"'See Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d at 78-79; Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 856 (1980), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1027 (1980); Escobedo v. United States, 621 F.2d 1098.
"
30G.A. Res. 217 A (III) U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)..
"'G.A. Res 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316.
"O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (english 1979).
"
33E.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept.
3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. No. 5; Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture,
Feb. 1, 1978, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO 213, now under U.N. consideration. See also Bassiouni & Derby,
An Appraisal of Torture in International Law and Practice: The Need for an International
Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, 48 REV. INT'L DE DROIT PENAL 23 (1977).See
also U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS DUCUMENTS:
COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS (comm. Print Sept. 1983).
4
'
4See supra notes 379-87 and accompanying text.
Spring, 19841 EXTRADITION
77
Bassiouni: Extradition
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
this could place the United States in a position of embarrassment vis a vis a
foreign government and could burden relations between the United States and
that government.
For example, the Act could contain the following proposed language:
Upon a prima facie showing by the requested person that he or she is
likely to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, extradition shall not be granted unless the requesting state shall pre-
sent to the Secretary of State satisfactory assurances that such treatment
or punishment shall not be imposed; or where a treaty between the United
States and the requesting state for transfer of prisoners exists, that the
extradition shall be conditional upon the return of the relator upon con-
viction for the execution of the sentence in the United States. The Secretary
of State shall negotiate these conditions in accordance with section 3196
and their terms shall be presented to the court and made part of the order.
Only in the most egregious cases shall the court deny extradition. The
Secretary of State may in any event exercise his discretion after a finding
of extraditability by the court.""
Like the political offense exception, this provision was hotly debated in
the Senate and House, and the Administration took a strong position against
giving the judiciary any discretion in the matter.
XXVI. THE PRINCIPLE OF SPECIALTY AND RE-EXTRADITION
The Act contains no specific provision embodying the principle of specialty,
which is well established in United States jurisprudence. 36 This principle stands
for the proposition that the requesting state which secures the surrender of a
person can prosecute that person only for the offense for which he or she was
surrendered by the requested state, or else allow that person an opportunity
to leave the prosecuting state to which he or she had been surrendered. The
same limitation exists on re-extradition from an originally requesting state to
another state."37 These requirements are designed to insure the United States
that its treaty relations and legal processes are not used for a purpose different
'"These observations and suggestions were also made by this writer at congressional hearings in various
versions of the Act. See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 3, at 21; House Judiciary Hearings
on H.R. 5227, supra note 4, at 100, 104-05; House Foreign Affairs Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 27.
4"See Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, Jan. 25, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656,
art. 17; Treaty Between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, Aug. 29, 1980, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9785, art. 32. See also Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64 (1899); Johnson v.
Brown, 205 U.S. 309 (1907); Greene v. United States, 154 F. 401 (5th Cir. 1907); Collins v. O'Neil, 214
U.S. 113 (1909); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962); Fiocconi v. United States, 462
F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); McGann v. U.S. Board of Parole, 488 F.2d 39 (3rd Cir 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974), reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 927 (1974); United States v. Rossi, 545 F.2d
814 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1976);
Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195
(D.D.C. 1979).
"'TSee generally 1 M.C. BAssiouNI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 12, at ch. VII, § 6.
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than the one which is specified in the applicable treaty.
The Act implicitly considers the applicability of the principle of specialty
only in its section regarding the relator's waiver of the extradition hearing,'38
but does not provide for the rule's applicability to other aspects of the extradi-
tion process. Although it can be presumed that this lack of clear legislative
guideline does not affect jurisprudential precedent recognizing this principle,
it would have been preferable to include in the Act a specific provision
embodying it.
While the rule is ostensibly intended to benefit the extraditing state, as
is reflected in the proposed texts of the Act, it is also intended to protect the
relator by preventing prosecution on the basis of physical presence without a
showing of probable cause to the satisfaction of the requested state (in this
case, the United States). The principle must also be interpreted in light of con-
ditional extradition and re-extradition. The former applies in the case where
the United States would only conditionally extradite a person for a specific
crime. 439 The latter limits re-extradition to a third state without specific
authorization from the originally requested state (in this case, the United States),
without a showing of probable cause.
A proposed text is as follows:
A returned person shall not be prosecuted, punished or re-extradited while
under prosecution or punishment in the requesting state without the specific
approval of the Secretary of State who may at his discretion authorize
any variance in prosecution or punishment in the requesting state or re-
extradition upon a showing of probable cause."0
XXVII. CONCLUSION
The analysis made hereinabove shows the differences between the Senate
and House verions, and the differences with or conformity to existing legisla-
tion and existing jurisprudence. The House version goes beyond the Senate's
in closing certain gaps, but even so, it is hoped that when the House considers
the present bill or a revised version thereof that it takes into consideration some
of the observations made herein, and certainly others that interested commen-
tators may point out. This is a unique historic opportunity to enact new legisla-
4'See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3193; S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3193; S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3193; H.R.
3347, supra note 8, § 3193; H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3193; H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3193; H.R. 5227,
supra note 2, § 3193. See also House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 12. The section
regarding waiver is discussed supra at notes 187-212.
"1'The Act provides for conditional extradition as part of the Secretary of State's executive discretion.
See S. 220, supra note 7, § 3196(a)(3)(B); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3194(g)(2); S. 1639, supra note 1, §
3194(a); H.R. 3347, supra note 8, § 3196(b); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3196(b); H.R. 6046, supra note
5, § 3196(b); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3196(b). It is discussed supra at notes 338-90 and accompanying
text, and also discussed with respect to the rule of non-inquiry supra at notes 424-35 and accompanying text.
"'These suggestions were made by this writer at congressional hearings on various versions of the Act.
See Senate Judiciary Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 24, at 20; House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 5227,
supra note 4, at 103; House Foreign Affairs Hearings on H.R. 6046, supra note 27.
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tion that will provide for more effective and swift extradition proceedings
without unduly sacrificing fundamental human rights embodied in international
standards and in United States constitutional law and policy as interpreted and
applied in criminal cases.
No extradition bill is expected to pass in this legislature because of differ-
ing positions on the political offense exception, the rule of non-inquiry and
the bail provisions. The lines are drawn between the Administration and its
supporters, principally in the Senate, and those deemed "liberal" in the House.
The differences are technically not so wide, but the feelings run strong among
different protagonists of different views. Regrettably a needed reform cannot
pass because of opposing idealogical positions, and the introduction in a
technical area, of a variety of political considerations which are of very limited
significance to the overwhelming majority of cases. Only bail is an issue that
affects most, if not all, extradition cases. The political offense exception has
been granted only three times in the past thirty years. 4' The rule of non-inquiry
has, in fact, always been upheld in the United States.
"'See McMullen note 46, Mackin, supra note 45, and the latest case, in the matter of William Joseph
Quinn, C 82-6688 R.P.A. (N.D. Cal.) opinion of Robert P. Aguillar, Oct. 3, 1983, holding the "political
offense exception" to apply. Pending before the Ninth Circuit, docket No. 83-2455.
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